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ABSTRACT
The aim of this dissertation is to address the importance and significance of Heidegger's
engagement with the Greeks and the ways in which his views are commensurate with
ecofeminism and the insights that a study of that intersection provides. I defend the
thesis that a proper return to myth and art as a means by which the transcendental realities
that constitute the phenomenology of our embodied existence may be better understood is
what may allow us to truly dwell in the Heideggerian sense and live full lives rich in
meaning and value. My methodology might best be described as a look at certain issues
of contemporary significance through the creative examination of historical texts using a
phenomenological hermeneutics of comparative philosophy. By examining key concepts
in Heidegger’s thinking and their role in ancient philosophy, as well, I establish an
alternative conception of truth and what that concept reveals. This is further made clear
by examining Heidegger’s thoughts on the poet and poetry and the role and purpose it
should play. I then bring in the ecofeminist critique, highlighting the relevant
intersections with Heidegger, then lay out criticisms raised by Nietzsche and compare
differences in thought between Nietzsche and Heidegger as explained by Iain Thomson.
A look at the mythological figure of Lilith and how the thought of Giorgio Agamben
provides further insight and an undeniable co-incidence of relevant concepts further
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solidify the common goal and project of both Heidegger and Ecofeminism, especially as
articulate by Trish Glazebrook. I conclude with a call for the overthrow of our strict
system of binaries, and I advocate that in the discipline of environmental philosophy
there is a third alternative to the binaries of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism that
answers the objections and shortcomings of each of the binaries. This I call
Daseincentrism.
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Introduction
Numerous attempts have been made and are made daily to understand our current
realities, to make sense of our human existence, our experiences both collective and
individual. Such attempts, made in earnest and with the utmost sincerity, can easily
overwhelm even those with the most adept powers of reasoning and the most resilient
emotional being, and even more so if one considers the vast number of approaches,
disciplines, thinkers, traditions, and perspectives from which one might begin such
thinking. Thoughtful persons tend to agree that in some way or another human existence
seems sorely afflicted. Things are just not right or as they should be, ought to be, might
be, or could be. Something is amiss, something is missing, something is wrong. Human
beings, it appears, either have never known or have forgotten how to truly and fully dwell
upon the earth, how to meaningfully exist as that which we are in the context of all that
exists and to which we are intimately related. This project presupposes this to be a
readily observable and recognized phenomenon to which the project itself is a response,
both in the sense of providing understanding and exposition and in the sense of possible
amelioration. While I will not argue for the theoretical supremacy of my approach, I do
hope that the approach will speak for itself in terms of its being meaningful, useful,
illuminating, and perhaps even somehow making a difference.
The path down which we will travel in this undertaking takes its start from Martin
Heidegger's passionate engagement with the Greeks, his understanding of their unique
mode of and relation to being and the resultant glorious existence that the Greeks
experienced. In our exploration of Heidegger's thought, we will discover the hints and
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suggestions that will, if we are able to allow them to assist and direct us, set us on our
way to possibly achieving a mode of being in the world that will not be the mode
possessed by the Greeks but may be understood as even more glorious. For, as we will
see, greatness and fulfillment of being is neither something found in some linear past now
gone forever, nor is it something found in some linear future toward which we inevitably
move, but rather it is always and continuously present, awaiting revelation by means of a
special negation, the negation of our nihilistic mechanistic materialist mindset, our longentrenched ways of conceptualizing self and other, our denial of immanent divinity, our
reduction of humans, animals, and nature to mere resources waiting to be optimized, in
short, our “modern” mode of being. This negation, this saving cessation, brings about
that which we can understand in one sense as an emptying of mind, the creation of the
necessary condition for the flowing-in of that which is itself the source of meaning and
glory, and the cultivation of what Heidegger calls “meditative thinking,” a thinking that is
the necessary condition for our attainment of true dwelling as mortals, upon the earth,
beneath the sky, and in communion with divinity. This negation may be understood to be
synonymous with Heidegger’s “clearing” [die Lichtung] that allows being to reveal itself
and understanding to take place. Through the explorations involved in this project, we
will come to more fully fathom why it is that Heidegger esteems the poet and the artist in
the way he does and why indeed he sees art and myth as not just necessary tools for better
living but as means that are glorious ends in themselves. (Here just let me point out that
the use of terms like “means” and “ends” is somewhat misleading in that it presupposes a
metaphysics that, as we will come to see, places a limitation upon what is in essence a
fullness beyond measure.)
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Our journey will begin with our exploration of Heidegger, his ideas, and some of the
most relevant ancient ideas with which he engages. We will then be introduced to the
philosophy of ecofeminism and get acquainted with each of its four core tenants and
various insights each provides. We will then proceed to examine some of Nietzsche’s
ideas that resonate with and reflect thinking similar to ecofeminism. From there we will
turn to look at a specific figure in Judaeo-Christian mythology, the figure of Lilith,
through the lens of philosopher Giorgio Agamben and his interesting and illuminating
concepts of homo sacer and the state of exception. We will make connections with our
previously laid out ideas and employ Agamben’s insights throughout the remainder of
our query. We will then find our way back to Nietzsche and Heidegger and an important
difference between them that when understood properly easily lends itself to the
ecofeminist project in offering us a transcendental ethical realism and a resultant
humanistic perfectionism that is not your average anthropocentrism. Next we will revisit
the ecofeminist perspective by acquainting ourselves with some specific terminology
relevant to this project via an engagement with the ecofeminist thinker and Heidegger
scholar, Trish Glazebrook. We will then bring together some ideas to help us move
beyond the binary. We shall wrap up our journey by coming round full circle to connect
back again with Heidegger and ideas laid out early on. In doing so, we will hopefully see
the ways in which we have indeed gained a clearer and more concrete sense of what
“meditative thinking” looks like, its importance for dwelling, its connection to myth, and
the role that myth and art can and do play for us, all such that we are able to envision a
possible new world in which we may fully dwell.
Is our path then to be linear and to the point? No. It cannot be. But, as will hopefully
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become clear as we meander, by no means are any of our steps wasted. There is not a
simple and straight path by means of which we can make this journey, as I hope to show
via the various vantage points from which we will be taking in the view along the way, a
view that, when seen from the differing vantage points, reveals how our understanding is
increased through multiple perspectives and demonstrates the need for continuous
augmentation, organic and dynamic as it is. In discussing the views and ideas of various
thinkers and traditions, it will be done with an aim toward taking what is most
enlightening from each and putting it to use in order to better illuminate a new pathway
of understanding. In other words, “Rather than endlessly restaging the old debates
between the masters, however, we do better to follow the spirit of the ecophenomenological movement by working creatively to appropriate their thinking for
ourselves.”1

Iain Thomson, “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental
Philosophy,” 400.
1
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Heidegger and the Greeks

II.1. A-letheia
The Greeks, for Heidegger, are exemplary. Their way of life and existence, as Heidegger
understood them, was ontologically unique. They existed and lived with and within
something exceedingly vital, perhaps even best understood as superlatively vivifying, yet
they did so without explicitly articulating it. They did not analyse it, nor did they seek to
conceptualize and intellectualize it as a modality of existence, since that would require
the existence of other modalities as well as a consciousness of them. The Greeks, as
Heidegger understood them, were blessed with what we can think of as an innate
situatedness in being that allowed them to experience existence in the fullest possible
way, yet this paradoxically required them to be subject to a special oblivion of sorts, as
well. It was this very special oblivion that allowed them to exist in such close proximity
to the source of intelligibility which Heidegger understands as having been in continuous
withdrawal from humankind since the time of the Greeks. This vital thing that has
continued to retreat into the realm of the obscure has by no means, however, ceased to
exist. Rather, it has become concealed, hidden, occulted, obscured, but in a very real
sense is it no less immanent to the intelligible order that it continues to make possible.
The idea of something existent yet hidden is, in fact, central to the Greeks' own
conceptualization of truth. The idea of that which is present yet concealed is what
constitutes the Greek concept of truth understood as a-letheia, literally translated as unforgetting or un-concealing. The myths involving the river Lethe can be instructive on
understanding this, and I will explore these elsewhere. This particular understanding of
5

truth, this metaphysics of truth, this understanding of the nature of reality, is of
paramount importance to Heidegger's thinking, derived as it is from a phenomenology of
existence. The idea of that which is real and present yet occulted, I contend, is in fact a
single thread which runs throughout and unifies a great deal of Heidegger's most original
thinking. This essential notion of concealed and unconcealed, as that which characterizes
all that is most central to our existence, is integral not only to the concept of truth, or aletheia, but also, as I will attempt to show, to virtually every other of the most intriguing
concepts in Heidegger's thought, such as the relationship between “earth” and “world,”
the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, his understanding of poiesis, art, poetry,
and the poet's relationship to the divine, to the thinker, and to humanity as a whole, as
well as myth itself, and its rightful place, according to Heidegger, as that which is central
to human life in our attempt to attain to real dwelling.
In the spirit of Heidegger's emphasis on the active receptivity of Gelassenheit or
"releasement," I believe that our endeavor to make sense of some of the more seemingly
esoteric strands of Heidegger's thought is made easier if we first open ourselves to
receiving this concept of the integral nature of concealment with unconcealment, and thus
allow it to be our guiding word, so to speak. Again, this concept that we are attempting
to fathom in a general way, if understood and accepted, will in turn allow us to see how it
permeates, inheres within, or otherwise weaves together in essence the various aforementioned important concepts in Heidegger's thinking. Perhaps before attempting to
spell out what it is, we should be clear on what it is not. This idea of concealed and
unconcealed should not be thought of as a pair of opposites. It should not be thought of
as thesis and antithesis, nor as a proposition and its negation. Rather, it may be thought
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of as a pair of interdependent complements but without the notion of a distinct dividing
line between the two which constitute the "pair." Perhaps a more realistic imagistic
conceptualization would yield something like a circular continuum on which at each of
the two 180 degree points one would find what we call "concealment" and
"unconcealment" while in between would be all manner of degrees of the two in their
intermingling and integral interrelatedness.
In more physical and material terms, one may try to better grasp truth as a-letheia or
un-concealing in a practical manner in the following way: imagine you are standing in
front of a tree. You want to know about the tree, let's say. You want to know the truth
about it. Well, you can undertake to very diligently pursue a view of all its parts, inside
and out. However, notice that when you are looking at one part of the tree, a different
part of the tree is not available to your view. It isn't any less true or any less real, but it is
concealed. When you move to bring a concealed part of the tree into view, thus bringing
it into unconcealment, the other part becomes concealed from your view. The roots may
even remain concealed. Of course, we must keep in mind that the crucial difference (if
indeed there be one) between a tree and truth is that the former is finite, and the latter, as
will be explained in more detail soon, is infinite.2
Heidegger's embrace of and emphasis upon the Greeks and their concept of a-letheia
is important to him because his own understanding is one in which everything is

One might respond here by asking, “Isn’t the intelligibility of the tree also infinite?” My point
was not so much to get a final answer on the finitude or infinitude of the tree per se but to make
clear that truth, as it is being set forth, is to be understood as infinite. One can see, I believe, that the tree as
a material object is finite, at least in certain very real practical regards. Of course, were we to venture off
into new physics and atoms and particles and wave collapse, etc., things are more complicated. We could
also make the case that there are infinite ways in which the tree may be understood.
2
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ultimately constituted by this essential reality of concealed and unconcealed. Of course,
for Heidegger, the Greeks were special not only because this essential fullness was their
lived reality, but because they lived it without making it explicit, analyzing it, and setting
it forth conceptually in conscious opposition to something else. That very unique and
special situation that the Greeks occupied in relation to this matter, although it can never
be recovered now that it has been lost, is a situation that Heidegger believes may be
approximated by means of proper understanding and effort--albeit with a few obvious
differences. Regarding the unique situation of the Greeks in terms of their relationship to
a-letheia or concealedness and unconcealedness, Heidegger says:
[F]or the Greeks the mutual counter-essence of aletheia and lethe was
experienced originally. We might therefore expect that this essential
correlation between aletheia and lethe would also, in a correspondingly
original way, be thought through by the Greeks and posed in thinking.
This expectation is not fulfilled. The Greeks never did explicitly think
through aletheia and lethe with regard to their essence and the ground of
their essence, since already, i.e., prior to all thinking and poetizing, these
pervade the to-be-thought as its "essence." The Greeks think and poetize
and "deal" within the essence of aletheia and lethe, but they do not think
and poetize about this essence and they do not "deal" with it. For the
Greeks it suffices to be claimed by aletheia itself and to be encompassed
by it. It is a sign of the necessity ruling its essence that Greek humanity, at
its inception, does not need to think about the essence of aletheia (and of
lethe). And when, at the time of the close of the Greek world, in a certain
sense a thinking "about" aletheia is inaugurated, then this inauguration is
precisely a sign of that imminent closing. But the history of the modern
world and its generations is much different.3
Here we see that Heidegger understands the Greeks as having existed in intimate
relatedness to this central aspect of existence, but in a way that we might best describe as
an existence of purely unreflective awareness. In other words, the Greeks were not
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Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 8.
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engaging in reflecting upon their unreflective awareness and experience. In this regard,
they could better be described as simply being in flow with that reality. The distinction
between what I am calling “being in flow with that reality” versus being engaged in a
reflective awareness of it may be understood by thinking of what it is like to engage in an
activity of embodiment versus what it is like to reflect upon that engagement. For
example, it is one thing to ride a bicycle. It is quite another to think about riding a
bicycle. Moreover, riding a bicycle may well be made more difficult if one attempts to
think about it and do it at the same time. The same can be said for any number of
embodied activities of a certain sort, such as snow skiing, skating, snowboarding,
dancing, swimming, etc. It is here that we should probably refresh ourselves with
something from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception to help make
clearer our meaning:
The world is there before any possible analysis of mine, and it would be
artificial to make it the outcome of a series of syntheses . . . When I begin
to reflect my reflection bears upon an unreflective experience; moreover
my reflection cannot be unaware of itself as an event, and so it appears to
itself in the light of a truly creative act, of a changed structure of
consciousness, and yet it has to recognize, as having priority over its own
operations, the world which is given to the subject, because the subject is
given to himself. The real has to be described, not constructed or formed.
Which means that I cannot put perception into the same category as the
syntheses represented by judgements, acts or predications.4
There are many activities of embodiment that, as such, are really best understood not as
"judgements, acts or predications" but as "perceptions." The aforementioned activities of
skiing, dancing, etc., may certainly fall into this category. For a better understanding of
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, x.
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the idea of an activity of embodiment being a "perception," let us look at something else
Merleau-Ponty says about using a cane or walking-stick:
Learning to find one’s way among things with a stick, which we gave a
little earlier as an example of motor habit, is equally an example of
perceptual habit. Once the stick has become a familiar instrument, the
world of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer skin of
the hand, but at the end of the stick.5
In the same way that one encounters the world as unreflective experience or engages in
an activity of embodiment without reflecting upon it or habitually uses a stick as an
extension of the hand as means of simple perception, the Greeks lived within a-letheia
and lethe without reflecting upon it, it was simply part of what Merleau-Ponty would call
their perception. This, I believe, is what Heidegger has in mind when he stresses that the
Greeks thought and poetized within the essence of a-letheia. There was no reflecting
upon that unreflective experience, no conceptual analysis thereof, and no attempts to
understand and articulate it. A-letheia was the real, as Heidegger put it; it was the world
which was given to the Greeks. And that is precisely what Heidegger means when he
says that the Greeks did not "deal" with a-letheia but dealt within it. Of course, for us,
being already engaged in reflection, the best we can do is try to imagine what it would be
like to not so much deal with concealedness and unconcealedness but to deal within it, for
clearly in our modern and late-modern worlds, we have already been subject to that
"changed structure of consciousness" and put in a position where we must "deal" with it.
The key, I contend in agreement with Heidegger, and as I hope to show, is to return as
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception, 152.
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best we can to an encounter with the real so as to describe it as it is and take our start
from there.
In an attempt to approach more closely this concept of concealedness and
unconcealedness as it appears in Heidegger, it may well be instructive to consider ideas
regarding “truth” set forth by Jean-Paul Sartre in his The Anti-Semite and the Jew. In the
piece, Sartre attempts to explain what it is that makes an anti-semite an anti-semite, or
more generally, what makes a bigot a bigot. His explanation involves the workings of a
cluster of specific fears that together serve to create a bigot by means of the bigot’s own
response to them. Central to his explanation, however, is the very concept of truth itself,
and the way in which a bigot fears truth. Sartre explains that the bigot longs for
impenetrability and stasis due to his fear of change and his subsequent need for
something immutable. But to say that the bigot fears truth in general is to miss the more
subtle but crucial reality of the situation, the phenomenological experience of truth itself.
Sartre explains that the bigot fears not the content of truth but its very form, for the form
of truth, according to Sartre, is infinite.6 Here, we can understand the encounter with the
infinitude of truth as phenomenologically akin to facing death or to gazing into the abyss,
in that each of these are encounters with something necessarily beyond comprehension
and adequation. By contemplating such things, we can gain some perspective as to how
one experiences existence itself.
The bigot, for Sartre, is someone who wishes to be in possession of complete and
immutable truth because he cannot deal with the prospect of the truth not being finite.

6

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Anti-Semite and the Jew, 18.
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His basically fear-driven modality of being simply cannot entertain the prospect of the
truth not being something which he may possess in totality in so far as he desperately
needs something unchanging upon which he may rely to quell his fears and anxiety. As
Sartre explains, the bigot is afraid of freedom and longs for the security that he believes
comes from submission (enslavement?) to an unwavering truth. Sartre makes clear that a
bigot will even ignore evidence that points to an error in his beliefs or thinking, so frantic
and thoroughgoing is his need to be right and in possession of the truth. Thus, he may
well be said to forego authentic being-toward-death and to refuse "to learn." Of course,
understanding and accepting truth as infinite presupposes an acknowledgement of the
finitude of human existence, and that acknowledgement entails the idea that what would
constitute being rational, as Sartre explains, is that a man have an attitude of openness
toward truth, understanding as he does, that truth exceeds him necessarily. This dynamic
experience which is the emergence of truth as content from truth in its infinite form is the
very play and movement that constitutes the unconcealing and concealing that is aletheia. Such dynamism and mutability are the conditions that allow for truth as that
which is infinite in its form to perpetually reveal itself in new and different ways. This
idea is captured nicely in Iain Thomson's Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity when he
explains: "For, it remains possible for being to continue to become newly intelligible only
if it cannot ever become fully intelligible."7
As mentioned above, Sartre explains that the reaction of the bigot, when faced with
truth as infinite, is to misuse reason. Sartre stresses that a bigot, as such, misuses reason
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Iain Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, 76.
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in a very real sense in that he takes his hypothesis as truth and interprets all evidence in
its light, ignoring and outright dismissing any evidence that would call into question his
own beliefs. Sartre states: "[T]hey wish to lead the kind of life wherein reasoning and
research play only a subordinate role, wherein one seeks only what he has already found,
wherein one becomes only what he already was."8 This reduction, what can be
understood as an erroneous simplification of infinite truth to finite knowledge, is
precisely what Heidegger seeks to avoid in developing the various concepts that are most
central to his thought, all of which are tied to the concealed and unconcealed. Thus,
Sartre, in his understanding of both truth as infinite and healthy reason as something
“open” and “receptive,” is in perfect keeping with the views articulated by Heidegger.
They are both in full awareness of the inestimable importance of understanding truth as
essentially constituted by the concealed and unconcealed. To live in accordance with
such truth is to learn.
Sartre's description in The Anti-Semite and the Jew of what constitutes a “reasonable
man” is itself very much in keeping with a description of what it is to be able "to learn"
set forth by Heidegger in his Introduction to Metaphysics. Sartre explains that a
reasonable man is open, tentative even, in his point of view, in that he recognizes that his
held opinions and views are continually subject to revision given new experience and
discovery. This proper use of reason, for Sartre, is in grave contrast to the way a bigot
employs reason.9 The subtlety and nuance of this same idea is developed in a different
way in the thought of Heidegger. In his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger writes:

8
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Jean-Paul Sartre, The Anti-Semite and the Jew, 18.
Ibid.
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But to know means to be able to stand in the truth. Truth is the openness
of beings . . . Merely to have information, however wide-ranging it may
be, is not to know . . . [T]o know means to be able to learn. Of course,
everyday understanding believes that one has knowledge when one needs
to learn nothing more, because one has finished learning. No. The only
one who knows is the one who understands that he must always learn
again, and who above all, on the basis of this understanding, has brought
himself to the point where he continually can learn. This is far harder
than possessing information.10
The notion of truth, once understood as a-letheia, makes incredible sense in that it
resonates with so much of our lived experience. It provides a key to understanding
certain phenomena of existence in that it reveals how things that we may merely sense as
being connected are indeed interwoven despite our inability to see and touch each thread.
Hence, there is the sense one may have that there is indeed a connectivity between things
but that it is seemingly existent behind a veil, just out of reach, and beyond the possibility
of any prehensile capture that would render it fully and completely comprehended or
apprehended in a manner fitting a “modern” understanding.
There is a particular word used by Heidegger that seems to capture much of that to
which we thus allude; that word is Innigkeit. While standard translations of the term
include “sincerity,” “ardor,” and “intimacy,” much thought has been given to the ways in
which Heidegger uses the term and the ways in which we might best translate it in order
to capture his meaning. In an interesting essay, "Translating Innigkeit," in which various
strands of thought relevant to this project seem to merge, Peter Warnek offers an
extended treatment of the concept. In the context of discussing Heidegger's views
regarding translation and interpretation, Warnek calls to mind the important distinction
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Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 23.
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made by Heidegger between “earth” and “world” when he writes, "What is at issue in
such translations is not simply the experiences these words should convey, but rather the
world itself for which these words and the experiences opened up by them play a
constituting role."11 This notion that “world” is conditioned and so never reveals to us
everything is a key part of understanding Innigkeit as “the belonging together of the
strange,” according to Warnek. Moreover, this understanding of the world as conditioned
allows us to see how the concept of Innigkeit captures what I believe is the core of
Heidegger's thought regarding the reality of Da-sein as explained through the concept of
concealed and unconcealed. Warnek speaks to this when he writes:
It thus cannot be said that the goal of the translation of this word consists
simply in rendering the word familiar or comprehensible. The goal of the
translation cannot consist in rendering clear the meaning of the word
because the saying power of the word has to do with the way in which
obscurity can become manifest, precisely as obscure. The Word says or
reveals a necessary concealment in the becoming manifest of things."12

Warnek tells us that, for Heidegger, Innigkeit is a Geheimnis, and that it is not to be
understood simply as the "mystery" of being but "also as the way in which human
dwelling is grounded in a hiddenness, or, said otherwise, the way in which the human
world belongs to the earth."13 The notion that human dwelling is grounded in a
hiddenness can perhaps be illustrated further by looking at Heidegger's discussion of the
fourfold, its “oneness” and its relationship to dwelling, to which we now turn.
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Peter Warnek "Translating Innigkeit: The Belonging Together of the Strange,"59.
`Ibid., 63.
13
Ibid.
12
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II.2. Dwelling and the Fourfold
In his essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," Heidegger tells us: “By a primal oneness
the four—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—belong together in one.”14 Heidegger
emphasizes the “primal oneness” here because, as he goes on to explain, no one part of
the fourfold is ever thought without the other three, yet we might easily forget to give
thought to “the simple oneness of the four.”15 Heidegger explains to us that mortals
assume their rightful place in the fourfold by means of dwelling. He goes on to make
clear that the mortals indeed have a unique role to play in their dwelling in that they
“safeguard the fourfold in its essential unfolding.”16 His meaning here will perhaps be
clearer after some further exploring of the essay.
In dwelling, Heidegger tells us, mortals save the earth. He says: “To save properly
means to set something free into its own essence . . . Saving the earth does not master the
earth and does not subjugate it.”17 This notion of saving as setting something free into its
own essence may be understand more fully in light of something Heidegger says in his
"Letter on Humanism." There he says: “To embrace a “thing” or a “person” in their
essence means to love them, to favor them. Thought in a more original way, such
favoring means the bestowal of their essence as a gift. Such favoring . . . can let
something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be.”18 To save the earth,
mortals must first orient themselves toward it in such a way that the essence of the earth
is recognized. In order to recognize the essence of the earth, mortals must understand
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that the earth does have an essence. The first step in doing this involves an understanding
of the earth as an endless source of meaning that is nonetheless inherently beyond
complete comprehension. Here we find the relevance of a-letheia yet again and the
application of the concealed and unconcealed to the concept of earth, for the earth, as
such, is beyond the comprehension of mortals in their finitude, and while we can indeed
and inevitably do seek to know more and more, those who may be said to be in the know
are some of the first to assert the limits of what is and can be known. We can see a
similar idea at play in the following from Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac:
The ordinary citizen today assumes that science knows what makes the
community clock tick; the scientist is equally sure that he does not. He
knows that the biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may
never be fully understood. That man is, in fact, only a member of a biotic
team is shown by an ecological interpretation of history. Many historical
events, hitherto explained solely in terms of human enterprise, were
actually biotic interactions between people and land. The characteristics
of the land determined the facts quite as potently as the characteristics of
the men who lived on it.19
Leopold here makes a few different and relevant points. He says that an average citizen
may mistakenly hold as true the scientistic claims that (1) science has a monopoly on
truth and (2) science has or can have all the answers regarding the earth. This scientistic
error in thinking on the part of many is related to the hubristic idea discussed earlier in
terms of truth being understood as something finite and wholly attainable. Leopold also
points out that the scientists themselves know their limitations. It is not uncommon to
hear those in the various fields of science say that in answering one question, ten others
arise. And Leopold's idea that what has formerly been understood as merely the results
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of human actions is now understood to be the result of a dynamic interaction "between
people and land," or for our purposes, between earth and mortals. This is of course quite
apropos to the ideas under discussion from Heidegger's own thinking. For the “earth” is
not merely a set of resources to be optimized, despite numerous attempts by mortals to
make it so. We can think through this more deeply by looking at what Leopold says in
the following excerpt, continued from the above quote. I believe we can indeed
understand how earth, as concealed, is to be distinguished from world, as unconcealed:
Consider, for example, the settlement of the Mississippi valley. In the
years following the Revolution, three groups were contending for its
control: the native Indian, the French and English traders, and the
American settlers. While historians wonder what would have happened if
the English at Detroit had thrown a little more weight into the Indian side
of those tipsy scales which decided the outcome of the colonial migration
into the cane-lands of Kentucky, it is time now to ponder the fact that the
cane-lands, when subjected to the particular mixture of forces represented
by the cow, plow, fire, and axe of the pioneer, became bluegrass. What if
the plant succession inherent in this dark and bloody ground had, under
the impact of these forces, given us some worthless sedge, shrub, or weed?
Would Boone and Kenton have held out? Kentucky was one sentence in
the drama of history. We are commonly told what the human actors in
this drama tried to do, but we are seldom told that their success, or the lack
of it, hung in large degree on the reaction of particular soils to the impact
of the particular forces exerted by their occupancy. 20
We can see what happened in Kentucky as an example of that which was concealed and
hidden within the earth becoming unconcealed and emerging as a new world through the
dynamic interaction of mortals and earth. Indeed, the idea that land, or "earth," is not
merely a thing but is itself a being that interacts with other beings is an idea quite
common to much of the literature in ecological and environmental philosophy. We have
also come to understand that many of the diseases that afflict human beings are also the
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direct result of actions taken by human beings that degrade, damage, devastate, or
otherwise violently or carelessly affect the earth, and they must be understood as the
result of the interaction of the two. By bulldozing and thus uprooting trees in a rainforest,
humans have unleashed deadly viruses that had lain dormant for centuries, possibly
millenia. A recent article in the New York Times on the ecology of disease said, "AIDS,
Ebola, West Nile, SARS, Lyme disease and hundreds more diseases that have occurred
over the last several decades — don’t just happen. They are a result of things people do to
nature."21 The concealed is unconcealed, for good or ill as humans would evaluate it,
when the four of the fourfold interact. I shall suggest that Heidegger's urging us to the
attainment of proper dwelling can be understood as "the cure" for such dis-eases, or at
least the elimination of conditions that may give rise to them. The proper orientation
toward the earth entails, at the very least, an attitude of reverence toward nature, and an
appreciation and understanding of nature, of the earth, as being made up of both
unconcealed and concealed truth, and a desire to stand in appropriate relation thereto so
as to experience the emergence of significance. Thomson puts this point nicely when he
explains that for Heidegger “earth” is that which does “give rise to our worlds of meaning
without ever being exhausted by them.”22 Awe and wonder are no doubt inherent in
existence when we truly dwell.
The attitude toward the earth which preserves its status as an endless source of
meaning is one readily embraced by many ecologists and environmental thinkers,

Robbins, Jim, “The Ecology of Disease,” The New York Times, accessed November 1, 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-ecology-of-disease.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
22
Iain Thomson, “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental
Philosophy,” 387.
21

19

including proponents of deep ecology. As deep ecologist Warwick Fox explains, such an
attitude is understood to be an intuition, that is, a view that itself cannot be proven,
although it should be understood to arise from and be grounded in phenomenological
experience. Fox writes, "[T]he central vision of deep ecologists is a matter of intuition . .
. it is a matter of trusting one's inner voice in the adoption of a view that cannot itself be
proven or disconfirmed."23 In other words, deep ecologists, as such, share an
understanding of the value of nature that results not from a process of reasoning but
rather is the result of direct experience of nature and an inescapable sense of appreciation
and connectedness with nature. As Fox explains: “The experience of commonality with
another entity does imply a sense of similarity with that entity, even if this similarity is
not of any obvious physical, emotional or mental kind; it may involve “nothing more”
than the deep-seated realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding
reality.”24 The realization that all entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality seems
akin to what it is for a mortal to dwell and safeguard the fourfold in its unfolding. The
view of deep ecology is indeed one that preserves the earth and safeguards it. Such a
view acknowledges the earth as an infinite source of meaning and denies
anthropocentrism. It recognizes the interrelatedness of all beings and the limits of our
human finitude. Thinking which arises out of a phenomenological experience of the
world and in turn gives way to such intuitions is further evidenced in something written
by Theodore Roszak:
Ecology stands at a critical cross-roads. Is it, too, to become another
anthropocentric technique of efficient manipulation, a matter of
23
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enlightened self-interest and expert, long-range resource budgeting? Or
will it meet the nature mystics on their own terms and so recognize that we
are to embrace nature as if indeed it were a beloved person in whom, as in
ourselves, something sacred dwells?25
The question posed by Roszak seems to ask if we will adopt the kind of view that
Heidegger sets forth in his explication of what constitutes saving the earth by means of
true dwelling and forego the common anthropocentric views that have long been standard
by embracing that which is held dear by the “nature mystics” and return to an
understanding of the essential oneness of the four of the fourfold.
In true dwelling, as Heidegger explains to us, mortals also “receive the sky as sky.
They leave to the sun and the moon their journey.”26 Heidegger explains that in dwelling
the mortals open themselves to the sky and its movements as the integral part of the
fourfold that it is, accepting what it is in itself and accepting it as part of the One of which
they themselves are also part. They do not seek to exert control over it, but, as Heidegger
tells us, “They leave to the seasons their blessing and their inclemency.”27 In dwelling,
mortals tune into the flow of the natural world and adapt themselves to it. In receiving
the sky as sky, mortals bring themselves into harmony with the natural world. They
attune themselves to the rhythm of existence, the ebb and flow of natural phenomena. By
means of an attitude of openness, an attitude that allows for the reception of reality,
mortals are able to recognize the patterns and movements in the sky. Such an
understanding allows for the harmonious existence of the mortals within and as part of
the fourfold. Possession of the proper attitude toward earth and sky, an attitude that we
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will later come to see is comprised of what Heidegger calls knowledge and tenderness, is
what ushers in the possibility for a greater understanding of existence. Regarding the
divinities and the mortals’ relation to them, Heidegger tells us:
Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities. In hope they
hold up to the divinities what is unhoped for. They wait for intimations of
their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not
make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very
depth of misfortune they wait for the weal that has been withdrawn.28
Most fundamental to this relationship, it seems, is the way in which mortals are
essentially in subjection to the divinities. We must be careful that we do not construe this
subjection as some kind of enslavement or demeaning degradation. Rather, mortals, by
their very nature and essence, are subjects of the divinities and subject to their divine
rule. This way of capturing the nature of reality is indeed metaphorical, hence the central
importance of myth, yet it is representative of the phenomenological experience of an
embodied being when he or she reflects upon any of a number of unreflective experiences
which make up the repertoire of human experiences, experiences which seem to emerge
independent of choice or will, experiences that seem to seize the individual, like a
possessing spirit, experiences such as rage, passion, joy, etc. One does not reflect and
thus choose to experience joy. When one experiences joy, one experiences joy as a being
in subjection to joy. I will delve further into this idea in a subsequent chapter and look at
other important things said by Heidegger on this matter.
Bearing in mind Heidegger’s assertion that the fourfold is itself one, we may
contemplate the interdependence of and essential link between each of the four of the
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fourfold. The nature of this interdependence between mortals and divinities is such that it
can be understood as on a par with the operation of nature itself. In other words, we
should understand that there are natural “laws” that determine the ways in which the
interdependence between mortals and divinities plays out. To say that, however, is not to
imply that we are able to necessarily discover and catalogue all such “laws.” For any
such “laws,” being another part of truth or a-letheia, would also be subject to the
concealed and unconcealed. And what's more, if we do indeed grasp this
interrelatedness and understand things in this way, we must forego any conceptualization
of the divinities as supernatural or otherworldly. The divinities, as one of the four of the
fourfold, are not outside, above, or beyond the other three of the four. The fourfold is
itself one, as Heidegger tells us, and yet it is four: earth, sky, divinities and mortals. To
conceptualize the divinities and their operations as supernatural or otherworldly is to
fundamentally fail to understand Heidegger, as well as lessons brought to light earlier by
Nietzsche that will themselves be further explored in a later chapter.
In thinking a little more about what it is for mortals to “await the divinities as
divinities,” it is helpful to think through the idea of mortals being in subjection to the
divinities and what that means. In being in subjection to divinity, the mortal should not
be understood as a subject in relation to an object that is divinity, which would imply a
relation between them that sets up the mortal as a consciousness and the divinity as a
thing to be represented therein. Nor is the conception rendered correct by positing that
the divinity is a subject that relates to a mortal as an object, and for the same reasons. To
say that mortals are in subjection to the divinities is best understood by thinking more
deeply about how we should understand the term subject and the way it is defined. If we
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look at the very meaning of the word, we see that to be subject to something is simply to
be open or exposed to the force of that something. Thus, mortals are open or exposed to
the force of divinity. Mortals, in recognizing this as true, are able to wait for the
intimations of the divinities, as Heidegger tells us. In other words, they wait for those
manifestations by means of which the divinities make themselves known. Such
manifestations will be intimate in that intimacy is the nature of the relationship that holds
between mortals and divinities. In reflecting upon the word intimate, its forms and its
etymology, we can perhaps better understand what is being proposed here.
The infinitive verb to intimate means an act by which someone or something makes
itself known. One may intimate in hopes of being intimate or achieving intimacy. The
Latin intimare means to make known, to impress upon, and intimus means the most
inward or most within. For Heidegger, in the German, it is Innigkeit. More will be said
about this term a little later. For an intimate relation to hold between two beings or
things, there must exist on the part of both beings both the active and the passive
element. The active aspect may be understood as being willing and able to truly intimate
that which is most inward to the other. In the case of conscious beings, one must be
intimus in one's own thoughts, words, and actions and thus truly reveal that which indeed
is the most inward and offer it to the other, thereby having a be-ing toward the other that
is intimare. The passive aspect may be understood as assuming an orientation toward the
other such that one is able to be impressed upon by the other's be-ing, a being that is itself
intimare. One must be open to the knowing of the intimus of the other, that is, one must
be open to receiving that which is the most inward or most within the other. Thus, the
reciprocal relation that is intimacy is achieved. Much more will be said about what it
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looks like for this to play out between a mortal and a divinity in a subsequent chapter.
And as we will see, the characteristics that Heidegger terms knowledge and tenderness
are crucial for the occurrence of intimacy, and for Heidegger they are given their fullest
expression in the person of a poet and his unique relation to divinity.29
Heidegger also reminds us in the above quoted passage that the divinities are in no
way made by the mortals. Rather, we should understand the divinities as being given as
what they are, and, as we will see, the clearest articulations by means of which the
divinities are disclosed is found in myth. Mortals do not make the divinities. Nor do
mortals worship idols, Heidegger tells us. The divinities are rightly said to not be idols in
that they are not mere appearances or representations, either mental or material,
manufactured by the imaginations of mortals. As will hopefully become clearer as we
proceed, it is the divinities who bring to mortals an abundance of rich experiences by
means of their existence as transcendental realities, elements, or principles. Thus, when
Heidegger says, “In hope they hold up to the divinities what is unhoped for,” he puts us
in remembrance of the wisdom of Heraclitus.30 For it was Heraclitus who wrote, “Unless
he hopes for the unhoped-for, he will not find it, since it is not to be hunted out and is
impassable.”31 The implicit truth in this statement is, once again, the assertion of that
fundamental idea of inexhaustible meaning, of the always partially concealed nature of
reality, of the importance and meaning of the finitude of mortals and their relation to the
infinite form of truth, to being itself. Thus, this fundamental recognition of the finitude
of mortal existence and the acknowledgment of the existence of something greater,
29
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something which is itself a source of meaning, coupled with an orientation of openness
toward that which is greater, is what allows for the very possibility of more than what
Heidegger calls in the quote below the merely actual. The divinities are the source from
which flows all that comprises mortals’ past, present, and future, both known and
unknown. The very notion of the unhoped-for points us toward that which is concealed
yet is very much in the realm of possibility. It would seem that what is most relevant in
what is said by both Heidegger and Heraclitus is that that which is in the realm of the
possible necessarily exceeds all our expectations, for the realm of the possible is infinite
and we, as mortals, are finite. Thus, not even in our most vivid imaginings can we ever
conjure up an expectation fit to match our anticipation. This is precisely how it is that we
can and should, as mortals, hope for the unhoped-for. We could say that it is against the
loss of the unhoped-for that Heidegger makes his plea for us to understand the danger of
average everydayness in Being and Time, when he writes:
This leveling off of Dasein's possibilities to what is proximally at its
everyday disposal also results in a dimming down of the possible as such.
The average everydayness of concern becomes blind to its possibilities,
and tranquilizes itself with that which is merely 'actual'. This tranquilizing
does not rule out a high degree of diligence in one's own concern, but
arouses it. In this case no positive new possibilities are willed, but that
which is at one's disposal becomes 'tactically' altered in such a way that
there is a semblance of something happening.32
What Heidegger is describing here is not only the loss of hope for the unhoped-for, but a
fundamental foregoing of real dwelling that occurs in such a way that one is unaware that
it is happening since one is operating under an active illusion of sorts. One becomes
highly involved in the day to day realities of existence, so much so that nothing beyond
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those mundane cares and concerns is even possible, yet one feels like one is working
hard, moving forward, living.
Regarding dwelling, Heidegger tells us that mortals, “initiate their own essential
being—their being capable of death as death—into the use and practice of this capacity,
so that there may be a good death.”33 Heidegger explains that we are not to understand
him here as saying that death is some “empty nothing” that is for all mortals the goal.
Nor are we to understand Heidegger as casting some sort of nihilistic wet blanket over
the whole of dwelling itself. Rather, if we recognize death as the actuality and capacity
that he understands it to be (an integral part of physis) and we understand in the proper
way his meaning of its “use and practice,” we realize that death is simply an integral part
of those inevitable transformations that occur in mortal existence for mortals in their
being as mortals. A simple way of capturing his thought is the idea that Life is Death. In
other words, life itself depends upon and is made up of death, and of course this is most
easily observed in the cycles of nature: day into night into day, spring into summer into
autumn into winter into spring again, the process of growth, fruiting and flowering,
withering, then dying that is the essence of all living things. And as will be elaborated
upon further a bit later, life itself in all its parts is made up of continuous changes that
may themselves be understood as “deaths” in that something that was no longer is.
Death, as a regular occurring event, may well be thought to be the most fundamental
manifestation that is the play of the concealed and unconcealed. When one understands
death for what it is, accepts it, and accustoms him or herself to it as the necessary and
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recurring event of ek-sistence, as the event that not only brings to an end a path, a plan, a
project, a phase, a relationship, or a life, but that also by its very nature makes possible
the birth of something else, then one is on his or her way to a good death.
If we are to grasp the concept of dwelling in its fullness, understanding the centrality
and importance of death in Heidegger’s thought is crucial. One need not read more than
a few choice lines of Heidegger here and there to know that he has something much
broader and deeper in mind when he uses the term “death” than the simple expiration of a
life. While elaborating on the oneness of the four of the fourfold, he writes: “The mortals
are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To die means to be
capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually, as long as he remains
on earth, under sky, before the divinities.34 For Heidegger, mortals, as Dasein, are in an
utterly unique position (this becomes relevant and discussed in a different way in the final
chapters). Mortals are the only beings for whom existence itself is an issue. Mortals
have as central to their existence care, finitude, and an awareness of the way in which
they are thrown into existence to travel through potentiality toward an inevitable end.
Heidegger says:
Death is a possibility-of-Being which Dasein itself has to take over in
every case. With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost
potentiality-for-Being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing
less than Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Its death is the possibility of nolonger being-able-to-be-there.35
And so it appears that while all living things perish, mortals alone have a capacity to put
into practice their ability to honestly and openly confront death in all its manifestations
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and occurrences and in doing so make themselves able to attain “a good death.” And as
he stressed when he said that doing this was in no way to “make death, as empty Nothing,
the goal,” putting this capacity into use and practice ensures fuller and richer dwelling in
that the practice itself is a necessary means to it. This idea will be illustrated in the final
section of this chapter when we look at Heidegger’s description of the dwellers within the
Black Forest farmhouse.
Heidegger tells us that the four of the fourfold is one. In order to facilitate our
understanding of the idea of the fourfold as parts of that which is primally one,
Heidegger’s explanation of the Greek term peras may be helpful. About the Greek peras,
or boundary, he says, “A boundary is not that at which something stops, but, as the
Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its essential
unfolding.”36 If we apply this idea to the concept of the fourfold, we can see that Being,
as the primal one that is the fourfold, could not begin its essential unfolding as the
fourfold without the boundaries that mark the four of the fourfold into the four that they
are. In undertaking to better understand the Greek peras, I sought to explore related
Greek terms. The various words which share in the root, be they verb, noun, adjective,
adverb, or participle all involve the notion of that which is finite, limited, with a distinct
end or a finish.37 The participle peperasmenos, for example, is a word that appears often
in Aristotle, such as in his Physics. In a discussion of Aristotle's use of the word in his
critique of Zeno, Cherubin and Mannucci write, "Similarly, peperasmenon is often
translated as "finite," but it may equally well mean "limited," "definite," or
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"determinate."38 This is in important contrast to apeiron, that which is indeterminate,
indefinite, and without limit. And thus if we conceive of peras as that which makes
something determinate or delineates something as such in contrast to apeiron as that
which is indeterminate, we can see why Heidegger would emphasize the importance of
such a boundary as that which allows something to unfold and become that which it is.
Seeing that the boundary is that which marks out each of the four, we can understand
that the boundary is not something to be understood as separating, dividing, cleaving, or
severing into four what was one, given that that which is one, as such, is determinate,
definite, and finite. Rather, the peras or boundary should be understood as that which
allows form to be given to what would otherwise be limitless and thus without form, it is
that which allows Being to unfold in its essence as beings, as the fourfold. Let us turn
now to a discussion of concepts during which this idea itself will be discussed more fully.

II.3. Boundaries, Chaos, and Intimacy
In order to gain a better understanding of the way in which Heidegger intends us to
understand peras, I believe it may be instructive to turn our attention to another concept,
the concept of Chaos. In his essay, "First of All Came Chaos," Drew Hyland offers some
insights and ideas that can assist us in our thinking. Beginning with the claim that
Heidegger's work should, above all, teach us to think, Hyland undertakes to show that the
real impact of Hesiod's claim that "first of all came Chaos" is experienced only when the
original Greek conceptualization of the word Chaos is understood. He argues that while
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our modern English understanding of Chaos as a "primal soup" or "an unintelligible,
undifferentiated, unarticulable condition" is one that fits nicely with accounts from other
cultures and even seems to prefigure the ideas of Anaximader, such an understanding of
the word is not really in keeping with its original Greek meaning. Making use of the
research and work of Mitchell Miller, John Bussanich, and others, Hyland explains that
the word Chaos means something like a gap, a yawn, a separation.39
Hyland proceeds to make the case that the questions and assumptions that seem to
naturally follow from such an idea, however reasonable they and the presuppositions they
indicate seem to be, are nonetheless in error. Hyland says: “Almost from the time the
original meaning of Hesiod's chaos as gap or separation was taken seriously, the question
was asked, and answers ventured, as to what the entities were that were separated by
Chaos.”40 Hyland goes on to work his way through the different proposals that have been
made regarding the idea of pre-existing entities separated by Chaos and to show how
each one, however long-held and dearly loved it may be, simply does not fit with
Hesiod's actual words.
In attempting to diagnose the widespread error, Hyland cites the work of three
different scholars of ancient Greek philosophy: Miller, Bussanich, and Cornford. About
the three, Hyland says, "[T]hese views assume that if Chaos is a gap or a "between," it
must be a gap in something that precedes (or is at least co-primordial with) Chaos, and
that "something," Miller suggests, "implies a pre-existing undifferentiated field."41 It is
this very notion, the notion that a gap or separation necessarily presupposes the existence
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of an undifferentiated field, Hyland believes is an error, for Hesiod asserts that "first of
all came Chaos." Hyland says:
Difficult as it may be to understand, however counter to our intuitions that
if Chaos is a gap or separation it must somehow separate something, I
suggest we should take Hesiod's Greek in the passage under consideration
to be indicating this truly remarkable thought: that Chaos, gap, separation,
comes before, is prior to, any pairings that it might subsequently separate.
Difference precedes and is the condition for sameness or identity. The
"between" somehow precedes the binaries that it distinguishes.42
Before I follow up on this notion of a “between which precedes the binaries it
distinguishes,” I wish to first follow up on Hyland's earlier suggestion regarding the view
he attributes to Bussanich via a quote from Bussanich that Hyland employs in his essay.
In Hyland's reading of Bussanich's essay, I think Hyland slightly misrepresents the view
developed by Bussanich.43 I believe Bussanich articulates his main point when he says,
"The name Chaos symbolizes the initial stage of pre-cosmic reality--a yawning chasm or
abyss. Since it stands at the beginning of things, it cannot be envisioned according to the
laws of perspective or dimension."44 As Bussanich fleshes out his view in his essay, I
believe his understanding of Chaos is more nuanced than what Hyland allows and is
somewhat at odds with Hyland's view in a subtle yet important way. While Hyland seeks
to put forth an understanding of Chaos not as a thing itself nor as a something that
presupposes the existence of any things but rather as something like the very concept of
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difference that would itself in turn allow for the existence of things, Bussanich seems to
develop an understanding of Chaos that makes it neither a thing (or a something that
presupposes any other things) nor Hyland's concept of difference. Bussanich writes,
"Since its function is cosmogonic, Chaos must be defined as undimensional or principial
space, an articulated nothing: it is the barest indication that there is a qualitative
something, from and in which cosmic differentiation occurs."45 And this is where we can
see what may well be the most important difference in the respective views of Hyland
and Bussanich, and where, as it will turn out, Bussanich seems to more fully heed the call
to thinking in that he thinks further than does Hyland.
For Hyland, Chaos is difference. For Bussanich, Chaos is the opening up that allows
for difference. It seems to me that certain ideas that are so centrally important to modern
philosophy, such as that of substance, serve to render even more difficult our attempts at
understanding of Chaos in this context. In his essay, Bussanich does offer us an
assessment of the situation that is very much in keeping with certain ideas being
developed overall in this project when he writes, "Speculation on the first things is the
response of the imagination when finite experience confronts a transfinite reality, in this
case the origin of the cosmos."46 That which is referenced by the designation transfinite
reality, I believe, is intimately tied to that which comprises the very heart of this project
and to the very notion of truth as a-letheia and its essence of concealed and unconcealed.
Furthermore, we could say that it is the response of the imagination when finite
experience confronts a transfinite reality that gives rise to the articulation of myth itself,
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for many of our phenomenological experiences in existence as human beings point us to
the concealed and unconcealed, and in response, we are given naturally to imaginative
speculation.
In thinking about the understanding of Chaos attributed to Hesiod and explored by
Hyland, it is understandable how some might see it as unreasonable to propose that
difference itself precede everything else. However, such thinking, when scrutinized, is
the result of metaphysical presuppositions that themselves should call out for further
thinking. Someone may thoughtfully ask, "Well, how can a concept, the concept of
difference, coming into existence, be the necessary condition for the coming to existence
of beings/things? Wouldn't there need to be a being from which beings come?" The
ultimate point, however, is missed with such questioning in that it matters not whether
there was a being or whether there was nothing since beings can only emerge once there
is difference itself. This seems to me to be very much entwined with the Greek concept
of peras explained earlier in that distinction and difference are themselves the necessary
conditions for plurality itself. Thus, I believe we can accept that Chaos came first and
recognize that it doesn't matter whether there was being or whether there was nothing
before that time in that either way it was a homogeneity about which such a designation
as one or sameness would not even apply since that concept itself presupposes plurality
and difference, if not as prior, then at least as cotemporal/coprimordial. You must have at
least two to say that they are the same, and in order to have two, there must exist
difference. Moreover, the designation "one" cannot exist except in contrast to "not one"
and the "not one" cannot be "nothing" in that that does not present a contrast to "one"
since both are homogenous. There must be at least "two" in order to recognize "one."
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And this is where, I believe, Hyland's thinking stopped too soon in that he only reasoned
up to the necessity of difference, which was an important discovery but itself did call out
for further thinking.
This very interesting concept of difference as the condition under which differentiated
being may manifest does tie in quite nicely with the concept that we set forth at the outset
as central to so much of Heidegger's thinking, the concept of a-letheia or the concealed
and unconcealed. The concept of the concealed may be understood as analogous to the
concept of difference in that there is a tendency of reason, it would seem, to draw an
inference from the assertion of either of these concepts that then, as an assumption, is
taken as a presupposition, albeit in error.47 That is to say, just as one might take the
positing of Chaos as first as indicating the preexistence of an undifferentiated field or a
holistic entity or undifferentiated substance that subsequently is made to possess
difference by means of the establishing of the existence of its parts, one may likewise
take that which is concealment as indicating the preexistence of unconcealment as some
kind of holistic entity or undifferentiated substance that is made to possess concealment
by means of the establishing of the existence of its parts. They then might possibly feel
compelled to believe and to pursue, albeit in vain, the acquisition of the truth in total
unconcealment, much as they would the establishment of a so-called undifferentiated
field, and perhaps even then proceed to build great edifices of knowledge on such a false
belief.48
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If we return now to that understanding of Chaos which Hyland referred to earlier as “a
between that precedes the binaries which it distinguishes, and consider also the concept
of peras, along with Warnek’s take on Innigkeit, we can see connections that may have
otherwise been concealed begin to move into unconcealment. Hyland’s
conceptualization of Chaos as “a between that precedes the binaries which it
distinguishes” is an illuminating idea and for a number of reasons. It is very much
amenable conceptually to Heidegger’s understanding of peras as “that from which
something begins its essential unfolding,” and it relates quite nicely to another concept
central to Heidegger's thought, that of Innigkeit. Holding in mind the idea of Chaos as
first, it is interesting to look at something said by Warnek in the essay, "Translating
Innigkeit." Warnek writes:
The task of translating Innigkeit thus demands the translation of the
movement of translation itself, the thought of the difference that joins all
things together . . . the translation of Innigkeit as the belonging together of
the strange already says the difficulty of thinking and saying this word . . .
The strange, therefore, has to be thought neither as what belongs nor
simply as what does not belong; the strange is rather strange precisely in
the belonging together that would preserve the strange, the strange as
strange . . . Innigkeit, according to Heidegger, does not simply name all
things, but names the granting of things in their discrete difference and
oppositional relation, the difference as it holds all things together.49
"The difference as it holds all things together," it would seem, is closely related to the
concept of Chaos understood as a gap or separation that itself came first. Thus it appears
that Hesiod's conception of Chaos, as spelled out above by Hyland and understood as
difference, is that which allows for the coming into being and the holding together thereof
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of all things by means of the establishing of peras. This, I believe, would be central to
understanding Innigkeit as the belonging together of the strange in that all things would
take their being from the coming into existence of this primordial difference and thus it
would be correct to say, as Heidegger does in quoting Hӧlderlin, "All is intimate."50
From what we have looked at thus far, it would seem that Chaos, understood as the
gap, the yawn, or the separation, in its coming-into-being, is like the coming-into-being
of emptiness or an empty space so that some thing or things can come into being. And
thus it is not that Hyland is wrong, but he stops thinking too soon when he sees Chaos’
coming-into-being as merely the coming-into-being of difference itself; in fact, Chaos’
coming-into-being is actually the condition for the emergence of both difference and
sameness. He was thus actually correct to say: "The between somehow precedes the
binaries which it distinguishes." He did not recognize that the binaries were difference
and sameness and that the between, as Chaos, was what allowed them both to emerge.
And this way of thinking, it seems, is in keeping with the line of thought articulated by
Bussanich. Something written by Heidegger in his Elucidations of Hӧlderlin's Poetry
supports and further clarifies my point:
Nevertheless,  signifies first of all the yawning, gaping chasm, the
open that first opens itself, wherein everything is engulfed. The chasm
affords no support for anything distinct and grounded. And therefore, for
all experience, which only knows what is mediated, chaos seems to be
without differentiation and thus mere confusion. The "chaotic" in this
sense, however, is only the inessential aspect of what "chaos" means.
Thought in terms of nature  chaos remains that gaping out of which
the open opens itself. Nothing that is real precedes this opening, but rather
always only enters into it.51
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And so it seems clear from what Heidegger says here that Хάος is, as I said earlier,
something like the emptiness which is necessary for anything to enter therein and thus
subsequently be understood by means of concepts such as difference and sameness. This
gaping is the idea at work when Bussanich says: "Chaos must be defined as
undimensional or principial space, an articulated nothing: it is the barest indication that
there is a qualitative something, from and in which cosmic differentiation occurs."52

II.4. All Together
We can now attempt to weave together in a more simple yet meaningful way the different
and important concepts we have been examining in order to establish the conceptual
groundwork for the ideas regarding poetry and the gods to be explored in the next
chapter. Хάος, as the gap or yawn which allows for the coming into being of the “real”
came first. Only after Хάος can things about which we could make the designation of
"same" and "different" come into being. All that comes into being is enabled to do so by
the peras or boundary that makes possible differentiation and allows things to begin their
essential unfolding. Their emergence into and out of existence is physis and the reality of
physis itself dictates what constitutes the essence of a-letheia, truth understood as the
perpetual dynamic of concealing and unconcealing. And thus it is true to say, as
Heidegger does, that "All is intimate" despite our mortal inability to see all at once the
interconnectivity of all things. Yet, if we are to attain to real and true dwelling, we must
recognize these things, understand, honor, and acknowledge them, and although we
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cannot do it in the way that the Greeks did, we can comprehend the meaning of what it is
to dwell within the fourfold and live accordingly.
If we turn now to something from Heidegger's "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," we
can perhaps experience it with something of an enhanced perspective on the matter and
thus see more clearly the intimate relation that holds between the four of the fourfold.
We can see more clearly in Heidegger’s description of the little farmhouse in the Black
Forest how the important concepts we have been exploring are at play as they manifest in
the dwelling of mortals. Heidegger writes:
Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and sky, divinities and
mortals enter in simple oneness into things ordered the house. It placed
the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope, looking south, among the
meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof
whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and that, reaching
deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter
nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it
made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the
“tree of the dead”—for that is what they call a coffin there; the
Totenbaum—and in this way it designed for the different generations
under one roof the character of their journey through time.53
The proper dwelling of the mortals who built and arranged their little house is
indicative of their understanding of their place within the fourfold. Demonstrated is their
receptivity to the fourfold and their willingness to work with it rather than against it.
They did not build their house in such a way as to deny nature or to attempt to master it.
Rather, they worked with nature in such a way that they both love and preserve it. They
did not choose the site upon which to build their little house based upon their preference
for a particular view that would require even more insulation and fuel to combat the cold.
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Rather, they chose a site which would naturally afford them protection against cold
winter winds and designed the little house itself and the pitch of its roof to accept the
snow and make the best use of it. Likewise, they chose a site near to a water source
rather than insisting that water be somehow directed to come closer to them by means of
elaborate mechanisms.
We see also that their things speak of the reality of Being as the fourfold and the
reality of the fourfold as physis. Their things acknowledge and pay tribute to the stages
and phases that make up mortals’ lives, to the central role that death plays in existence, as
well as the intimate relationship that holds between the four of the fourfold. The
presence of both childbed and tree of the dead point toward the awareness and acceptance
of the continual changes that comprise existence. By making explicit and honoring death
as an integral aspect of life, life is more fully understood and therefore more fully lived.
The various rites of passage, the little deaths and changes that can and will occur, are
reverenced and cared for and thus real dwelling is made possible.
In our own time, such an approach to living is scarcely found. While we very much
talk about and emphasize all the new beginnings in life, rarely is acknowledgement given
to the death or ending that made each new beginning possible. Whether it be the death of
a childhood fantasy, such as comes when one learns that there is no Santa Claus or tooth
fairy or that occurs when one finds out that one's own parents are finite and imperfect, or
the death that is the loss of one's virginity, or the death that is becoming an adult by
means of turning eighteen, or the death that is high school graduation, or the death that is
the loss of that first love, or the death that is the giving up of a dream, or the death that is
a divorce, or the death that is a layoff, or the death that is becoming a parent, or the death
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that is the loss of youth, few if any of these things are ever acknowledged, honored,
mourned, and incorporated into an understanding of life as the intrinsic parts of life that
they each may be. Much less do we truly honor death as that ultimate and final
happening in a mortal's life. Our practices of draining blood, embalming, applying
makeup, extracting eyes, and sewing shut lids and lips belie our professions to any real
acceptance and embrace of the reality. To place a body that itself has been preserved in a
wood and metal strongbox and then place that into a vault in the ground so as to stave off
the natural, the inevitable, is upon reflection not only sad but really quite hideous and
most assuredly indicative of a complete failure to embrace death as the natural part of life
which it is. In assuming their own proper place within the fourfold, the dwellers of the
little Black Forest farmhouse create the necessary conditions for a seamless unfolding of
their essence, for the safeguarding of their abode, for the receptivity to the movements of
the sky, for the manifestation of the unhoped-for and for their initiation into a good death.
And as we will see as we proceed, mortals are not left alone to make their way alone and
on their own, but they are provided with encouragement, insight and edification by means
of myth, art, and poetry as they make their journey upon the earth, under the sky, and in
relation to divinity.
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Poetry and the Gods

III.1. "What is the Poet's Own?" The Poet as Yoked to Divinity
Let us begin to think about Heidegger's ideas on poetry and the gods as we continue our
endeavor to see more clearly the role these play in mortals’ pursuit of dwelling within the
fourfold. Some important writings from which we can take our start and that will greatly
assist us in gaining insight into our topic are found in Heidegger’s Elucidations of
Hӧlderlin’s Poetry, as well as his lecture Hӧlderlin's Hymn "The Ister." I will approach
this task by taking my cues from Heidegger in the way he follows Hӧlderlin’s lead in
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selecting the pertinent questions that should be asked and answered. In explaining how
he plans to proceed in the undertaking, Heidegger first cites lines from Hӧlderlin’s poem
“The Archipelago”:
But because the present gods are so near
I must be as if they were far away, and dark in the clouds
Must their name be for me, only before the morning
Begins to glow, before life glows in its midday
I name them quietly to myself, so that the poet may have
His own, but whenever the heavenly light goes down
I gladly think about what is past, and say--go on blooming!54
Heidegger follows his recitation immediately by saying: "We are inquiring into the
proper character of the poem. It can be experienced if we submit ourselves to the
following questions: What is the poet's "own"? What proper element is alotted to him?
To where does the decree compel him? From where does it come? How does it
compel?"55 I will approach these issues by using the five questions that Heidegger
himself poses as a guide and starting point for the endeavor.
The first question he poses and with which we too will begin is, “What is the poet’s
“own”?” For Heidegger, true poets, as such, bear a special relationship to the divinities
and serve a special role in the operation of the fourfold. Heidegger makes several
statements throughout the essay “The Poem” that indicate the nature of the relationship
that holds between poets and divinities, such as a poet being a poet due to his destiny, and
the idea that a poet and his poetry are determined and that the character of the poet’s
poem is allotted to him. While poets in general have a role to play and serve a unique
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purpose, Heidegger sees Hӧlderlin as unique and hence of particular significance because
of the fact that Hӧlderlin’s poetry not only “names the holy” but also engages in a kind of
poetry that is about the poet, his poem, and poiesis itself. Heidegger tells us, “Hӧlderlin
has devoted his poetic activity to the poet and his destiny, and thus to the poem’s proper
character, its own unique nature.”56 While Heidegger’s conception of his own role as
thinker may be understood as analogous to that of the poet in certain regards, it is
markedly different in others. While Heidegger sees Hӧlderlin as a poet who “touches
upon the fundamental experience of his poetic activity,” Heidegger sees himself, as a
thinker, as rendering this fundamental experience accessible to any who are capable of
thinking along with him. He tells us, “Until now, thinking has not yet been able to think
this experience properly, or to ask about the realm in which the experience is at play.”57
And this is precisely why Heidegger chose to call what he is doing with Hӧlderlin’s
poetry Elucidations [Erlauterungen], a word which has the sense of the reverberating
sound of a bell which has been rung. Heidegger does see himself as making clear
Hӧlderlin’s meaning and not merely interpreting him. A most relevant distinction when
we keep in mind the ideas discussed in the previous chapter regarding the unconcealed
and concealed nature of a-letheia. For if meaning and its source, as such, are
inexhaustible, possible interpretations are, as well. And Heidegger is not merely offering
an interpretation of Hӧlderlin’s poetry but rather sees himself as intimately linked to the
meaning of Hӧlderlin’s poetry as Hӧlderlin’s poetry. This is accomplished by means of
the connection between the two within the fourfold. As Keith Hoeller points out in his
Translator's Introduction to Heidegger's Elucidations of Hӧlderlin's Poetry, "[I]t is
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Heidegger's intent to question the text in terms of the one question which, according to
the later Heidegger, no science can ever ascertain: the question of Being."58 There is
undoubtedly an element of revelation that occurs with such elucidations. Hoeller quotes
Heidegger as having said during a lecture given a year before the publication of the
Elucidations, "The poetic turn toward his [Hӧlderlin's] poetry is possible only as a
thoughtful confrontation with the revelation of Being (Seyn) which is successfully
accomplished in this poetry."59 As I hope will become clearer as we proceed, a
thoughtful confrontation with the revelation of Being is precisely what is possible
between the philosopher and the poet, both of whom fulfill their respective functions by
means of a comportment that is best characterized as receptive and appreciative and
thereby open themselves to receiving new meanings from that inexhaustible source of
meaning itself.

III.2. "From Where Does It Come?" A Calling from Beyond Time
Heidegger explains to us that the poet’s calling or vocation is to serve in the capacity of
poet in the operation and being of the fourfold. The poet is to carry out the task of his
poiesis and thus mediate between the divinities and the mortals. It is the shouldering of
this burden that necessitates the poetic saying, Heidegger tells us. “Until the words are
found and blossom, it is a matter of bearing one’s burden.”60 It is the poet’s very being as
poet that compels him to his poiesis. Heidegger calls this compulsion a decree.61 We
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should be careful to understand that when we speak of the poet as being compelled, we
are emphasizing two important things: the poet cannot choose to not carry his burden
and the burden is one placed upon him and not one he assumes. The decree that is issued
to the poet, Heidegger tells us, comes to him from the “sphere of the gods” or “the
arriving gods who are present to him”62 as well as from “the present gods who are
distantly nearing.”63 Using a phrase of Hӧlderlin's, Heidegger tells us that essentially the
poet is "compelled by the holy" to a poiesis that names.64
In Hӧlderlin's Hymn "The Ister," there is an extended discussion in which we can find
help in answering the question "from where," as well as some of our other questions.
There Heidegger says:
[T]his hymnal poetry is in an essential respect river poetry. The spirit of
the river is the poetic spirit that experiences the journeying of being
unhomely and "thinks of" the locality of becoming homely. As river, that
is, as the journeying, the river can never forget the source, because in
flowing, that is, in issuing from the source, it itself constantly is the source
and remains the locality of its own essence. What is to be said in this
hymnal poetry is the holy, which, beyond the gods, determines the gods
themselves and simultaneously, as the "poetic" that is to be poetized,
brings the dwelling of historical human beings into its essence. The poet
of such poetizing therefore necessarily stands between human beings and
gods. He is no longer merely a human being. Yet for the same reason he
is not, indeed never is, a god. From the perspective of the "between"
between humans and gods, the poet is a "demigod."65
It is the holy which compels the poet, and it is from there that the decree does issue. And
although the poet will be compelled to name the gods, it is the holy itself which is to be
poetized and is itself beyond the gods and does, in fact, determine them. To simplify yet
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retain the flow or chain that is thus far established, there is first the holy or the source,
then the gods, then the poet or demigod, then human beings or mortals. Later, we will
come to see that Heidegger does seek to make a further distinction in terms of “the gods”
by means of employing the Greek terms and distinguishing between theoi and daimones.
We should also take note that, according to the above passage, the poet, as river,
cannot forget its source because in its flowing it is its source. This is indeed a rich
assertion, and there are many aspects that need to be addressed. The spatio-temporal
notions that are present in phrases such as distant gods are nearing and the locality of its
own essence point us toward an aspect of Heidegger's thought that appears throughout a
great deal of his work. By fleshing out at least a little the way in which we should
conceive of such phrases, much may be gained in terms of understanding. To state it
simply, we conceive of his meaning most readily when we think of “the holy” or “the
source” and “the gods” as existent in some sense outside of space and time, although the
gods, and perhaps only in their aspect as daimones, do manifest in time. Thus, they may
be spoken of as near or distant.
In attempting to think through these particular matters, I find certain ideas in the
thought of phenomenologist Erazim Kohak of interest and potential import in
understanding Heidegger. By looking at Kohak's ways of conceptualizing certain
phenomena, some light may be shed on how we can piece together the ways in which
being, space, time, the holy, gods, poets, and mortals can all hang together in Heidegger's
thought. In his book The Embers and the Stars, Kohak undertakes to give an account of
how me might understand that which is the source for the phenomenological experience
of what we call "the beautiful, the good, and the true." While he acknowledges and even
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gives an account of how it is we might come to think of being and time as the same,
albeit in error, he then endeavors to set forth a way of understanding reality that accounts
for the phenomena that give rise to that error but also gives place to those other
phenomena which make up existence, as well, and thus clearly undercuts the notion that
being and time are indeed the same. Kohak writes:
The categories of the “temporal” and the “eternal,” though barely
philosophically intelligible today, remain indispensable. The temporal
perspective of a sequence of events, the preceding determining that which
comes after, does create the illusion of being as wholly contained in time,
merely natural in the reductive sense of that term.66
He believes, however, that proper reflection upon experience and the phenomena which
constitute it reveal such an illusion for what it is. In speaking about what he calls "the
fact of being, the flow of time, and the vision of eternity," Kohak makes the case for what
he calls the three orders of reality. He stresses that distinguishing between the three is
crucial in giving an account of the diverse phenomena of experience. He writes,
"Whenever in its long history, philosophy confounded them, it ended up in a dilemma,
just as it when it sought to isolate one of them alone as real."67
To summarize simply his three orders of reality, he says there is the order of being,
the realm in which it is correct to say it is better to be than not to be or it is better that
there be something than that there be nothing. This is the realm of whatever is, is.
Existence is preferable to non-existence in and of itself. There is also the order of time,
that realm which has come to dominate our thinking in that it is what is most familiar to
us in our average, everyday consciousness. It is the realm in which utility becomes
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relevant and in which relative value may appear. It is in the realm or order of time that a
conflict may arise between two beings such that it appears that one must be valued or
chosen over the other in some way. Kohak explains that because of our
phenomenological experience of existence as being in time, we tend to recognize only
this one particular order of reality. There is also what he calls the order of eternity.
Kohak says:
Eternity is not an "other" realm, discontinuous with the order of time, nor
an infinite prolongation of it. It really does ingress in time, reorienting the
moment from its horizontal matrix of the before and after to a vertical one
of good and evil.68
While I propose we forego the term "evil" in order to avoid unsavory and irrelevant
connotations of religious ideology or any kind of Manichaean metaphysical
presuppositions, the notion that eternity is an order of reality or a realm in which what we
might call the good exists outside of time is not an unfamiliar idea. For Kohak, it is the
realm of eternity ingressing in time that allows for an experience of non-relative value
and meaning that is not merely instrumental. This idea it seems to me could be otherwise
captured by speaking about it as the way in which earth manifests as worlds. Such ways
of describing experience are very much in keeping with the kinds of experiences alluded
to in the previous chapter in discussing the intuitions of deep ecology and their
experientially-based notion of the sacred as immanent within nature, always available to
perception, yet necessarily exceeding our human capacity for a full and totalizing
comprehension. For Kohak, the realm of eternity is to be understood as that realm in
which exists the beautiful, the good, and the true and from which those things manifest
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within space-time. That which exists in the order of eternity remains concealed in itself
but is unconcealed in its manifestation within the order of time.
Kohak, much like Heidegger, emphasizes the uniqueness of humanity. Humans are
the ones who can recognize in the flow of time the intersecting dimensions of eternity
and time in that they are themselves a nexus of being, time, and eternity. Kohak says, "A
person is a being through whom eternity enters time."69 This is in perfect keeping with
the way in which mortals operate within the fourfold. It seems Warnek, too, understands
human beings in this way, and it is captured in his discussion of Innigkeit when he says:
What is at issue, therefore, in the Innigkeit proper to human life is the way
in which that life belongs ecstatically to the nature both that it is and that
exceeds it.70
If we return to and reflect upon the words of Heidegger quoted from the Ister lecture
at the beginning of this section when we undertook to answer the question, “From where
does the decree issue?” and we keep in mind Kohak's articulation of ideas as just
discussed, there is an illumination. For it would appear that Heidegger's “source,” his
“holy,” points to the same reality as that to which Kohak's “eternity” points us. This is
further supported by something Heidegger says in Lecture II of What is Called Thinking:
Its [the poetic word's] statement rests on its own truth. This truth is called
beauty. Beauty is a fateful gift of the essence of truth, and here truth
means the disclosure of what keeps itself concealed. The beautiful is not
what pleases, but what falls within that fateful gift of truth which comes to
be when that which is eternally non-apparent and therefore invisible
attains its most radiantly apparent appearance.71
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I contend that that which is signified by Kohak's term “eternity” and that which is
signified by Heidegger's phrase “that which is eternally non-apparent” are in essence the
same and should be understood to transcend time yet appear within them. This idea is in
keeping with Heidegger’s understanding of “earth” as transcendent, as already
mentioned, in the sense of earth being that which in-forms yet exceeds our
conceptualizations of it. Whether we are examining the relationship between eternity and
time or the relationship between the holy and poetry or between truth and beauty or
between earth and world, what rules in each and every case is an intimacy, an innigkeit, a
belonging together of the strange.72 And the fundamental truth of this innigkeit is aletheia and the unconcealment and concealment. In other words, a full and total
comprehension of that which is signified by the terms under discussion is not possible by
virtue of the very essence and nature of these things and their relationship to one another.
Any kind of intellectual repugnance one might feel in response to this is likely the result
of a bias that has come to dominate thinking. This bias, which will be examined in much
greater detail in the next chapter, makes the irrational demand that, in the name of reason,
one must be able to render something in totality in order for it to be comprehended or
otherwise grasped. As should already be apparent from our explorations of Heidegger’s
own thought, such a demand is in error and is a great stumbling block to real thinking.
The idea that we can somehow fathom the innigkeit and what it signifies and properly
appreciate it for what it is, despite our ability to subject it to a purely analytic reduction,
is what Heidegger emphasized in the appendix to the Elucidations when he says:
This means that one is appropriated to the other, but in such a way that
thereby it itself remains in what is proper to it, or even first attains to it:
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gods and men, earth and heaven. Intimacy does not mean the coalescence
and obliteration of distinctions. Intimacy names the belonging together of
what is foreign, the ruling of the strange, the claim of awe.73
This reality with which we are contending, this notion of that which is transcendent, of
that which is unconcealed and concealed, of a-letheia, of that which sustains our
experience yet necessarily exceeds it, of that which holds all things together is itself from
where the poet’s decree does issue.

III.3. "To Where Does the Decree Compel Him?" Naming
As a poet, Hӧlderlin is compelled to name the holy in his poetry.74 Hӧlderlin engages
in a naming that should not be understood as the bestowal of a name. Rather, it should be
understood as a naming that is itself the giving account of an essence recognized for
which Hӧlderlin knows the name. This is a very important distinction. Hӧlderlin, in
naming these gods, is not calling to them in the ordinary sense of invoking them. He
does not seek to make them arrive or to hasten their arrival. Rather, he names and calls
them because they are to him, as poet, already present. He names them in a way that is
indicative of both the revelation to which he is uniquely privy and the inherent obscurity
that is entailed in such a revelation given from where the decree to name itself does issue.
Thus, in order to “preserve the distance,” he engages in a naming that names but does so
darkly. This is why Heidegger describes the naming as both an “unveiling” and a
“veiling.” We should not think of Hӧlderlin as attempting to hide something or
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attempting to make obscure what need not be so. Again, Heidegger holds that the poet is
compelled to name the holy, it is his burden, his calling, his vocation. In naming the
holy, the poet simply offers up what is available to him as poet, and thus the naming veils
and unveils not due to efforts or motivations on the part of the poet but rather due to the
very essence of that which he is naming, an essence which when unconcealed keeps
hidden and safe its essence in that its source is inexhaustible in concepts, time, and
intelligibility.
The decree itself and the place to which it compels the poet may be understood as
applicable not only to the poet but rather to all who are called to poiesis. In other words,
all true artists are mortals who are themselves channels or conduits for the gods, and the
gods connect with the mortals via the realm of the daimonic in order to manifest in the
material world. It may perhaps be helpful to consider the metaphor Heidegger employs
to shed light on the situations of both poet and thinker. The poet and the thinker are
understood as existing on different mountain peaks separated by an abyss, or perhaps we
should say separated by Хάος. Hӧlderlin, as poet, views the approach of the gods from a
lofty vantage point that is accessible to him as poet but inaccessible to others. Hӧlderlin
is compelled to express the gods’ imminent arrival based on their immanent presence to
him, and their immanent presence to him is itself due to his being as poet. Here we
should recall how Heidegger said that the poet, as river, issues from the source and in
flowing is the source. Moreover, Hӧlderlin is compelled to the naming due to what
Heidegger would call Hӧlderlin's knowledge, a knowledge to which Hӧlderlin is uniquely
privy by means of what Heidegger would term Hӧlderlin’s tenderness of being. This is
that very special mode of being attributed to the ancient Greeks by both Hӧlderlin and
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Heidegger and that Heidegger, I believe, perceives himself as possessing as well.
Explanation of the concepts of knowledge and tenderness are found in the essay
“Hӧlderlin’s Heaven and Earth” and are used therein in part to explain the operation of
the fourfold.75 Put simply, knowledge is the capacity for thinking that is truly reflective,
that is, thinking that mirrors what is. Tenderness is an orientation toward that upon
which one reflects that is open, receptive, and appreciative. Heidegger describes
tenderness as a “gladdening-bestowing and a simply-receiving.”76 This is indeed that
orientation toward being articulated earlier in the discussion of the dwellers of the Black
Forest farmhouse from the essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking.” The orientation in and
toward the fourfold that is receptive and responsive to what is, one that does not seek to
conquer and control but to harmonize and to flow is an orientation that does not confine
itself to the merely actual but is inherently open to the possible. It is the orientation or
comportment toward being that accompanies the practice of what Heidegger calls
meditative thinking. Toward such an orientation toward and engagement with being is
precisely where the decree which issues from source compels the poet go.

III.4. "How Does It Compel?" A Destinal Sending
Regarding the decree that compels Hӧlderlin to his poiesis, Heidegger states, “What
speaks is the claim which holds sway everywhere in its unspokenness, the claim under
which his own poetic activity stands.”77 We may understand the claim as something like
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Hӧlderlin’s destiny, that is, his being as poet. The claim does not need to be spoken in
order to hold sway. The claim inheres in Hӧlderlin’s very being as that which is his eksistence. In his “Letter ‘On Humanism’,” Heidegger says:
Metaphysics closes itself to the simple essential fact that the human being
essentially occurs in his essence only where he is claimed by being. Only
from that claim “has” he found that wherein his essence dwells.78
The essence of a human being it seems cannot be understood as something purely
resultant from his or her own control or will. Rather, it is manifest only in the human
being in his or her receptivity, in his or her capacity to be claimed by being. And perhaps
this is why the claim speaks in its unspokenness. Heidegger explains what he means by
ek-sistence:
As ek-sisting, the human being sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da,
the clearing of being, into “care.” But Da-Sein itself occurs essentially as
“thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of being as a destinal
sending.79
This idea of a destinal sending is the lot of mortals in their relationship to divinities in the
fourfold that is one, but it is also the role of mortals in their relationship to the earth and
sky. The ways in which any given mortal is interconnected to the other three of the
fourfold is not a matter over which he or she has ultimate control regardless of the desire
to believe otherwise. Each and every mortal is “thrown” and therefore has his or her own
destinal sending. Each and every mortal finds himself existent in and among things not
of his own making or choosing and possessed of an orientation toward existence that has
care as its essence. In other words, none of us chose to which set of parents we would be
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born, our sex, the era of our birth, the county of our origin, the language we would be
taught as children, or the number of our siblings. And we did not choose to care but
rather could not help but care. Hence, there is indeed a destinal sending but not in the
sense of some one specific predetermined way in which the mortal should be or should
act but rather an inexhaustible array of possibilities which may be accessed by means of
proper dwelling, by an orientation of receptivity and openness to the realm of the
possible, and by a comportment toward being that does not confine itself to the merely
actual. Both the poet and the mere mortal, as Dasein, in their thrownness, find
themselves already among things, between earth and sky, and intimately bound up with
the divinities, subject to them, and capable of intimacy with all of it, capable of taking
that clearing of being into care and fulfilling the destinal sending. In order to fulfill the
destinal sending most effectively and successfully, one must possess those characteristics,
that particular comportment and attunement toward being, that Heidegger has called
knowledge and tenderness. For a receptivity to the very space and time in which one
finds oneself is indeed that which is required not only for harmonious existence within
the fourfold but to even begin to engage in what Heidegger calls “thinking.” For it is in
the practice of real thinking that we can recognize and overcome the tendency to
totalization that is built into intelligibility and that disposes each understanding of being
to take itself to be the whole story. For as we will later see, it is that faulty mode of
thinking, that tendency to totalization, that has thwarted our attainment of real dwelling
thus far and instead brought us to a place where our annihilation may be imminent. Let’s
look at some of Heidegger’s ideas on thinking.
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To better understand what Heidegger has in mind regarding thinking we can look at
something he says in his Discourse on Thinking. There Heidegger tells us that man is in
flight from thinking.80 He goes on to make the important distinction between what he
understands as the two modalities of thought which are possible. He calls these
calculative thinking and meditative thinking. About calculative thinking, he says: "This
calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains
calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or
computer. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next . . . [It] is not
meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in
everything that is."81 In terms of various concepts and ideas already explored, we might
think of calculative thinking as the kind of thinking that occurs when one confines
oneself to the merely actual, given that it is clearly a modality of thought reckoning with
what is useful, efficient, and productive, while meditative thinking would be the kind of
thinking that occurs when one does not confine oneself to the merely actual but opens to
the possible, to what was spoken of in the previous chapter as what Heraclitus and
Heidegger called the “the unhoped-for.” Additionally, calculative thinking would clearly
deal only with the unconcealed, those prospects that are known and understood, while
meditative thinking would be open to the whole of a-letheia, to the unconcealed and
concealed. Considering Heidegger’s own words that meditative thinking is “thinking
which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is,” it could only be
meditative thinking that is open to a-letheia as such. Meditative thinking necessarily
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involves that capacity to mirror or reflect that which exists, what Heidegger calls
knowledge, as well as that particular orientation of appreciation and openness that
Heidegger calls tenderness. We can also see the relevance of the particular locale of the
thinker, the particular place in space and time in which he finds himself, that clearing of
being which is taken into care, for this is the point at which and in which meaning
gathers, as is clear when Heidegger says:
Yet anyone can follow the path of meditative thinking in his own manner
and within his own limits . . . It is enough if we dwell on what lies close
and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of
us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present
hour of history.82
This quotation brings us round yet again to the very notion of dwelling and the way in
which building, dwelling, and thinking go together. Heidegger’s distinction between
calculative and meditative thinking may be understood to also be at work in his
discussion of the role and place of thinking in relation to building and dwelling:
Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling.
The two, however, are also insufficient for dwelling so long as each busies
itself with its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one another .
. . The real dwelling plight lies is this, that mortals ever search anew for
the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if man’s
homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the
real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to
his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and kept
well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling.
But how else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their
part, on their own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its nature? This
they accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of
dwelling.83
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Heidegger explains that we are to build out of dwelling and think for the sake of
dwelling, and so it seems that thinking for the sake of dwelling would entail that mode of
thinking called meditative thinking in that it would only be in meditative thinking that
man could think of the real plight of dwelling, his “homelessness,” as the plight. We
might even venture to say that calculative thinking as a mode of thinking engaged in by
mortals who do not also engage in meditative thinking is what Heidegger has in mind in
the above passage when he says: “The two, however, are also insufficient for dwelling so
long as each busies itself with its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one
another.” Mere calculative thinking is thinking that is done for some sake other than
dwelling. For the notion that building and thinking can listen to one another and only in
doing so can dwelling be achieved seems to point us to the way in which the two
modalities of thinking, meditative and calculative, can and do serve the cause of dwelling
when employed in the way proper to each. The above passage also reminds us once
again of the necessity for mortals to be ever able “to learn.” And as Heidegger makes
clear in the above passage, real dwelling is not to be attained until both building and
thinking are carried out in the proper way and in proper relation to one another.
The responsibility to attain to proper dwelling falls upon the shoulders of each mortal
as a part of the fourfold. When we link this understanding up with the distinctive way in
which a poet bears his unique burden, we see that the poet and the mere mortal, while
different in certain very important respects, are best understood as not being different in
kind but different in degree. What is relevant to the one as Dasein is relevant to the other.
The poet, as such, may be understood to carry a burden that is different than that carried
by the mere mortal, positioned as the poet is closer to the source and to the gods. These
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ideas appear clearer further still when we recognize the way in which the poet serves the
fourfold as a whole, serving earth, sky, divinities and mortals in his role as poet. And
although the poet and the philosopher may stand on different mountain peaks separated
by an abyss, separated by Хάος, Хάος as explained in the preceding chapter as that very
separation that allows for difference and sameness, they are intimate, they belong
together, they are bound together in being, by the fourfold that is one, and they both have
their own roles to play in service thereto. Something Heidegger says in his essay
“Remembrance” seems to fittingly sum this up: “The dwelling near the origin that
prepares a foundation is the original dwelling, in which the poetic is first grounded, upon
whose ground the sons of earth are then to dwell, at least if they are to dwell poetically
upon this earth . . . Destiny has sent the poet the essence of poetic activity, and chosen
him to be the first sacrifice.”84 And our guiding question is thus answered: the poet
cannot escape his destiny for it is how the poet is compelled.

III.5. "What Proper Element is Alotted to Him?" Feeling for the Gods
We arrive now to what may well be the most interesting question of the five posed by
Heidegger in terms of what I take to be his answer, although that answer, as one might
suspect, is not so obvious. However, as I will attempt to show, Heidegger does have an
answer in mind. One that I believe has not been adequately revealed before. And while a
measure of obscurity and vagueness cannot be escaped entirely if we are to remain true to
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Heidegger’s thought and the nature of a-letheia, I will attempt to make clear what is
revealed to me in his thinking.
For Heidegger, Hӧlderlin is himself like the Greek gods in that he does not command
but points and gives signs. In fact, in Heidegger’s thinking, the poet is himself a sign.
Earlier we quoted Heidegger in his lecture on Hӧlderlin's "The Ister" proclaiming the
poet a "demigod" of sorts. Let us consider something he says there: “A sign, human in
kind, and yet not merely human, conditioning at the same time the belonging together of
the gods, and yet not a god--something between humans and gods, a demigod, then?”85
Within the fourfold, the poet has a role to play, a vocation that is crucial to the interplay
and interconnectedness of all that is part of the fourfold. In seeking to gain further
insight into the nature of the relation that holds within the fourfold between divinities and
mortals and more specifically divinities and poets, let's look at some lines from Hӧlderlin.
From The Rhine:
. . . For since
The most blessed in themselves feel nothing,
Another, if to say such a thing is
Permitted, must, I suppose,
Vicariously feel in the name of the gods,
And him they need 86
From The Archipelago:
Always, as heroes need garlands, the hallowed elements likewise
Need the hearts of us men to feel and to mirror their glory 87
From many lines later in that same hymn:
For the Heavenly like to repose on a human heart that can feel them 88
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These lines from Hӧlderlin’s poetry assert the intimate relationship between divinities
and mortals and set forth the idea that there is indeed a mutual dependency, an
interdependency, that holds between the four of the fourfold. In my attempt to make
plain the way in which I think Heidegger understands these things, it is important to make
clear that the explanation I will be exploring is one resultant from a phenomenological
approach to the question. On the one hand, there is the explanation that arises purely
from phenomenological experience, an experience that calls out for thinking, an
experience that calls out for the thinker’s thinking of being, the philosopher’s surmising
as to the metaphysical nature of reality that gives rise to the phenomena constituting the
experience. On the other hand, this explanation that arises from our phenomenological
experience is one that is also a creative response, a poeisis we might say, akin to the
poet’s naming of the holy, or the artist’s rendering of what the holy would look like in
manifestation. For if we are to truly understand the way in which all things are intimate
in the four of the fourfold that is one, as well as the all-pervading nature of a-letheia, that
is, the way in which unconcealment and concealment rules, then we must open ourselves
to undertaking the endeavor in this way. Otherwise, we resign ourselves to an
understanding that is less than it could be.
In attempting to think about the divinities, to speculate upon the nature of the reality
pointed to in speaking of them, it is best to conceive of them not as personalities with
histories, nor as independently existing discrete beings, but rather quite simply as
affective aspects of being. In other words, we should conceive of the divinities as
principles or elements, as transcendental realities, as modes or moods, as archetypes that
may be known by various names, names which themselves point to or indicate these
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elemental principles, principles such as Courage, Passion, Wisdom, Mercy, Fear, Love,
Strife, etc. For once we understand the nature of divinities in this way, and can
conceptualize their operation within the fourfold, and the resultant tender encounter
between divinities and mortals, we render the place and importance of myth easily
comprehensible as that which creatively results from the point of view that is the
phenomenological approach to human existence, and, in turn, allows mortals an enhanced
understanding of their place and purpose in the fourfold as they ever learn to dwell. In
this way, we see that myth serves as something like a handbook to existence. Myth is a
way of conceptualizing experiences, experiences that are felt by mortals to be encounters
between the mortal and an outside force perceived as acting upon them. We also gain an
even greater understanding of Heidegger’s love of the Greeks, the centrally important
function of myth as enlightening, edifying, and educative in the ancient world, and
Heidegger’s conviction that only in a conscious return to myth and art, to poetic dwelling
upon the earth, will humankind not destroy themselves and die meaningless deaths. For
as he puts it in an interview:
Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct change of the present
state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all merely
human meditations and endeavors. Only a god can still save us. I think the
only possibility of salvation left to us is to prepare readiness, through
thinking and poetry . . .89
While our future is yet concealed from us, we are able through thinking and poetry,
through philosophy and art, through contemplation and myth, to make ourselves ready for
whatever may come, and in doing that, we make possible our salvation, even as the
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unhoped for, for it is only by assuming our proper place within the fourfold and attaining
to proper dwelling that a god could “save us.” Stated in another way, it is in our
cultivation of both the practice and appreciation of the aforementioned activities that we
enhance our perceptual awareness of our place and purpose as one of the four of the
fourfold and thereby “practice death,” as Heidegger has spoken of it, which is the means
by which we are made able to achieve “that good death,” whether that be our annihilation
or our transmutation via “a saving god.” Change is essentially what we are speaking of
here. Unless and until we are made able to practice our capacity for receptivity and fully
embrace mythos, ethos, and logos, there is no chance for survival. Unless and until we
assume our place in harmonious interrelatedness and forego our conqueror mentality, not
even a god can save us.
And what of these gods, these divinities? From a phenomenological approach to the
matter, how is it that we should understand them in terms of their interactions with us
once we conceptualize them as elemental principles or transcendental realities? While
Hӧlderlin tells us that the divinities “feel nothing in themselves,” we must attempt to be
clear about what this means. Most simply, we can take this to mean that the divinities, as
such, are without sentient experience; they are not beings or entities. It would be
incorrect, however, to assume that because these principles feel nothing in themselves
that they are without affective purpose and power to manifest in concrete material reality
by means of influence upon and instantiation through mortals. Here it is important to
keep in mind how both divinities and mortals are part of that which is itself one,
according to Heidegger. While we may conceptualize mortals as discrete and separate
beings, to stop thinking there is to stop thinking too soon. The divinities, as elements or
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principles, may be understood in a certain sense to purpose manifestation of their essence
insofar as each is what it is and inclines to be so in the nexus of the fourfold that is one.
In other words, in their interrelatedness with mortals, mortals are their feelings. And so it
is correct to say that the divinities have need of mortals so that mortals may feel on their
behalf in the sense that the divinities as elements or principles intend toward
manifestation as an embodied expression thus experienced, thus fulfilling that which is
appropriate to each as a given element or principle. These daimones, these gods and
goddesses, these elements, these principles, these divinities express the aspects of being
that they are, and it is only through mortals that they do so. Only through mortals do the
daimones have their share of earth and sky and partake of the gathering of meaning that
occurs in the clearing of being that is taken into care by the mortals. It is in that clearing,
taken into care by a mortal, that the divinities may express as that which they are by
means of the knowledge and tenderness of a mortal whose comportment toward being is
such that his heart be one that can indeed feel and mirror the glory of the divinities as the
transcendental realities which they are, whether they be Fear, Courage, Passion, Lust,
Envy, Joy, Sorrow, etc., for there are no divinities apart from mortals and there are no
mortals apart from the divinities, and neither of these exist apart from earth and sky.
The very idea of a mortal human being as conduit for something divine is quite
commonplace, whether implicit or explicit, and seems to have always been so to some
degree or another if we take a look at language, literature, art, and myth throughout
history and across cultures. Moreover, if we just simply consult people on their
experiences as spectator of what we might categorize as feats of human greatness or if we
reflect upon our own experiences of such, we find that virtually everyone has indeed been
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witness to something glorious, something that may be described as the glorious
manifestation of divinity of which we speak. For example, imagine what it is like to
witness a great runner doing that at which he is great, or a spellbinding dancer whose
movement entrances and reveals the spirit that moves her limbs, or a mesmerizing pianist
whose playing sweeps us away into that other realm, the realm from which his or her own
inspiration comes, the realm which may be understood as that which is indicated by
Kohak when he speaks of the order of eternity in that the phenomena of the experience
point to that transcendental or timeless realm, that aspect of being that we rightly call
divine. Such experiences are ones that we describe as “inspired” in that we perceive and
feel what we can only describe as a spirit coming into a body. So many experiences are
of such a kind; consider the monumental bravery and heroism of a great warrior as
manifested in the heat of battle, or the captivating words and gestures of a powerful
orator or teacher, or the grace, speed, and agility of an athlete on the field. All such
experiences of human greatness may be understood as experiences of the glory of
divinity manifesting in the flesh. Again, if we confine ourselves to the phenomenology
of certain experiences, if we attempt to simply describe the experience, we can get in
touch with that element of the experience of greatness in another that is experienced and
felt to be an encounter with divinity. Of course, even the more mundane expressions
which occur in human life can be understood as expressions of the divine principles,
elements or divinities, especially if one attunes oneself to this aspect of existence. While
the experiences we categorize as sensational, epic, monumental, profound, and highly
moving may be those that most easily render us able to see Heidegger’s ideas at work,
what he has in mind has its place also in the more commonplace and ordinary parts of

66

existence. The divine is present in the ordinary. Divinity is truly immanent. If we keep
in mind Heidegger’s assertion that anyone can engage in meditative thinking in his own
way and in his own manner on his own patch of home ground as we proceed here, it
should become clearer. For Heidegger, Being is omnipresent. And as he is fond of
pointing out, that which is closest to us is that which we have the greatest difficulty
recognizing. As he is prone to do, Heidegger seeks to make clear his ideas on the way in
which being presents itself in, through, around, and amongst beings by examining
language. Consider in this light something Heidegger says in his Parmenides:
What shines into beings, though it can never be explained on the basis of
beings nor constructed out of beings, is Being itself. And Being, shining
into beings, is τό δαίον—δαίμον. Descending from Being into beings, and
thus pointing into beings, are the δαίοντες—δαίμονες. The “demons,” so
understood, are altogether “undemonic”: that is, judged in terms of our
usual murky representation of the “demonic.” But these undemonic
δαίμονες are anything but “harmless” and “incidental.” They are not
casual additions to beings, which man could bypass with no loss of his
own essence and could leave aside and could consider solely according to
his whims and needs. In consequence of this inconspicuous
unsurpassability, the δαίμονες are more “demonic” than “demons” in the
usual sense could ever be. The δαίμονες are more essential than any
being. They not only dispose the “demonic demons” into the disposition
of the horrible and frightful, but they determine every essential affective
disposition from respect and joy to mourning and terror.90
Heidegger tells us in this passage that the daimones are more essential to being than any
being. The daimones, according to Heidegger, are all “affective dispositions” known to
mortals. He mentions joy, respect, mourning, and terror. Thus, we can see how the
affective dispositions such as envy, courage, strife, love, and passion mentioned earlier in
the context of the discussion of divinities as elements or principles are indeed the very
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things to which Heidegger is here referring. Heidegger also makes clear that the affective
dispositions determined by these daimones are not to be avoided, set aside, or otherwise
rendered to be without consequence. He stresses that they are not “casual additions” to
mortals who could otherwise still fulfill their essence as beings. No, the daimones are
more essential to being than any being. The inescapability of the daimones as affective
dispositions is an idea that sheds light on that which was being shown to us in the lines
from Hӧlderlin’s poetry. A given god, as such, can feel nothing and thus it is said by
Hӧlderlin that he needs a mortal to feel for him, and it is only in the coming together of
the two that the fullness of experience is achieved. We will see as we continue that
Heidegger’s understanding of this is more nuanced and complex, and it is grounded in
what he understands to be revealed by a close study of ancient Greek thought and
language.
In his Parmenides lectures, Heidegger emphasizes the way in which his own
understanding of a thinker is in keeping with that of Aristotle as set forth in his
Nicomachean Ethics in the discussion of what the achievement of happiness or
eudaimonia requires and what a life of contemplation looks like. For Aristotle, a thinker,
by virtue of his being as thinker, is privy to being in a way that the ordinary person is not
since the ordinary person is not engaged in the type of thinking in which a thinker
engages. The thinker, through his activity as thinker, through the activity of
contemplation, is able to achieve eu-daimonia, that is, he is able to have a god good
within. In his book, Daimon Life, David Farrell Krell explains, “Heidegger eschews the
“Christian” understanding of the daimonic as demonic, of daimones as minions of evil.
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He embraces Aristotle’s definition of the thinker.”91 It is interesting and very relevant
that the Greek word which is most commonly translated as “contemplation” and
sometimes as “study,” which is the activity of the thinker or philosopher, does not at all
involve the idea that there is some problem to be solved or some answer to be discovered.
Rather as translator Terence Irwin explains in the glossary of his translation of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics: “Theorein is study in the sense in which I study a face or a scene
that I already have in full view; that is why the visual associations of theorein are
appropriate.”92 Thus, the thinker contemplates or studies something that is present to him
and able to be viewed, seen, and gazed upon.
This idea that the thinker simply holds in view or looks upon something already
present and known links up well with Heidegger’s ideas of knowledge and tenderness and
the way in which a person possessing those characteristics simply mirrors reality by
means of their receptive and appreciative capacities. In other words, the thinker simply
engages in phenomenology, that is, he or she describes that which is present, and that is
in keeping with Heidegger’s very definition of what he calls “meditative thinking.” The
ordinary person, on the other hand, as Aristotle explains, is chiefly concerned with his or
her own perceived good, that is, that which is good for a human being. Thus, that which
occupies a thinker seems somehow astounding or even foolish to the ordinary person.
And here we could think of the ordinary person as being caught up in what Heidegger has
called calculative thinking, and therefore he or she has essentially concerned himself or
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herself with the merely actual. Such a person is operating in “average everydayness.”93
They are enacting that tendency to totalization previously mentioned, a tendency which
leads the person to think not in terms of the possible or the unhoped for but to think in a
way that is in its very essence confining and restrictive and that ultimately prevents the
mortal from attaining to that state in which the good god dwells within. These various
ideas seem to be the essence of what Heidegger says in Parmenides when he remarks:
Aristotle, Plato’s disciple, relates at one place (NE, Z 7, 1141b 7ff.) the
basic conception determining the Greek view on the essence of the
thinker, “It is said they (the thinkers) indeed know things that are
excessive, and thus astounding, and thereby difficult, and hence in general
‘demonic’- but also useless, for they are not seeking what is, according to
straightforward popular opinion, good for man.” . . . Δαιμόνια is used here
as an all-encompassing word for what is, from the point of view of the
ordinary busy man, “excessive,” “astounding,” and at the same time
“difficult.” On the contrary, what is current, what a man is doing and
what he pursues, is for the most part without difficulty for him because he
can always find, going from one being to the next, a way of escape from
difficulty and an explanation. The many and all too many pursue only the
beings that are current; for them, these are real, if not precisely “the”
reality . . . They could never be busy with beings without having Being in
view. Thus “the many” see Being and yet do not see it. But because they
always have Being in view, although not in focus, and only deal with, and
calculate, and organize, beings, they ever find their way within beings and
are there “at home” and in their element. Within the limits of beings, of
the real, of the “facts,” so highly acclaimed, everything is normal and
ordinary. But where, on the contrary, Being comes into focus, there the
extraordinary announces itself. 94
That which is closest to us is often not noticed. Being is not in focus for “the many” who
are busy organizing and dealing with the “facts,” the real. Yet being is right there and in
clear view of the thinker who engages in theorein, the thinker who studies that which is
in full view but is thought to be “excessive” or “astounding” by the many who cannot see
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what is right there in front of them. The notion of the extraordinary announcing itself is
indeed what we are talking about in terms of the nature of the relationship that exists
between divinities and mortals, whether it be manifesting in that which we describe as
glorious or the more ordinary and mundane. This is the interrelating of the four of the
fourfold and its manifest being of physis (a notion I will soon elaborate more fully).
However, as Heidegger emphasizes, the extraordinary, although it is that which is closest
to us, is that which we too often cannot see, in that it is easily covered over by our
tendency to average everydayness. The unheimlich or uncanny is the very nature of our
being and signals our richest possibilities, yet is that from which we flee into “The They”
(das Man) to content ourselves with calculation and the merely actual. If we examine
something Aristotle says, he seems to be asserting something very similar:
If reason is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is
divine in comparison with human life. But we must not follow those who
advise us, being men, to think of human things, and, being mortal, of
mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and
strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even
if it be small in bulk, much more does it in power and worth surpass
everything. This would seem, too, to be each man himself, since it is the
authoritative and better part of him. It would be strange, then, if he were to
choose not the life of his self but that of something else. And what we said
before will apply now; that which is proper to each thing is by nature best
and most pleasant for each thing; for man, therefore, the life according to
reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is
man. This life therefore is also the happiest.95
Aristotle clearly has a conception of man as intimately interrelated with divinity in an
essential way. Moreover, like Heidegger, he sees man’s highest possibilities as
achievable only in purposeful relation to divinity, divinity understood as inherent within
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man, that is, immanent divinity. Conceptions of divinity that locate divinity outside of
and independent of mortals fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the relationship
between the two and in the displacement of divinity necessarily prevent happiness, from
Aristotle’s point of view, in that mortals cannot thus fulfill their function, now could they
engage in dwelling, from Heidegger’s point of view, since dwelling requires real thinking
which presupposes a recognition of divinity as one of the four of the fourfold. Aristotle
even asserts that for a man to forego this is for that man to forego himself. Yet, as both
Aristotle and Heidegger understand, all too many do forego it in their excessive
occupation with what is conceived as being the domain of concern proper to man as such.
They miss what is right there in front of them, what is right there inside of them.
This ever-present yet extraordinary nature of the daimonic, as has already been
mentioned, is not to be understood as in any way supernatural or otherworldy, and despite
its being extraordinary, it is also exceedingly ordinary. Regarding this David Farrell
Krell writes, “The daimonic is not diabolical. It has to do with the Ungeheur, the vast,
colossal, un-common and un-familiar . . . The daimonic, passing strange, is actually the
nearest of the near, the most intimate and natural thing in the world. It is ύσις itself.”96
And while it seems it is only the thinker who concerns himself with such matters,
according to Aristotle and Heidegger, those very matters are everywhere and always
present, continuously available to any who care to see. Once seen, they are understood as
that which they are. They are physis, that is, nature. Heidegger writes:
We may call the δαιμόνιον the uncanny, or the extraordinary, because it
surrounds, and insofar as it everywhere surrounds, the present ordinary
state of things and presents itself in everything ordinary, though without
96
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being the ordinary. The uncanny understood in this way is, with regard to
what is ordinary or natural, not the exception but the “most natural,” in the
sense of “nature” as thought by the Greeks, i.e., in the sense of ύσις.97
In different places in his writing, Heidegger stresses the way in which ύσις (physis)
or nature is related in the most fundamental way to a-letheia. In fact, they are really one
and the same in a certain sense. While, as discussed earlier, Heidegger points out that the
Greeks did not “deal with” a-letheia in that they simply dealt within it, they understood it
by means of, or as, physis or nature. Another way of understanding this is to say that the
Greeks’ concept of truth, that is, a-letheia, was determined by nature and its operations.
It is important that we here attempt to understand what is meant by physis in the Greek
sense. A helpful way to conceptualize what is meant by the term is to imagine a timelapsed video that depicts a patch of ground, a seed falling thereupon, rain taking it down
into the dirt, days passing, the seed sprouting, growing, blossoming, fruiting, withering,
dying, and the process then happening again and again.98 It is the entirety of this
dynamic and cyclic process in terms of both that which is available to our sight and that
which occurs beyond the scope of our vision, as well as the spirit which animates it all,
that is indicated by physis. Likewise, all cycles that we experience as mortals here on
earth beneath the sky reveal to us truth as a-letheia if we simply look upon nature. These
perpetual and unending cycles, such as day into night and night into day, the waxing, full,
waning, dark, and new moon, spring into summer into fall into winter, and the cyclical
changes the seasons themselves spur within the myriad beings, are all the continuous
process of concealing and unconcealing played out endlessly in our view, and in them is
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revealed to us an intentionality or purposiveness that is inherent in the natural world and
all its processes. This is physis and a-letheia.
I believe that we should understand Heidegger’s view of physis and a-letheia as
equiprimordial in thinking being, and as he makes clear in the following passage, it is that
which permeates all of existence yet exceeds it, as well, and this is, of course, in keeping
with his distinction between earth and world. In elucidating one of Hӧlderlin’s poems,
Heidegger states:
Nature is present in everything that is real. Nature comes to presence in
human work and in the destiny of peoples, in the stars and in the gods, but
also in stones, growing things, and animals, as well as in streams and in
thunderstorms . . . From where does nature take her power then, if she is
prior to all that is present? Nature does not have to borrow her power
from somewhere else. She herself is that which bestows power . . . She is
present in everything, even in the gods . . . That she is present in all does
not mean a complete, quantitative comprehension of all that is real, but
rather the manner of permeating the real things that, according to their
kind, seem to mutually exclude each other. This omnipresence holds in
opposition to each other the extreme opposites, the highest heaven and the
deepest abyss.99
Physis permeates nature. Nature permeates the real. Nature encompasses the fourfold.
All is intimate through nature. The divinities get their power from nature, as do the
mortals, and so does earth and sky. And while it would not be incorrect to perhaps say
that nature and being are the same, perhaps it is better to understand nature as being
unconcealed.
Here I want to propose an idea that I hope will help us gain deeper insight into and
understanding of the various things under discussion. I propose that we conceptualize the
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operation of unconcealment and concealment as functioning something like a fractal in
the following manner: at each level of being there is a replication of the previous level. If
we conceive of being as itself being made up of the concealed and the unconcealed, and
we then move to the unconcealed of being, we find that within the unconcealed of being
there is both the concealed and unconcealed, and so on it goes at each new level. Put
another way, if being is primary, and is itself made up of the concealed and unconcealed,
and we understand the unconcealed of being as what we call nature, then we see when we
look at nature that it is made up of both the concealed and unconcealed, and if we then
look at some part of nature that is unconcealed, say, for example, an oak tree, we see yet
again, that an oak tree in its essence is both concealed and unconcealed, and this process
of concealing and unconcealing can be viewed throughout the seasons of a year or over
the course of many years. This pattern is repeated over and over in all things. This
indeed corresponds with the idea set forth in my first chapter that Heidegger does indeed
see unconcealment and concealment as present in all of reality, and yet we can also
acknowledge that in some metaphorical way, the way in which being manifests is as
something of a gradient, that is, it reveals itself in layers or levels, with a repetition of
form yet a difference of content.
Keeping in mind this idea about the way in which being unfolds as layers or levels,
each having its own concealed and unconcealed aspect, I want to turn to what is a very
important distinction in Heidegger’s thinking between the gods and the daimones. As I
hope will become clear, Heidegger holds that in terms of understanding the gods, we
must understand that they, being concealed, have their share of unconcealment by means
of the daimones. The daimones are the aspect of the gods that are unconcealed or
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revealed to mortals. Looking at something Heidegger says in Parmenides about this
issue may be helpful:
Being—ίδέα—is what in all beings shows itself and what looks out
through them, the precise reason man can grasp beings as beings at all.
That which looks into all that is ordinary, the uncanny as showing itself in
advance, is the originally looking one in the eminent sense: τό θεάον, i.e.,
τό θείον. We translate “correctly,” though without thinking in the Greek
manner, “the divine.” Οί θεοί, the so-called gods, the ones who look into
the ordinary and who everywhere look into the ordinary, are οί δαίμονες,
the ones who point and give signs. Because the god is, as god, the one
who looks and who looks as the one emerging into presence, θεάων, the
god is the δαίων-δαίμον that in the look presents himself as
unconcealed.100
While the daimones may be ontologically identical with the gods, they are to be
distinguished from them ontically in that they are the aspects of the gods or of being,
according to Heidegger, that are unconcealed in the look. Being shines into beings,
Heidegger has told us, and as that which looks out through beings, being is the gods, but
as that which offers itself to be seen, being is the daimones. In commenting on
Heidegger’s discussions of this matter, Krell writes about Heidegger:
He is more intent on showing that the root of δαίω is identical to that of
θεάω, “to look,” in the middle voice “to offer something to the gaze” or,
better, “to offer itself to a sighting.” The gods, οί θεοί, are those who are
seen to gaze. Daimones are those who indicate, signal, and show
themselves.101
We see again in these ideas about the gods and the daimones the dynamic interplay of the
unconcealed and concealed. We also see the way in which this is linked up to
Heidegger’s neo-Aristotelian philosophy in that the very activity that both Aristotle and
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Heidegger say is the province and domain of the thinker involves this awareness of and
openness to that which offers itself to be looked at, gazed upon, studied, and
contemplated (theorein), and, as hopefully has been becoming more clear, is best seen by
the thinker in the person of the poet or artist, for they are the richest conduits for this
expression, according to Heidegger. Hence, his idea regarding the special and important
relationship between the poet and the philosopher. Being or source reveals itself to the
Poet, who is closest to it, the Poet in turn reveals what he sees, and the thinker sees what
is revealed and elucidates so as to reveal to others, and so on. If we understand this
dynamic properly, we can see how in the ancient world the writers of the tragedies, and
the thinkers who explored them, and the performance of them in theater, and the people’s
experience of them, and the resultant edification and illumination attained thereby
exemplify this process, and again the importance of myth and art and experience thereof
is understood.
I wish to turn now to thinking a bit more deeply about the very idea of vision and the
visible, this centrally important phenomenon of seeing and being seen. If we consult
ourselves and our own personal experiences of the phenomenon of eye contact, much
insight may be gained. Likewise, if we really consider, in terms of the phenomenological
experience, the important place that eyes and eye contact hold in myriad situations,
disciplines, art, and literature, as well as in our daily lives, it is hard to deny Heidegger’s
ideas. A quick look at language reveals a wealth of expressions, clichés, and idioms built
upon the phenomenology of eye contact. The phenomenon of eye contact is in human
experience a unique and powerful experience thought to be unlike any other. Eyes are
the windows of the soul, so the saying goes. A French proverb tells us that the first love
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letters are written with the eyes. Myriad expressions such as “turn a blind eye,” “eyes in
the back of your head,” “a roving eye,” “ the evil eye,” “bedroom eyes,” “ feast your eyes
upon,” “ more than meets the eye,” and many other such sayings affirm the unique and
powerful place of the experience of eye contact. Silent and sustained eye contact
between two human beings is a profound and moving experience that seems to inevitably
result in strong surges of emotion. The fact that an important part of training soldiers to
kill is to train them to avoid all eye contact is not surprising. If we reflect honestly upon
our own experiences, we can begin to recognize certain patterns that point us toward
Heidegger’s ideas. Many people will agree that the appeal that is made to them in the
silent eye contact of a child, for example, is virtually impossible to ignore. Likewise,
many people will openly acknowledge that they avoid eye contact either because they
sense it as intrusive to the other or feel it as the other intruding. People will avoid eye
contact in an attempt to keep hidden their thoughts and feelings. Often people who work
together in various capacities will describe how there is an ability for unspoken
communication that develops by means of eye contact. Likewise, in improvisational art
forms, eye contact amongst participating members can be the sole means of
communicating. And some people will even acknowledge that they find it exceedingly
difficult if not impossible to be overtly dismissive or unjustifiably cruel to someone while
looking that person in the eye. And what of that well-known phrase, “It was love at first
sight”? Many people describe their experience of eye contact with certain others as
jolting, electrifying, soul-stirring, etc. Perhaps, when under the gaze of another, we sense
the presence of being, the presence of divinity, and, perhaps, when gazing at one another,
we are experiencing being looking out at and into itself. It may well be that when we are
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making eye contact and feel the need to look away, we are retreating so as to avoid the
overwhelming daimon that is glimpsed in the eyes of the other. Put another way, when
we gaze into the eyes of another person, we do so either calculatively or meditatively. If
the latter, we are open and receptive to the other and to being itself. If the former, we are
closed off from being and likely do not wish to have the encounter.
Returning now to our thinking about the daimones and the gods, it is instructive and
interesting to explore the ways in which certain ideas expressed in Plato's Symposium are
in keeping with an understanding of the daimones as either beings in their own right that
exist between gods and mortals or as aspects of the gods themselves that might appear to
mortals as beings in their own right in that they are that which show themselves to us
while the gods do not. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates relates to the others that which
was told to him by Diotima regarding the nature of Eros or Love. Diotima explained to
Socrates that Eros, being desirous of the beautiful and the good, cannot himself be a god.
Rather, he is a very powerful spirit which exists halfway between gods and men. About
such spirits, it is said:
They are the envoys and interpreters that ply between heaven and earth,
flying upward with our worship and our prayers, and descending with the
heavenly answers and commandments, and since they are between the two
estates they weld both sides together and merge them into one great
whole. They form the medium of the prophetic arts, of the priestly rites of
sacrifice, initiation, and incantation, of divination and of sorcery, for the
divine will not mingle directly with the human, and it is only through the
mediation of the spirit world that man can have any intercourse, whether
waking or sleeping, with the gods. And the man who is versed in such
matters is said to have spiritual powers, as opposed to the mechanical
powers of the man who is expert in the more mundane arts. There are
many spirits and many kinds of spirits, too, and Love is one of them.102
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Much in this passage fits with Heidegger's own discussion about the nature of the
relationship between gods and daimones. While in Plato the daimones are the
intermediaries between the gods and men, and would thus appear to be beings in their
own right, in another sense, given that it is said that it is they that "weld both sides
together," we can fit them into the view expressed by Heidegger in which he sees the
daimones as the aspect of divinity that "communicates" or “interacts” with mortals in that
they "point and give signs."
Heidegger’s idea of the daimones as they that "point and give signs" may be further
connected with Plato in that Socrates himself was said to be attended by such a daimon.
We find references to this in various of Plato’s dialogues.103 While there is not a great
deal of discussion about it in the dialogues, I contend that its somewhat regular
appearance as a fact about Socrates is significant. Furthermore, words spoken by
Socrates in the dialogue Cratylus is very much in keeping with Hӧlderlin's poetry and his
description of how the mortal and god are united through mutual need and
interdependence. In Cratylus, Plato has Socrates say: “And I say, too, that every wise
man who happens to be a good man is more than human () both in life and
death, and is rightly called a daimon.”104 In proclaiming the good man as more than
human, Socrates affirms that there is an intimate relationship between the mortals and the
divinities, and Socrates’ good man appears to be on a par with Heidegger’s demigod poet
in the sense that both are felt to be closer to Source and privy to some deeper and more

103
104

Apology, 31c-d, 40a. Republic, 496 b-c. Symposium, 175.
Plato, "Cratylus," 435.

80

meaningful understanding and modality of being. Likewise, for both of them, such a
person has a role to play as such in terms of what we could think of as “pointing and
giving signs” to the common people. To be such a mortal no doubt carries with it its own
difficulties, burdens, and travails. To further explore this idea, let us look again at lines
from Hӧlderlin’s poem The Rhine. We will then look at what Heidegger says about them
in Hӧlderlin's Hymn "The Ister." From the poem The Rhine:
Yet of their own
Immortality the gods have enough, and if one thing
The heavenly require,
Then heroes and humans it is
And otherwise mortals. For since
The most blessed feel nothing of themselves,
There must presumably, if to say such
Is allowed, in the name of the gods
Another partake in feeling,
Him they need; yet their own ordinance
Is that he his own house
Shatter and his most beloved
Chide like the enemy and bury his father
And child beneath the ruins,
If someone wants to be like them and not
Tolerate unequals, the impassioned one.
In elucidating these lines of poetry, Heidegger writes:
An Other must be, who is other than the gods and in his being other must
“tolerate unequals.” This Other is needed to “partake in feeling” in the
name of the gods. Partaking in feeling consists in his bearing sun and
moon, the heavenly, in mind and distributing this share of the heavenly to
humans, and so, standing between gods and humans, sharing the holy with
them, yet without even splitting it apart or fragmenting it. Such
communicating occurs by this Other pointing toward the holy in naming it,
so that in such showing he himself is the sign that the heavenly need . . .
The poet is thus beyond human beings and yet unequal to the gods, and to
humans as well.105
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Let's focus first on Hӧlderlin's words. The immortals, the gods, have need of mortals so
that the mortals may feel in the name of the gods since the gods themselves can feel
nothing. This idea we discussed earlier. We can see from what is said that the very
nature of the relationship between gods and mortals is one in which the gods themselves
in their relating to mortals “tolerate unequals” for some further good, and it appears from
what Hӧlderlin tells us that if a mortal who has been impassioned by a god fails to retain
his own humility and recognition of his proper place and wishes to be like the gods yet is
unlike them in that he does not “tolerate unequals,” he will be made to bring about
destruction to his own house, his own kin. That is the ordinance of the gods, says
Hӧlderlin. Harmony and balance are achieved only when each part of the whole, in
doing its own part, does so with an aim toward accepting and tolerating lesser and greater
beings, we could say. To avoid the destruction of one’s own house, one must, if
impassioned by a god, “tolerate unequals.” Of course, for Heidegger, the specific role
that the poet plays is his primary concern, the ways in which the poet serves, as poet, to
“weld together” gods and humans. The poet serves the humans by “sharing the holy with
them.” The poet is he or she who facilitates or provides for mortals access to and
experience of the “holy.” The poet serves the gods by being the sign they need. As
Heidegger writes, “The poet is the sign that is in such a way that its mind has sun and
moon in view . . . The sign (“the besouler”) bears everything originarily in mind in such a
way that, in naming the holy, the sign lets the heavenly show itself.”106 The poet, as
such, being unequal to the gods and unequal to the humans, would need to tolerate
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unequals in his efforts to both offer the mortals an “unfragmented” experience of the holy
and be the sign the heavenly require.
Let us return now and think further about the distinction Heidegger makes between the
gods and the daimones, the idea that the gods as such are hidden or concealed while the
daimones are unconcealed. This conceptualization, as we can see, fits the pattern of the
unconcealing and concealing nature of being. It preserves truth understood as a-letheia,
that strange, seeming-antinomy that is truth's simultaneous revelation and hiddenness.
About it, Heidegger says, "concealedness and unconcealedness determine beings as such.
That means: disclosedness and concealment are a basic feature of Being."107 We are
reminded yet again of the idea that this feature of reality, this concealedness and
unconcealedness, is constant. The nature of the concealedness itself is given treatment by
Heidegger in a discussion about truth and the ways in which the Greek’s conception
thereof differs from the modern conception which supposes that truth is rightly to be
understood in opposition to falsity. Heidegger suggests that the hiddenness or
concealment that is a part of the Greek conception of truth should be understood as
sanctuary or safe-keeping. He explains, "There is also, however, a kind of concealment
that does not at all put aside and destroy the concealed but instead shelters and saves the
concealed for what it is. This concealment does not deprive us of the thing, as in cases of
dissembling and distorting, withdrawing and putting aside. This concealment
preserves."108 To understand the hiddenness as something inherently good in that it
“shelters” is in itself already at odds with the modern conceptualization of truth and its
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tendency to a scientism of thought which would suppose that only truth that makes
known can be understood as good since only what is known can be made useful.
When we apply Heidegger’s understanding of the hidden as that which is kept safe
and preserved to our understanding of the gods as concealed, we see that it is a
concealment which preserves and shelters the gods as the aspect of being that they are
while that which they are does come into expression and unconcealment in the daimones
who offer themselves to a sighting in their pointing and giving of signs. As Heidegger
explains, it is the poet who, as perfect channel or conduit for the daimones, becomes the
sign the gods need so that their concealed and preserved essences may come to
expression and manifestation in the nexus that is earth, sky, divinity, and mortal.
The distinction between the unconcealed and concealed and their interrelatedness is
expressed nicely in one of Vincent Vycinas’ books on Heidegger when he writes,
“Moreover, Maet is not the rays of the sun nor is Ra the sun itself; they merely are
manifested by these entities which are backed up by these deities or permeated by them.
What really are gods in themselves remains concealed; they break through into disclosure
by way of things.”109 This idea that the god as such is concealed yet comes into presence
by way of daimones or things is precisely what Heidegger has in mind when he speaks
about the importance of the poet as one by means of which the gods can be made
manifest. Being, as such, is both concealed and unconcealed. Being manifests as physis,
and a-letheia is understood on the basis thereof. The power that may be said to belong to
the gods is itself derived from physis, as Heidegger earlier articulated, and that power is
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manifest by means of daimones, poets, beings, and things. If we think again about the
idea that the divinities are aspects of Being that themselves may be understood as
principles or elements or affective dispositions, and that they are a part of physis, an
experienced reality, we can more fully understand what Vycinas has in mind when he
writes:
These realities [gods as powers of Being] can be considered as the basic
articulation of logos, the natural language of physis . . . In the worlds of
two different gods, a thing is not the same in each because by reflecting a
different essence of a god, it itself becomes different . . . love in the world
of Hermes and in that of Aphrodite are different loves. Love in the world
of Hermes is a matter of luck or opportunity. It is the kind of love a
traveler knows—suddenly coming and going, found, enjoyed, and
forgotten. A love in the world of Aphrodite is a blissful unification
breaking all bounds and upsetting the former mode of living. Such a love
brings a revolutionary change in human life, like a sudden spring in which
meadows burst into blossoms overnight . . . Gods as worlds never merely
dominate or support a section of reality; they dominate everything
whatsoever.110
The divinities, operating as elements or principles, determine the affective dispositions of
the mortals over which they rule. A lover ruled by Hermes is very different than a lover
ruled by Aphrodite. As Vycinas points out, one mortal’s experiences as lover may vary,
depending upon in which divinity’s world his actions as lover are unfolding.111 When we
keep in mind Heidegger’s own distinction between earth and world, earth as hidden, and
worlds as manifest, and the idea that earth is inexhaustible while any given world may
collapse, it allows us to see how we may understand the truth Vycinas points us toward in
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the above passage. We can with relative ease imagine how a mortal who may be
understood as existing in the world of Hermes happens to meet someone who introduces
him to the world of Aphrodite and there is a subsequent collapse of that former world. If
we think of an individual mortal as being attuned to being by virtue of the god or goddess
he or she presently “serves,” and thus the world he or she occupies, we can see how
something such as love is indeed very different in those two lovers or worlds. This
makes sense when we reflect upon the phenomenological experience of meeting someone
who introduces us to a new way of understanding an old concept. Worlds collide. One
collapses and another emerges. A new world is disclosed. An epochal shift occurs. One
vision dies and a new one is born. There are many other things besides a conception of
love which we can imagine changing in like manner, and we can see how those things are
indeed different in different worlds and how they may be altered by any of the various
connections and encounters that are possible in the fourfold. If we think about a person,
for example, who identifies with the myths of Hermes upon learning of them, when can
understand that he does so due to his own phenomenological experience of existence and
the resonance that exists between that and the myths of Hermes to which he has been
made privy. Thus, we can see that in acquiring a fuller knowledge and appreciation for
myth, the individual's own life is made richer by means of the understanding and insight
that is provided by the myth, by the god himself, by being. And here we can perhaps
begin to see yet again the important place myth, art, and poetry hold for Dasein as a
mortal in the fourfold.
The importance of the attunement of the individual is not to be diminished and thus
again is emphasized the importance of real dwelling for Heidegger. The divinities cannot
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simply express through and with just any human being. They appear to need mortals who
hold within their finitude and orientation toward being the capacity for acting as a
conduit, as a clear channel for glorious manifestation of divinity. The divinities manifest
most beautifully through those who, like Hӧlderlin, are possessed of what Heidegger calls
knowledge and tenderness, that is, mortals who are open, receptive, appreciative and able
to reflect the reality that is divinity. Such mortals, it may be said, are truly loved and
favored by the divinities in that they make of themselves a vessel fit for the indwelling
and operation of these elements, principles, daimones, or divinities. This is precisely
what Heidegger appears to be saying when, in reference to the above quoted lines from
Hӧlderlin’s The Archipelago, he explains that we should understand the word glory as it
appears in the poem in the Pindaric sense as a letting-appear.112 In order for glory to
manifest, the divinities, the hallowed elements, the gods and goddesses, need mortals,
mortals who will let-appear their glory. Here, again, would be relevant those examples
of human greatness mentioned earlier: great musicians, dancers, orators, athletes, and
warriors. Indeed, the artist who possesses the characteristics of knowledge and
tenderness is the fertile ground for the springing forth of the divinity that itself as
principle or element manifests only through the artist in the material world as art. We
find that we have now answered our guiding question as to what is the proper element
allotted to the poet. Feeling for the gods is the proper element allotted to the poet.
Keeping in mind how both Vycinas and Heidegger emphasize that what the gods are
in themselves remains concealed, we should note that in his essay, “Building, Dwelling,
Thinking,” Heidegger tells us that the mortals “do not make the gods.” Vycinas, in his
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Search for Gods, writes, “According to mythical understanding, the gods are not to be
seen as founded on wholly human grounds, but vice versa: man on the transcendental
grounds of gods. Man’s holiness, his beauty, his greatness, his wisdom, are the outcomes
of his serving the gods in their play.”113 While there may be differences to be
understood, I believe it is important to emphasize that from the phenomenological point
of view, both Heidegger and Vycinas understand the experience of mortals in relation to
divinity in this way. Hence Heidegger's assertion in Parmenides, quoted earlier, that “the
daimones are more essential than any being.” We are left to attempt to grasp as best we
are able the nature of the inescapable and inexorable bond that holds between divinities
and mortals, for it is most intimate. Such a bond is representative of the relationship that
holds between all four of the fourfold. And while the manifest and experiential operation
of the fourfold is physis, it is not inaccurate to say that the fourfold is one. The myths by
means of which we learn about the divinities preserve within themselves, albeit in a
somewhat hidden way, the various truths of human being, profound phenomenological
insights into the workings of being as it manifests in and through beings and each of the
four of the fourfold. The undeniably powerful elements that operate in the lives of all
human beings, elements which are referred to as daimones by Heidegger, can be
recognized, appreciated, understood, and thus reverenced for what they are by the return
to and the embrace of myth and the acknowledgment of the role and place and purpose of
art in our mortal lives in our pursuit of real dwelling. The attunement that opens us to
hear the truths found in art and myth, as well as nature itself, is indeed an attunement to
the earth itself, it is a kind of thinking, and thus can it enable our harmonious dwelling
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within the fourfold through the building of new and different worlds. Keeping in mind
the concealed and unconcealed nature of truth, let us seek further unconcealment. We
will now look at these very ideas and other important related ones from a different
vantage point.

Our Loss of Dwelling
IV.1. Our World
Our world is fraught with crises, disorder, injustice, suffering, exploitation, oppression,
degradation, and destruction. Most people, even if unaware of details and specifics, have
a deep and abiding sense of things simply not being “right,” and they suffer a lack of
meaning, happiness, and peace. Whether they are focusing on individual, collective,
societal, or global situations, many people long for guidance, for direction, for someone
to show them a different way or to simply give them hope that a different way is possible.
A very small sampling of some of the crises we are facing may serve to get us properly
oriented: 8% of the world’s population controls 79% of the wealth, and 31% of the
world’s population controls 96% of the wealth, the U.S. has only five percent of the
world’s population yet uses 33 percent of all non-renewable resources and 25 percent of
the planet’s commodities, globally, 1.2 billion people lack safe drinking water, currently,
the U.S. has lost all but 10 percent of its ancient forests, 40 thousand children starve to
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death on our planet each day, animal agriculture produces two billion tons of waste each
year.114 Additionally, there are all the problems, issues, and horrors related to fracking,
famine, mountain top removal, prison as a for-profit industry, oil spills, coral bleaching,
homelessness, ocean acidification, desertification, starvation, hunger, and malnutrition,
the Pacific ocean garbage patch, neglected veterans, Fukushima, colony collapse disorder
and the loss of bees, seemingly endless war and religious strife, and the list goes on and
on. We could conceive of each and every one of these things as a discrete and separate
problem or issue and engage in a thoroughgoing investigation of it, no doubt gaining
understanding of the details and perhaps even hitting upon things relevant to causation.
Perhaps, however, we should consider an approach that attempts to understand these
things more holistically with an eye toward finding the underlying reality or realities that
give rise to each and every one of these problems.
Perhaps a metaphor and analogy is useful here to understand this difference in
approach I am proposing. In traditional Western medicine, illness and the body have
been approached in a very non-holistic way. You have your general practitioners, but
most of the heavy lifting is done by specialists who have devoted themselves to the
understanding and study of one specific part or system of the human body in isolation
from the rest. Today, more and more people recognize the limitations of this approach
despite the seemingly entrenched modes of practice that constitute the industry and
institution that is medicine. The rise of interest in and appreciation for alternative
approaches that view the body holistically and acknowledge the interrelatedness of not
only different systems within the body but the different facets that make up a human
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being speak to this shift in conscious awareness of the integral nature of well-being. If
we were to conceive of our world in the same way we conceive of an individual human
being, recognizing that it is indeed sick, has many, many symptoms, and acknowledge
that while it has various different systems that operate within it, all the systems are
ultimately interrelated and integral to the healthy functioning of the being as a whole, we
can get a sense for the approach I am proposing.
To get us started in reflecting on things, I will offer a summary of the philosophy of
ecofeminism and examine some of the most meaningful contributions of this philosophy
for the gaining of understanding about much of our current human situation and our
current world. Inherent within the ecofeminist framework is theorizing as to how we
arrived at this point, how the current global crises came to be, how we might best
understand the interconnected nature of these crises and the causes that might otherwise
be construed as separate and discrete. As I see it, there is within ecofeminist theorizing
an insightful articulation of the interrelated explanations for the present functioning of
global oppressions and for what I am calling “a general loss of dwelling,” as well as
many other valuable insights pertinent to ideas central to my project. Perhaps most
importantly, however, there is an orientation of openness toward thinking, toward any
and all thinking that takes as its concern the health of the earth, human well-being and
flourishing, and aspires to think toward the eradication of oppression and exploitation and
the cessation of destruction and suffering by cultivating what Trish Glazebrook calls “an
intellectual climate of solidarity, connection and intersection” through the maintenance of
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an “inclusivity that seeks introduction over reduction, emergent growth over confining
and common denominators.”115

IV.2. Ecofeminism and what it Unconceals
Ecofeminism has its roots in the French tradition of feminist theory. Early on, Simone
de Beauvoir made the case that patriarchal reasoning relegated both nature and women to
the realm of other.116 Later, French feminist Francois d’Eaubonne coined the term
“ecofeminism” when she called upon women to bring about ecological revolution in
opposition to the overpopulation and destruction of resources that resulted from
patriarchal rule. In North America, various writers such as Rosemary Radford Ruether
and Carolyn Merchant began to lay the foundation for the much fuller approach that
ecofeminism has come to be today. While there is some disagreement among various
ecofeminists regarding certain issues, there are some basic viewpoints shared by virtually
all ecofeminists, and it is from those that we will take our start.
As its name implies, the philosophical approach that is known as ecofeminism begins
with the supposition that historically there has been a very clear link between the
subjection, domination, and oppression of women and the conquest, destruction, and
exploitation of nature. In attempting to understand the conditions that gave rise to the
mutually reinforcing oppressions of certain humans along with the natural world, specific
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ideas and institutions continually came to the fore. Put most succinctly, ecofeminism
holds that it is the separation between culture and nature that is at the root of all these
current crises. However, that answer, as accurate as it may be, is somewhat vague and
abstract, and itself calls for more thinking. In responding to that call, ecofeminists focus
in on four specific things which provide us with a fuller and more in-depth understanding
and explanation for most if not all of our current crisis situations. The majority of those
claiming to be ecofeminist see each of the four explanations as playing an important role
in the unfolding of our global and human situation in that they are historically and
culturally intertwined and mutually reinforcing in various ways. Metaphorically, these
four things may be conceived as making up the four sides of a frame, the frame of
ecofeminism, through which we are better able to see and understand our world and its
realities in terms of both accurately diagnosing problems and their causes and offering
prognoses. The four things that make up the ecofeminist framework of critique are: the
scientific revolution, capitalism, patriarchal religions, and self and other dualisms.
The first explanation we will look at is that of the scientific revolution and the spread
of the mechanistic universe world view.117 While this shift did not occur overnight, it
was an epochal shift that did indeed occur and involved some serious changes in the
dominant mindset of humanity, or at least in those who wielded power over others and
over what would come to be understood as conventional wisdom. Prior to this epochal
shift, nature was seen as alive. With the shift into the mechanistic materialist model,
nature came to be seen as simple, dead, and inert matter. Nature was increasingly viewed
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as a machine whose laws could be known and understood. What was formerly seen as a
forest, alive and full of life, came to be seen merely in terms of its usefulness. A former
sacred wood became only so many potential square feet of lumber. Thanks to the work
and thought of Descartes, Francis Bacon, and others, both nature and animals, the very
earth itself, came to be understood on the model of a machine, and the entire universe
was taken to be something that could be comprehended mathematically, its laws
discovered and documented, and ultimately manipulated and controlled through analysis,
reason, science, and technology. All of the natural world was thereby reduced to
something to be conquered, dominated, and controlled. Of course, it followed that nature
and all within it existed so as to be used, instrumentalized, and optimized. Under such a
mechanistic, materialist conception, the only ethics that were applicable were the ethics
of utility and perhaps a Hobbesian egoism.
The next explanation for the culture/nature separation that will be addressed is the rise
of capitalism and its accompanying colonialist/imperialist practices. Some ecofeminists
see the rise of feudalism in Europe and the enclosing of the commons and the creation of
private property as bringing about the hierarchy that is endemic to the culture/nature
division by creating the land-owner class and the landless peasants. Engels himself is
often cited, for in 1884 he wrote, “The overthrow of mother-right was the world historical
defeat of the female sex. The man took command in the home also; the woman was
degraded and reduced to servitude, she became the slave of his lust and a mere instrument
for the production of children.”118 While the role and place of women can certainly be
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argued to have been fundamentally altered with the rise of capitalism, it was not only
women who found themselves oppressed, exploited, and denied equal value but anyone
for whom the designation of “other” seemed to apply.
What followed in the colonialist-imperialist expansion was the enslavement of
indigenous peoples, the capturing of land and resources for use and profit by an elite few,
and what came to be a kind of systematic underdevelopment in those places that further
perpetuated not only the twin dominations and exploitations of both women and nature
but also people of color. While it is indeed recognized that indigenous men suffer, the
practical fact is that the domestic responsibilities in such places fall primarily upon
women. Women are the ones responsible for growing and preparing food, gathering
wood for heating and cooking, collecting water for the household, and so on, and this
means that there is an even greater burden placed upon the women since the changes
brought about by the colonizers and imperialists often made these tasks much more
difficult if not sometimes impossible.
The pattern was that indigenous people were forced to stop growing the crops that
they had traditionally grown so as to grow cash crops for export, which of course
translated into very little compensation for the people themselves, and they no longer
were growing the food they needed to survive. Practices such as the clear-cutting of
forests so as to increase crop yield resulted in massive erosion of the soil, and growing
the same cash crop year after year depleted the soil of its nutrients. Thus, these peoples
soon found themselves truly poverty-stricken and in debt to their colonial lenders.
According to Gaard and Gruen:
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The affluence of the North is founded on the natural resources and labor of
the South . . . One debtor nation, the Philippines, is among 70 countries
which annually remit over $50 billion in interest alone to First World
creditors. At this rate, the Third World will be perpetually indentured
servants of the industrialized nations, an outcome well-suited to the goals
of capitalism.119
Perhaps what is most ironic and symbolically telling is that the lifestyle these indigenous
peoples had been living prior to the arrival of the Europeans, although viewed as
“impoverished” and “uncivilized” by the invading Europeans, was in fact what is now
understood as “subsistence living,” and the so-called improvements in material existence
that were supposed to have followed from the civilization and industrialization foisted
upon these people by the Europeans has actually resulted in real material poverty far
worse than ever known before.120
Another crucial and important element of the capitalist paradigm is the way in which
the West established that a nation’s wealth is to be measured by its GNP and GDP. The
logic is that if you consume what you produce, you don’t produce. Thus, production
must be greater than consumption. This imposition rendered the work and product of
most women around the world of zero value in so far as what they produced, they
consumed. Likewise, nature’s own production and destruction are not accounted for in
any way or granted value unless and until they somehow enter the cash economy. As
Gaard and Gruen point out, “A clean lake which offers women fresh water supplies has
no value in these accounting systems; once it is polluted, however, and companies must
be paid to clean it up, then the clean-up activity itself is performed by men and recorded
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as generating income.”121 The failure of capitalism to accord value properly is wellarticulated by Vandana Shiva in many of her books, essays, and articles. She sums it up
well when she writes:
Thus nature’s amazing cycles of renewal of water and nutrients are
defined into nonproduction. The peasants of the world, who provide 72%
of the food, do not produce; women who farm or do most of the
housework do not fit this paradigm of growth either. A living forest does
not contribute to growth, but when trees are cut down and sold as timber,
we have growth. Healthy societies and communities do not contribute to
growth, but disease creates growth through, for example, the sale of
patented medicine.122
Once we are made able to see what is right in front of us, it does quickly come into focus.
These ideas are not foreign in any way to our own popular culture, as evidenced by
bumper stickers and memes on facebook even that say, “There is no profit in the cure of
cancer.”
The third ecofeminist explanation offered is the advent of patriarchal religion.
Another epochal shift, this one occurring long before the scientific revolution, began
roughly 4500 BCE. Around that time, there was a shift away from long-standing, earthbased, goddess-worshipping religions, in which both the earth’s and women’s fertility
were seen as sacred and reverenced accordingly, in favor of the worship of sky gods who
were distant and removed from the earth and its people yet ruled over them nonetheless.
Various cultures that had long existed without gender hierarchies now esteemed man
above woman. Cultures in which divinity had been understood as immanent and present
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in both nature and humanity came to conceive of divinity as merely transcendent. Many
cultures made the transition when they fell under the rule of leaders and/or invaders who
had such ideologies, myths, and religions and imposed their views upon the conquered
people, the native tribes of the North American continent and their subordination to
invading Europeans and their beliefs being perhaps one of the most recent examples of
this type of occurrence. Such patriarchal religious views entailed that the earth and all
therein were created by a god or gods who created and ruled from outside. This
conception of a distant and masculine authority paved the way for the role of the male to
be elevated above that of the female in reproduction; the female was compared to a
barren field awaiting the planting of male seed. Of course, this change occurred over
time and at different rates in different places but certainly was in full effect by the time of
both the Jews and the Greeks. Within the Judaeo-Christian tradition, man’s dominance
over both women and nature is entrenched and, moreover, is reinforced by a mythology
of divine command.123
Some ecofeminists approach this issue from an anthropological perspective, and thus
they see patriarchy itself as the result of developments in human evolution. They argue
that once male hominids began hunting for food and interacting with other hominids
outside their specific group, the realm of culture was conceived, and it was one involving
men’s death-oriented activities, while women, who were weaker and smaller and whose
reproductive capacities and obligations prevented them from engaging in the hunting
activities of the men, were relegated to the realm of non-culture, along with animals and
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nature.124 This distinguishing of the realm of culture from the realm involving domestic
and reproductive activities is one that is common to ancient Greek thought and made
evident by a study of language, as we will see in the following chapter. The emphasis,
however, even for those thinkers who approach these issues from the human evolution
standpoint is upon the division between men and women that is intimately linked up with
the division between culture and nature.
The fourth and final explanation, that of self and other dualisms, is conceptual one and
is the most abstract of the four and in many ways is itself an aspect of each of the other
three. Nonetheless, ecofeminists see it as important to distinguish it as a separate idea,
and its usefulness as a tool of analysis and criticism will hopefully make itself apparent as
we go along. Self and other dualisms are also sometimes referred to as value dualisms.125
Essentially, these dualisms may be understood as valuations that esteem all things
associated with the self and devalue all things associated with the other. Oppression and
domination are built in to such thinking in that the other by means of negation is the
means for defining or understanding the self as powerful, good, and the like. This idea
that an individual or a group will use another individual or a group as a means to his or
their own identity or “goodness” is not a new idea or one confined to ecofeminism or
feminism for that matter. The writings of various existentialists, for example, and other
thinkers are rife with such discussions.126 From the ecofeminist point of view, women
have been systematically rendered as the other and linked up with nature in that
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designation throughout the epoch of history known as patriarchy. The systematic
devaluing of all things deemed non-masculine or “feminine” has served to create an
entrenched mode of thinking that has resulted in the ever-increasing loss of an entire
section of the spectrum of the possible. Dualisms such as self/other, culture/nature,
reason/emotion, practical/impractical, civilized/wild, white/non-white,
heterosexual/homosexual all serve to establish value hierarchies and determine what
constitutes the norm. Moreover, I contend that in the process of defining what’s
normative, what may rightfully be understood as being “masculine” comes also to
determine what is seen as “neutral.” A good example of this idea is found in the use of
type-face or fonts. Seldom, if ever, does a font get described as “masculine.” Rather,
such fonts that from a critical view might be termed “masculine” are more commonly
referred to as “standard” or “ordinary” or “business” fonts. Such fonts would include
Times New Roman and Arial. Fonts that are not “standard” may be termed “frilly”
“feminine” or “artsy.” Such fonts would include Monotype Corsiva, Papyrus, Perpetua,
and any of the scripts. The identification between the masculine and the neutral was
acknowledged by de Beauvoir when she wrote, “In actuality the relation of the two sexes
is not quite like that of two electrical poles, for man represents both the positive and the
neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to designate human beings in
general.”127
I believe that it is worth taking a small detour here and looking at some of Heidegger’s
thoughts on the loss of handwriting with the rise of the use of the typewriter. I think that
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we can see definite points of intersection between Heidegger and ecofeminism by looking
at this particular and interesting issue. Heidegger says:
Man himself acts through the hand; for the hand is, together with the
word, the essential distinction of man . . . The hand exists as hand only
where there is disclosure and concealment . . . The word as what is
inscribed and what appears to the regard is the written word, i.e., script.
And the word as script is handwriting. It is not accidental that modern
man writes “with” the typewriter and “dictates” into a machine . . . The
typewriter tears writing from the essential realm of the hand, i.e., the realm
of the word . . . In the time of the first dominance of the typewriter, a letter
written on this machine still stood for a breach of good manners. Today a
hand-written letter is an antiquated and undesired thing; it disturbs speed
reading. Mechanical writing deprives the hand of its rank in the realm of
the written word and degrades the word to a means of communication. In
addition, mechanical writing provides this “advantage,” that it conceals
the handwriting and thereby the character. The typewriter makes everyone
looks the same.128
Making everyone look the same is of course the essence of a “neutral” means of
communication, no doubt, and a “neutral” font would be requisite. The mechanical
writing that Heidegger speaks of is itself the result of the implementation of scientific and
technological advances, and of course the efficiency of this mechanization is well-suited
to the goals and purposes of capitalism. Heidegger’s assertion that the concealment of
handwriting is a concealment of character is perhaps the most important, for in that
assertion we can tie together many of the important ideas that span the breadth of this
project. Modern humanity, having been shaped by the ideals of the scientific revolution,
patriarchal religion, capitalism, and enslaved by the reigning value dualisms, not only
assent to a reduction to the same via mechanical writing but may well enjoy the
anonymity and concealment of character that it provides. Loss of dwelling presupposes

128

Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 80.

101

loss of self, and if self is lost, there is no substantial character to come through in one’s
script. Just as one may be all too content to be a merely calculative thinker, one may be
content to be merely a façade, an optimized resource, a shiny exterior that conceals the
absence of the fourfold within. It should not be surprising that human beings who are
subjected from birth to systems of existence which operate on the principles of
denigration and domination opt to forego the depths and tread only the surface.
Regarding the self and other dualisms, Gaard and Gruen point out, “Domination is
built in to such dualisms because the other is negated in the process of defining a
powerful self.”129 Certain ideological underpinnings that connect women to nature and/or
animals thus configuring them as other are often revealed when a closer look is taken at
language itself. Any close critique of language, as Mary Daly has shown in numerous
works, uncovers the rampant and widespread use of words and phrases that perpetuate
ideologies which serve to reinforce the inferior status of women and nature. An
examination of this phenomenon with an openness to seeing what it reveals, coupled with
Heidegger's idea that although humanity wishes to believe itself ruler, it is language that
is master, proves helpful in understanding further the ecofeminist viewpoint. Moreover,
as ecofeminists often point out, any group of people who are deemed as other will be
subjected to this same process of animalization, feminization, and naturalization via the
language employed in reference to them in the process of subordinating them. This
process may be observed in an analysis of the metaphors of language that are used to
describe a given individual or group. Gaard and Gruen point out just a few instances of
this by referencing such terms and phrases as ‘virgin forest,’ ‘rape of nature,’ ‘bitch,’ ‘old

129

Gaard and Gruen, “Ecofeminism: Toward Global Justice and Planetary Health,” 278.

102

hen’ and ‘sow.’130 In terms of animals having their names applied to humans, I would
add to the list ‘cow,’ ‘hog,’ ‘pig,’ ‘chicken,’ ‘dog,’ ‘cougar,’ ‘tiger,’ ‘wolf,’ ‘snake,’
‘squirrel,’ ‘worm,’ ‘rat,’ ‘mouse,’ ‘alley cat,’ ‘fox,’ and ‘beaver,’ although that last one is
used in reference to a particular body part of a woman. In each instance, regardless of
which animal name is being used and regardless of what traits are being alluded to as
existing in the human referent, there is clearly a value hierarchy that is implied in the
animalization of the human being and a configuring of that human being as an other.
There are many terms and phrases employed in language whose ideological
underpinnings may call for close examination. Here I want to take a look at a couple of
very contemporary terms that have since their introduction into common vocabulary
struck me as very relevant: “douche” and “douchebag.” I noticed the entrance of these
terms used in their current fashion about three years ago. According to Merriam Webster
online dictionary, “douche” is defined as “a liquid that a woman squirts into her vagina to
wash it; also: an object used to squirt such a liquid into the vagina.”131 I found it very
interesting that while the online free dictionary called Dictionary.com offered the
following definition for “douche bag”: “a small syringe having detachable nozzles for
fluid injections, used chiefly for vaginal lavage and for enemas,”132 the Merriam Webster
online dictionary only provided the current slang meaning for the term: “an unattractive
or offensive person.”133 The contemporary usage of the terms as forms of slang is
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rampant; a quick googling of the terms shows that forth undeniably. The slang meaning
of both terms is spelled out on urbandictionary.com, a site that itself is a veritable gold
mine for further proving ecofeminst theses about language. On urbandictionary.com
“douche” is defined as “a word to describe an individual who has shown themself to be
very brainless in one way or another, thus comparing them to the cleansing product for
vaginas.”134 Urbandictionary.com also defines “douchebag” as “someone who has
surpassed the levels of jerk and asshole, however not yet reached fucker or motherfucker.
Not to be confuzed with douche.”135 By all means, let’s do avoid being “confuzed.”
First, there is the perhaps obvious misogynistic and degrading putting-to-use of these
terms in these new and contemporary ways in order to describe specific persons and
attribute to them specific characteristics. There is an entire ideology of the vagina as
something “dirty” and “unclean” built into the terms themselves along with the even
more degraded means by which such “filthy things” would be cleaned. Then there is the
fact that actual douching is now widely understood and scientifically verified to be not
only completely unnecessary but often unhealthy and potentially dangerous.136 Yet, as is
reported by the National Institute of Health, douching continues to be practiced, and even
more so by poor women and women of color.137 These terms then are not only great
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examples of the self and other dualisms present within language but are easily linked up
with all four of the main areas of concern that constitute the ecofeminist critique: the
mechanization and technologization of the body and all natural processes, the
commodification of the body and its clinicalization so as to render it in need of product
and service by a capitalist industry, value dualisms imposed that impart the female body’s
less-than status, and the patriarchal mindset that feels justified in imposing the other three
in so far as women’s bodies are considered their territory and ultimately under their
purvey and control. Language is indeed the master, a medium for the sedimentation and
consequent reinforcement of these somewhat subtle yet undeniable forms of oppression.
This ecofeminist frame, made up of the close and critical examination of these four
phenomena of the scientific revolution, capitalism, patriarchal religion, and self and other
dualisms, and an understanding of the role and function of each and their mutually
reinforcing interrelatedness, will enable us as we go along to develop clearer means of
surveying our world and to more clearly see the very real ways in which human beings
are experiencing what I am calling “a loss of dwelling.”

IV.3. Nietzsche's Insights: Patriarchal Religion and the Otherworld
While "Patriarchal Religion" is not an explicit theme in Nietzsche's work, we can
examine certain of his ideas from an ecofeminist point of view and see that his ideas do
indeed express insights to which we could make appeal in a critique of many of the
concerns central to the ecofeminist point of view. In his Thus Spake Zarathustra, Beyond
Good and Evil, and Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche speaks of the attachment of the
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resentful to the “otherworldly” (überirdischen, literally, the “over-earthly” and sometimes
translated as “supernatural”), and he emphasizes that within the Judeo-Christian
worldview there is an overemphasis upon and an overconcern with a “true world,” a
place other than this world, a place above, beyond, or outside of the earthly realm that we
can experience. Nietzsche takes serious issue with the fact that they embrace a
metaphysics that is "hostile to the senses."138 Nietzsche, speaking as Zarathustra, says, "I
beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth, and do not believe those who
speak to you of otherworldly hopes! Poison-mixers are they, whether they know it or
not. Despisers of life are they, decaying and poisoned themselves, of whom the earth is
weary: so let them go."139 Those who would focus upon an otherworld are betrayers of
life, it seems, and being decaying and poisoned themselves, they seek to poison others.
Let’s look at the points of intersection between Nietzsche’s thought and the ideas of
ecofeminism.
Nietzsche’s assessment of the Judaeo-Christian worldview as primarily responsible for
the rise in attachment to the “otherworldly” and the concomitant loss of intimate
connection with and care and concern for the earth is much like the ecofeminist idea that
the rise of patriarchal religion is responsible for many of the current ills of our planet due
to their rejection of immanent divinity and their profaning of the flesh and of nature itself
and their embrace of a belief in a merely transcendental divinity. The Judaeo-Christian
worldview, by overthrowing the earth-based, goddess-worshipping religions and
emphasizing a male-centered cosmogony, once spread via the Roman Empire and then
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the Roman Catholic Church, may be understood as one of the most crucial events in
history in this regard. Nietzsche argues that those who are focused on the otherworld
become haters or despisers of life itself. In their embrace of and emphasis upon the
otherworld, they reject life as its own justification and demand something outside of life
to justify it. Nietzsche’s idea thus resonates with the ecofeminist assertion that in
foregoing a belief in immanent divinity in favor of a belief in divinity as transcendent
only, there is a fundamental loss of reverence for life itself and the life-giving power of
the earth, nature, and the feminine. Life is no longer sacred but must require
sanctification from outside itself.
One may also see Nietzsche as coinciding with ecofeminist thinking in terms of
concerns about the paradigm created by the scientific revolution and the consequent
issues arising therefrom. For as Nietzsche argued, religion had provided answers
regarding ultimate purposes, and science then ushered in the doubt and progressive
overthrow of religion. But while science may try to fill the void created by the death of
god, and people may even come to worship science as the new religion, science cannot
actually achieve that end. Science as such has no consideration for ultimate purposes.140
The “death of God,” or nihilism, may be understood as this lack of any ultimate reasons
for being. In the opening of his work Will to Power, Nietzsche writes, “What does
nihilism mean? That the highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking:
“why?” finds no answer.”141 For both Nietzsche and ecofeminist thinkers, the mindset
belonging to the mechanistic materialist model of the universe is one that deprives
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existence of ultimate purposes, denies inherent or intrinsic value, and ultimately reduces
everything to meaningless resources awaiting optimization.
We can further develop this important intersection between Nietzsche and
ecofeminism in terms of the ways in which Nietzsche speaks about self and other. In the
Genealogy, he states:
Whereas all noble morality grows out of a triumphant affirmation of
oneself, slave morality immediately says No to what comes from outside,
to what is different, to what is not oneself: and this No is its creative deed.
This reversal of the value-positing glance--this necessary direction
outward instead of back to oneself--is of the nature of ressentiment: to
come into being, slave morality requires an outside world, a counterworld;
first an opposing world, a world outside itself. Psychologically speaking, it
requires external stimuli in order to act at all. Its action is basically
reaction.142
Nietzsche's point in this quotation is an excellent example of the concept central to the
ecofeminist critique of self and other dualisms or value dualisms. Nietzsche argues that
the very system of valuation which is contingent upon dualities is itself flawed in that the
self in such a system does not see itself first but only sees itself subsequently and through
others.143 The existence and conceptualization of the other is the necessary condition for
the existence and conceptualization of the self, one might say, at least for those Nietzsche
would label “slaves.” Of course, it is this very type of evaluative system that
ecofeminists see as operative and at play in the twin dominations of women and nature.
Patriarchy, as a way of thinking, emerged in the thinking of men who sought to develop
their self-understanding by means of contrasting themselves with the other as embodied
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in both women and nature. It is in the event of the conceptual linking of women with
nature in the thinking of men that men conceive themselves as linked to culture. This is
an idea, as explained earlier, that is embraced by those ecofeminists who look to
developments in human evolution to understand the rise of patriarchy. Woman’s
physical weakness and reproductive capacities were a reason to separate her from man.
“Her life-bearing activities stood in sharp contrast to the death-oriented activities that
underlie culture.” 144 Other ecofeminists, not so anthropologically oriented, see the
ascendancy of patriarchy as involving men taking over all determinations of value, and
regardless of what their motives may have been, relegating woman to a less-than status in
establishing themselves as superior, rational, logical, productive, and conquest-seeking.
Men defined themselves in self-conscious opposition to women as they perceived them.
The tendency to think in terms of self and other has been argued by many to be basic to
the functioning of human thinking. Even de Beauvoir said that, “The category of the
Other is as primordial as consciousness itself.”145 However, this tendency, no matter how
primordial, has also been argued to be something that can and should be overcome or at
least recognized and resisted, contextualized, and rendered contingent and thus less
oppressive, all the more so when it is understood to be motivated from power-seeking
impulses such as fear and aggression. Nietzsche’s own assessment of the motivation for
the thinking typified by the slaves is that they are essentially fear-driven. This fear
prompts them to define themselves as good or superior by means of denigrating the other.
This is the precise kind of thinking Nietzsche describes when he writes, "Imagine "the
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enemy" as conceived by a man of ressentiment--and here precisely is his deed, his
creation: he has conceived "the evil enemy," "the evil one"--and indeed as the
fundamental concept from which he then derives, as an after-image and counterinstance,
a "good one"--himself."146 We would understand this as applicable in the sense that it is
only in his defining “woman” or “the feminine” that he can then define himself as an
“after-image.” In his defining of woman and nature in this way, he necessitates that both
be dominated and controlled, for the after-image created is one of a rightful conqueror
and ruler. With these ideas in mind, let us turn our attention now to look at the
mythological figure of Lilith, representative of women and the feminine in the JudaeoChristian tradition, using as tools for our analysis some enlightening ideas of Giorgio
Agamben on how sovereign power is constituted.
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Lilith and Agamben
V.1. Ideas
Taking seriously Foucault’s idea that power should be thought of in terms of the
concrete ways it penetrates not only the lives of subjects but their very bodies, Giorgio
Agamben develops an interesting set of critical ideas in his book Homa Sacer: Sovereign
Power and Bare Life. I shall endeavor to explain these ideas and then appropriate them
in an attempt to provide an ecofeminist perspective on a seemingly timeless conception
of a certain aspect of the feminine found in the mythological figure of Lilith. The
concepts Agamben develops and employs that are relevant to this undertaking are: zoē,
bios, homo sacer, bare life, sovereignty, and the state of exception.
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In the spirit of Foucault and looking at power and power structures in terms of the
ways in which they directly play upon the very physicality of a subject’s being, I shall
demonstrate how Agamben’s ideas may be appropriated and used to better understand
certain ideas surrounding a particular conception of the feminine, particular beliefs and
practices that were developed in relation thereto, as well as specific phenomenological
experiences that, I believe, are not confined to any particular place or time but that
perpetually recur so long as a given society is conceived of as being under the control
both politically and religiously by what, for our purposes, I will refer to herein as the
sovereign masculine.
This chapter will be divided into three parts. In this first section, I will attempt to lay
out the meaning and use of the relevant terms developed and employed by Agamben,
with the understanding that I will take them up again in further discussion and application
of the concepts in the third section of the chapter. In the second part of the chapter I will
introduce and discuss the character of Lilith, an ancient she-demon found in the teachings
and myths of various cultures but one primarily developed in Judaism and more
extensively in the mystical branch of Judaism known as Kabbalah. In the third section of
the chapter I will show how Agamben’s ideas may be used in an analysis of Lilith, as
well as her counterparts, Adam and Eve, and how the insights gained from that analysis
demonstrate the applicability of the ecofeminist critique.
My intent with the undertaking in this chapter is threefold: I want to demonstrate via
an examination of a mythological figure the way in which myth does indeed reflect
human beings’ understanding and interpretation of their lived phenomenological
experiences. Whose experiences are being reflected in any given myth will be an
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important question to ask ourselves. I also want to demonstrate via an examination of
this mythological figure the ways in which the ecofeminist framework, in good
Heideggerian fashion, may assist us in seeing something that has been right in front of us
all along but was nonetheless unseen. Finally, I want to demonstrate how Agamben’s
ideas, giving us insight as they do into the underlying structure and operation of political
power, provide us yet another means of better understanding the way in which the four
core areas of concern in ecofeminism intersect to bring about real material
disempowerment for certain human beings as bodies in the world and citizens of a polis,
this being relevant in itself and as an integral part of our loss of dwelling.
One further thought: from the phenomenological point of view, discussions of the
feminine, it seems, are often reductive. The feminine, as a phenomenological experience
that is concretely described is not often enough recognized as more than one-dimensional
in the course of analysis and inquiry. And too often, when an analysis of the feminine is
undertaken and the feminine is approached as something complex or multi-faceted, it is
done with a view toward the reintegration of the parts into a neat and tidy unity that
misses the crucial and necessary division of the feminine into different aspects that, I
hope to demonstrate, are what allow for the usurpation of sovereign power by the
masculine.
In the “Introduction” to his work Homo Sacer, Agamben examines two concepts, zoē
and bios, the understanding of which is crucial to the further and related ideas he
develops, those of homo sacer, bare life, sovereignty and the state of exception. Relying
upon his study and understanding of the classical tradition, Agamben explains how the
ancient Greeks conceived of life in two distinct and separate ways. He writes:
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[The Greeks] used two terms that, although traceable to a common
etymological root, are semantically and morphologically distinct: zoē,
which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings
(animals, men or gods), and bios, which indicated the form or way of
living proper to an individual or a group.147
Agamben explains that zoē, as such, was excluded from the polis proper in the Greek
tradition and was restricted to the domestic sphere or home in that it was understood as
merely reproductive life. Bios, on the other hand, is a life that aims toward the good, it is
a life with a particular telos, a life to be lived and fully realized in the polis. Bios is the
kind of life to which only man can attain in so far as man is that which is able by means
of his possession of certain capacities to realize logos within himself. Of course, for the
Greeks, “man” does here mean “men” only. Women were not included as members of
the polis thus understood.
This distinction that Agamben directs our attention to is indeed in keeping with the
distinction that ecofeminists hold to be so crucially important, that is, the distinction
between nature and culture. Additionally, in investigating the terms zoē and bios,
Agamben discovers a division that seems predicated upon what anthropologicallyminded ecofeminists feel is so important, a division that is predicated upon reproductive
activity and the consignment of those caught up therein to the domestic sphere only.
Agamben offers further insight into the interesting way in which these two kinds of
life are connected and how they should be understood as a standard pair in the West when
he writes:
The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of
friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē/bios,
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exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being
who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and,
at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an
inclusive exclusion.148
For Agamben, bare life, in a very real sense, is that which by means of being included
through its exclusion forms the very foundation of the entire political system. In other
words, bare life is held to be without place in the political realm, but because the very
notion of bios entails bare life as that to which it opposes and distinguishes itself, it is
included as what establishes the fundamental boundaries of the political domain by
means of its exclusion. This is a crucial point to be understood. So, it is by the very act
of making the distinction between bare life and bios and asserting that only the latter is
rightfully to be found in the political realm that bare life is nonetheless included in the
realm of the political by means of its being excluded. Speaking further to this point,
Agamben writes:
At once excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political
order, the state of exception actually constituted, in its very separateness,
the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rested.149
The idea that the state of exception constitutes the very foundation for the political
system is an important idea we will be looking at often throughout this chapter.150
Agamben goes on to explain to us that the very “force” of law is comprised by the ability
of law to assert itself in relation to that which is exterior to it.151 One way we may
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render his meaning here is to say that the force of the same/self is made up of its capacity
to assert itself in relation to an other. The other is crucial to the operation and function of
the same/self. Without the other, the same/self could not exist. Again, Agamben is
articulating an idea, a dynamic that is in perfect alignment with the ideas articulated by
both ecofeminism and Nietzsche. In explaining further the interdependence of and
intimate connection between that which is included and that which is excluded, Agamben
writes:
Here what is outside is included not simply by means of an interdiction or
an internment, but rather by means of the suspension of the juridical
order’s validity—by letting the juridical order, that is, withdraw from the
exception and abandon it. The exception does not subtract itself from the
rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and,
maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a
rule.152
The exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself,
gives rise to the exception. This idea is a crucial aspect of his theory and important for
our purposes, as well. Agamben asserts that that which gets excluded in no way is
excluded by means of something intrinsic to it or as a result of something that it itself
does or asserts. Rather, that which gets excluded, for Agamben, is best seen as a nonactor, a non-agent, a pure passivity, in the sense that what happens to it is precisely that
which happens to it as a result of the action and agency of something else that asserts
itself as the rule. The actor or the agent in this event is that which is the rule. The rule,
in suspending itself, creates the exception to it. Thus, what is outside the realm over
which the rule is operative is so by means of the very rule itself, and the rule, in
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maintaining itself in relation to the exception it created, renders itself the rule. This
sounds very much like Gaard and Gruen’s observation in explaining ecofeminism’s
concern with self and other dualisms, “Domination is built into such dualisms because
the other is negated in the process of defining a powerful self.”153
To illustrate Agamben’s idea of how the rule makes of itself the rule by establishing
the exception, I offer the following analogy: imagine there are a group of children
playing together. Now, one child determines for whatever reason that she no longer
wishes to speak or interact with one of the other children. She henceforth engages in
what we would call the silent treatment in regards to the rejected child. In so far as she
maintains her position and refuses to speak or be engaged by the rejected child that she
has chosen to shun, under Agamben’s theory, she simultaneously creates both herself as
the rule and the other child as the exception. The other child is indeed included in the
shunning child’s realm of power by means of being excluded. The shunned child in this
situation was indeed a non-actor, a non-agent in this unfolding. The shunned child, as
Agamben would say, did not subtract herself from the rule but was abandoned or made an
exception by the actions of the shunning child who asserts herself as the rule by means of
suspending herself in relation to the other child.
Agamben explains that the dynamic does not simply end in the rule and its exception,
but rather in establishing itself by means of delineating that which is excluded, it founds
its power so as to make a further distinction. To explain this, he appeals to the literal
historical figure in Roman law of the homo sacer. This is not just some abstract area of
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intersection between bare life and bios to be analyzed in order to understand the concepts,
but the concrete and very real example through which the ideas may be understood is the
home sacer, the one abandoned, exiled, and cast out. Drawing upon a number of
classical sources, Agamben offers a sketch of homo sacer that tells us of his uniqueness
in that he is the person, “who may be killed and yet not sacrificed.”154 Here Agamben
speaks of the simultaneous abandonment of the person of homo sacer by both the
juridical realm and the divine realm by means of the withdrawal of the law from homo
sacer in each of those two realms:
What defines the status of homo sacer is therefore not the originary
ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong to him, but rather
both the particular character of the double exclusion into which he is taken
and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. This violence—the
unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may commit—is
classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither as the execution of
a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. Subtracting itself from the
sanctioned forms of both human and divine law, this violence opens a
sphere of human action that is neither the sphere of sacrum facere nor that
of profane action. This sphere is precisely what we are trying to
understand here.155
The figure of homo sacer, for Agamben, is one that sheds light on the very structure
and nature of politics and the operation of sovereign power. Agamben goes to great
lengths to demonstrate how homo sacer should not be understood as the result of some
ambivalence of the sacred. Rather, homo sacer, as a figure who is beyond both penal law
and murder as well as divine law and sacrifice, is “the originary figure of life taken into
the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the
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political dimension was first constituted.”156 Thus, homo sacer is a concrete
manifestation of the reality of a dimension of existence that is neither sacred nor profane,
a zone of indistinction whose very existence is that which allows for the possibility of the
distinction itself and the consequent naming and constituting of those two realms in
which sovereign power is operative, that is, the juridical realm and the divine realm.157
This dimension of existence, this zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide,
this zone from which is made the distinction between bare life and sacred life, between
zoē and bios, is that which constitutes the first content of sovereign power.158
Homo sacer is the person who has effectively been abandoned by both the juridical
and the divine orders. The sovereign, in both of those realms, whether he be the same or
different, exercises his sovereign authority by virtue of the withdrawal of the protection
afforded by being included in his realm of dominion. However, the withdrawal of the
protection and the resultant abandonment are nonetheless themselves supreme exercises
of sovereign power. Thus, the realm in which homo sacer finds himself is a realm that,
although a state of exception, is nonetheless a realm in which sovereign power is
manifest in its own absence. Doubly excluded from both the juridical and divine realms,
homo sacer is neither fit for sacrifice nor worthy enough to be a victim of homicide. He
or she may be killed with impunity. The realm in which homo sacer exists is not a realm
merely devoid of law but is a realm that results from the exercise of sovereign power in
its highest form, according to Agamben. Homo sacer finds himself abandoned, cast out,
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excluded, and under ban by means of sovereign power’s fullest exercise of power, that is,
sovereign power’s ability to rule by suspending the very law it creates.

V.2. Lilith
Lilith is a character who has appeared in a range of times and places, such as the
Sumerian epic poem Gilgamesh from around 2400 BCE, the Babylonian Talmud, which
was compiled ca. 500 CE, Aramaic incantation bowls that date between the 5th and 7th
centuries CE, the Dead Sea Scrolls ca. 3rd century BCE through 1st century CE, as well as
various Kabblistic sources from the medieval period, including The Zohar ca. 1270 CE.
While particular details may vary from source to source, there are nonetheless some
central features that are essential to her across place and time. While an attentive and
thoughtful student of folklore, myth, and religion will see similarities between Lilith and
other feminine mythological figures, for my purposes, I will be offering a sketch of
certain of Lilith’s central features that render us more easily able to make sense of her in
relation to the various concepts and ideas under discussion here in this chapter and in this
dissertation as a whole. My purpose here is not to prove that there exists this particular
understanding of Lilith nor to provide extensive documentation for this understanding of
Lilith throughout various times and places but rather to acquaint the reader with the
mythological figure in general.
As is well known, in the book of Genesis there are two separate accounts of creation,
Genesis 1:1-2:3 and Genesis 2:4-25. These two accounts differ in that in the first account
humans are said to have been created after the animals were created, and male and female
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human beings were created simultaneously, both being made from the dirt of the earth.
In the second account of creation, which is the more widely known account, human
beings were created before the animals, and the female human being was created after the
male and from his very flesh, specifically from his rib.
It is believed that it was this difference in the two accounts of the creation myth that
first gave rise to the stories of Lilith. It is thought that Jewish biblical scholars, in an
attempt to make sense of the existence of two differing accounts of the creation of
woman, developed the understanding of Lilith as the first wife of Adam. Lilith, like
Adam, was created by God from the earth and was thus equal to Adam. Viewing herself
as equal to Adam, she was reluctant to submit to him. When he sought dominion over
her, she was quarrelsome and contentious. She did, however, provoke in Adam much
desire for her. Yet, she refused his advances and did not wish to lay under him for the
sex act. The story goes that when Lilith saw that Adam was determined to overpower
her, she uttered the name of God, rose up into the air and flew away to live at the Red
Sea, a place full of lascivious demons with whom she was said to have acted out her lust
and passion, giving birth to more than a hundred demons daily.159
Once Lilith was gone, God made Adam a second wife, Eve. This wife God made
from Adam’s own flesh, and Adam found her more properly submissive to his authority.
However, it was not too long before Lilith made her presence felt again in Adam’s life.
In the Garden of Eden, Lilith appeared to Eve as a serpent and seduced her into eating of
the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Lilith then prompted Eve to tempt
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Adam with this fruit, as well. Here we can see that the aspect of the feminine represented
by Lilith in the myth is not without intimate relation to the aspect of the feminine
represented by Eve. Although Eve is a version of the feminine that is perhaps “less evil”
than Lilith, she is still, in her being as woman, susceptible to the influence of Lilith. Eve
must, therefore, be kept under tight rein so as to prevent Lilith being a further corruptive
influence.
Adam, after succumbing to the temptations of Eve that were instigated by Lilith,
separated himself from Eve for 130 years. He imposed this period of penitence upon
himself once he realized that through the weakness he had experienced as a result of the
beguiling and seductive feminine he had brought the curse of mortality to mankind.
During this period, in which he abstained from sex with Eve, Adam found that on
occasion he would have involuntary nocturnal emissions. Such events were understood
to be the result of the work of Lilith, who would visit and seduce him in the night so as to
use his semen to create more demons and evil spirits. It was from this understanding of
the biblical text that, in the first century AD, Rabbi Hanina was prompted to issue a
warning that forbade men from sleeping alone in a house since, under such conditions,
Lilith would likely seduce them.160 Lilith, as the seductive lust-inspiring aspect of the
feminine, is an ever-present threat to men:
And she [Lilith] goes and roams at night, and goes all about the world and
makes sport with men and causes them to emit seed. In every place where
a man sleeps alone in a house, she visits him and grabs him and attaches
herself to him and has her desire from him, and bears from him. And she
also afflicts him with sickness, and he knows it not, and all this takes place
when the moon is on the wane.161
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The sexually seductive power of Lilith is so strong that there can be no doubt that it
has its source in evil, and, as such, it must be countered by any means necessary. While
Lilith succeeds all too easily at seducing men in their sleep, she is also a danger to the
wide awake as well. Consider the following:
She adorns herself like a despicable harlot, and takes up her position at the
crossroads to seduce the sons of man. When a fool approaches her, she
grabs him, kisses him, and pours him wine of dregs of viper’s gall. As
soon as he drinks it, he goes astray after her. When she sees that he has
gone astray after her from the path of truth, she divests herself of all
ornaments which she put on for that fool. Her ornaments for the seduction
of the sons of man are: her hair is long and red like the rose, her cheeks
are white and red, from her ears hang six ornaments, Egyptian chords hang
from her nape and all the ornaments of the Land of the East, her mouth is
set like a narrow door, comely in its décor, her tongue is sharp like a
sword, her words are smooth like oil, her lips are red like a rose and
sweetened by all the sweetness of the world, she is dressed in scarlet, and
she is adorned with forty ornaments less one. Yon fool goes astray after
her and drinks from the cup of wine and commits with her fornication and
strays after her. What does she thereupon do? She leaves him asleep on
the couch, flies up to heaven, denounces him, takes leave, and descends.
That fool awakens and deems he can make sport with her as before, but
she removes her ornaments and turns into a menacing figure, and stands
before him clothed in garments of flaming fire, inspiring terror and
making body and soul tremble, full of frightening eyes, in her hand a
drawn sword dripping bitter drops. And she kills that fool and casts him
into Gehenna.162
One of the implications of the above passage is that only a fool allows himself to be
tempted by the Lilith aspect of the feminine and does so at his own peril. For despite
alluring appearance and the promise and even fulfillment of sensual delight, this aspect of
the feminine is dangerous, deadly, and inherently destructive to man as such. By no
means, however, are we to understand Lilith, as an aspect of the feminine, to only be
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present in the person of a prostitute or any other woman of so-called “loose morals.”
Lilith, we will see, is always ready to make an appearance when there are any activities
of a sexual nature taking place or even being contemplated, even between a legally
wedded man and wife. Lilith, it seems, is responsible for and lurks behind all perceptions
on the part of men that are of a sensual, erotically appealing, or enticing nature. The
following illustrates this idea:
And behold, that hard shell, Lilith, is always present in the bedlinen of
man and wife when they copulate, in order to take hold of the sparks of the
drops of semen which are lost—because it is impossible without such.
But there is an incantation for this, to chase away the Lilith from the bed
and to bring forth pure souls.163
and
Lilith, God preserve us, has dominion over children who issue from him
who couples with his wife in candlelight, or with his wife naked, or at a
time when he is forbidden to have intercourse with her.164
A man who feels desire for his wife, or any other woman, desire that is in any way
beyond the scope of what is legally, religiously, or morally permissible, feels such desire
because of Lilith. It appears that erotic desire itself is the result of Lilith’s presence and
evil-doing. Lilith is the source and cause of all incarnate sexual desire and lust.
There is another important aspect to Lilith besides her seductiveness and role as the
source of all sexual sin and that is her role as child-killer. Lilith is seen as ultimately
responsible for all barrenness, miscarriages, stillbirths, infant deaths, and any other
manner of affliction having to do with reproductive capacity, pregnancy and childbirth.
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It is held that she is motivated to do these things out of spite, hatred, jealousy, wrath, and
envy. Women are understood to be especially susceptible to the influence of and harm
from Lilith during certain times, such as prior to the loss of virginity, during
menstruation, and the hours before childbirth.165 Thus, it appears that all things uniquely
feminine in the embodied sense are themselves “evil” in being intimately connected to
Lilith.
Inscriptions found upon many of the Aramaic incantation bowls make evident the
perceived power of Lilith. The bowls also illustrate the great lengths to which people
would go to try and keep Lilith at bay. Rituals, incantations, amulets, edicts,
proclamations, prayers, fastings, and even the drawing up of legal documents, such as a
Jewish get or divorce document were actions taken against Lilith. Some Rabbis went so
far as to pronounce Lilith under ban or herem by their respective Jewish community.
One such inscription is translated as follows:
. . . because it is announced to you that Rabbi Joshua bar Perahia has sent
against you the ban. . . . A divorce-writ has come down to us from heaven
and there is found written in it your advisement and your terrification, in
the name of Palsa-Pelisa [“Divorcer and Divorced”], who renders to thee
thy divorce and thy separation, your divorces and your separations. Thou,
Lilith, male Lili and female Lilith, Hag and Snatcher, be in the ban . . . of
Joshua Bar Perahia.166
Raphael Patai explains in his essay on Lilith that it was believed that Lilith and her
entourage of demons would seek to attach themselves to their human hosts by means of
sexual seduction in order to produce more demonic offspring. If Lilith or one of her
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demons was successful in doing so, it was thought that they then acquired all the rights of
cohabitation and must therefore be expelled by legal means.167 It seems that Lilith was
conceived of as more than a mere idea or a myth; she seems to have been understood as
something very much a part of concrete, embodied existence, something that, as an aspect
of reality, founded by means of its very existence an order and a system that created itself
in self-conscious opposition to and separation from this aspect of reality, this aspect of
the feminine represented by Lilith. If Lilith is desire incarnate in all its reason-defying
power and persuasion, then she was what gave rise to an order and system that
constituted itself in purposeful opposition to her as a means of protecting itself from her,
and that order and system would indeed, having found her and what she represented to be
evil, frightful, and immoral, deem itself good, righteous, and moral. This is reminiscent
of ideas found in both ecofeminism’s thought on self and other dualisms as well as
Nietzsche’s discussion of slave morality and what gives rise to it.
Lilith was possessed of the ability to inspire great lust and desire, as well as fear and
terror. Understanding Lilith as such speaks not only to the tremendous nature of her
purported powers but to the perceived extreme powerlessness of those who feared her.
As I will demonstrate in the next section, the mythology of Lilith, understood through the
lens of Agamben’s concepts, illustrates the way in which this particular aspect of the
feminine has existed in a perpetual state of exception that, having been established by the
masculine, founded the masculine as sovereign.
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V. 3. State of Exception
Agamben’s view is that the very foundation of political life as such is the
distinguishing of a life that may be killed. It is through its capacity to be killed that it is
politicized.168 In other words, it is by means of the drawing of this distinction that the
realm of the political comes into existence. Agamben writes, “What is decisive,
however, is that from the beginning this sacred life has an eminently political character
and exhibits an essential link with the terrain on which sovereign power is founded.”169 It
is from within that zone of indistinction that the juridical realm is established and
distinguished from the divine realm, but it is into that zone of indistinction that homo
sacer finds himself abandoned. Thus, homo sacer is a state of exception due to the rule’s
suspension of itself in regards to him, due to the withdrawal of protection by the
sovereign, due to being abandoned by the ruling power. Homo sacer cannot be sacrificed
nor murdered, but he may be killed. This is the founding of sovereign power for
Agamben. He writes:
At the two extreme limits of the order, the sovereign and homo sacer
present two symmetrical figures that have the same structure and are
correlative: the sovereign is the one with respect to whom all men are
potentially homines sacri, and homo sacer is the one with respect to whom
all men act as sovereigns. The sovereign and homo sacer are joined in the
figure of an action that, excepting itself from both human and divine law,
from both nomos and physis, nevertheless delimits what is, in a certain
sense, the first properly political space of the West distinct from both the
religious and the profane sphere, from both the natural order and the
regular juridical order.170
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This fascinating inverted proportionality that exists between the sovereign and homo
sacer illustrates the complete and total power of the one and the complete and total
powerlessness of the other. Moreover, as Agamben points out, it establishes a political
space that is unique in that it is neither the religious domain nor the natural domain, a
space where neither man’s nor God’s law applies. The person who is sent there is in
essence beyond any hope, mercy, help, redemption, or care; such a person is abandoned
and stripped of all personhood, left for dead. In terms of the application of these ideas to
the aspect of the feminine represented by Lilith, Lilith is the homo sacer.
Lilith is exiled, under ban, abandoned, cast out. It is in the very distinction that is
made between the aspect of the feminine represented by Lilith, the aspect of the feminine
that is represented by Eve, and the realm that is the masculine that there is established the
sovereign power that may then be understood as being embodied and carried out by
Adam as sovereign, as the representative of the masculine itself, which is, of course,
justified by appeal to the ultimate masculine who deemed it all so, God. God, it may be
argued, is the projection of sovereign masculine power onto a supposed transcendent
reality. Of course, this ties in very neatly with ecofeminism’s concern regarding the rise
of patriarchal religion and its rejection of immanent divinity in favor of a merely
transcendent divinity that was masculine. However, because there is a need for and the
necessity of woman, or the feminine, the realm of zoē is established and the aspect of the
feminine as represented by Eve is consigned thereto. Here we may also wish to call to
mind some of the value dualisms that seem applicable, especially rational/non-rational.
The rational or masculine is the sovereign power that is established by means of
delimiting an aspect of the feminine that is held to be non-rational, an aspect of the
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feminine that, in being designated as such, founds the very realm from which it is then
excluded but nonetheless included thereby. Lilith, in all her non-rationality, is wild
sexuality, untamed, like nature itself, unpredictable, and therefore threatening. The
aspect of the feminine represented by Lilith is, in its essence, and has been described as,
beyond comprehension or subordination to reason. Such is the very essence of the affects
of desire and lust. They defy reason, do not submit to it, and as such, they are attributed
to Lilith. This, it may be argued, is precisely why she is perceived as so dangerous.
If we look closely at the way in which Agamben distinguishes homo sacer from zoē,
we are more readily able to see the applicability of this to the distinction that is made
between the two aspects of the feminine represented by Lilith and Eve. Consider
Agamben’s words:
[Look at] the situation of the patria potestas at the limit of both the domus
and the city: if classical politics is born through the separation of these
two spheres, life that may be killed but not sacrificed is the hinge on
which each sphere is articulated and the threshold at which the two
spheres are joined in becoming indeterminate. Neither political bios nor
natural zoē, sacred life is the zone of indistinction in which zoē and bios
constitute each other in including and excluding each other.171
For Agamben, homo sacer is the hinge on which each of the two spheres are
articulated; it is the threshold at which the two spheres are joined. Likewise, the aspect
of the feminine that is represented by Lilith serves that same function. Lilith, like homo
sacer, is the hinge on which the two distinct spheres understood as represented by Adam
and Eve are articulated. Eve, like zoē, represents reproductive or biological life, the
realm of “nature,” the non-rational aspect of life of the species whose purpose and place
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is to be distinguished from and made subject to Adam, Adam being he who exemplifies
bios or life in the polis, the realm of “culture,” that is, rational life with a telos that is
more fitting to his superior nature and power, and Lilith provides the hinge on which each
of these two is articulated via the rule of sovereign power.
The analogy between homo sacer and Lilith in terms of their role as hinge is a very
fruitful one, I believe. Just as homo sacer is the hinge that joins domus and polis, nature
and state, divine and juridical, and animal and human, so is Lilith the hinge that joins
Adam and Eve, sacred and profane, good and evil, that which is made by and in the
image of God and that which is made from man. Lilith is the zone from which these
distinctions are possible and in which they are joined. It is by means of the very act
which designates the realm of the feminine that is represented by Lilith and makes of her
the state of exception that sovereign masculine power is founded and the other two
realms, that is, the tolerated because necessary feminine realm represented by Eve and
the masculine realm represented by Adam, are established, and the nature of their
political structure created.
Agamben reiterates the uniqueness of the zone where bare life/homo sacer exists, its
relationship to the two other realms, and its importance to his theory of politics and
sovereign power when he writes:
The time has come, therefore, to reread from the beginning the myth of the
foundation of the modern city from Hobbes to Rousseau. The state of
nature is, in truth, a state of exception, in which the city appears for an
instant tanquam dissoluta. The foundation is thus not an event achieved
once and for all but is continually operative in the civil state in the form of
the sovereign decision. What is more, the latter refers immediately to the
life of the citizens, which thus appears as the originary political element,
the Urphänomen of politics. Yet this life is not simply natural
reproductive life, the zoē of the Greeks, nor bios, a qualified form of life.
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It is, rather, the bare life of homo sacer and the wargus, a zone of
indistinction and continuous transition between man and beast, nature and
culture.172
If we carefully attend to the above in terms of its application to the analogy I am
making, we can see even more clearly the applicability and instructiveness of this
ecofeminist appropriation of Agamben’s ideas. We may think of the “myth of the
foundation of the modern city” as analogous to the myth of creation wherein the aspect of
the feminine understood as represented by Lilith is analogous to the state of nature. The
assumption of power by the masculine, as represented by Adam, is like the formation of
the state or modern city. This would be, of course, from a Hobbesian point of view, in
line with the dictates of reason and rationality. However, if we apply Agamben’s insight,
we can see that what is posited by Hobbes as a state of nature which he contends
precedes the coming into being of the state and is that from which the state sets us free, is
really itself a creation of the state and that founds the state’s sovereignty in that the state
makes of the state of nature a state of exception. This state of exception is something
integral to sovereign power itself. As Agamben explains, it is that which results when
sovereign power exercises its power by withdrawing or suspending itself. Likewise, the
aspect of the feminine represented by Lilith is not really that which precedes and from
which the zones of Adam and Eve help us escape, but rather, it is that which is created so
as to found the very realms designated by “Adam” and “Eve” and establish sovereign
power in doing so. Lilith, like the state of nature, is a construct that allows for the
foundation of a politics and the establishment of a sovereign power that maintains its
sovereignty by means of its very ability to suspend its rule in the state of exception,
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which is that realm of the feminine represented by and personified in the figure of Lilith.
The idea that Lilith is that which represents sexuality in its purest form, sexuality as that
which exists independently of the realm of reason, as a pure phenomenological
experience of an embodied being has been argued well by many, including Maurice
Merleau-Ponty.173 This unreasoned sexuality, this Lilith, does not subtract itself from the
rule, but rather finds itself abandoned by the rule, as represented by the sovereign
masculine. According to Agamben’s analysis, it is by the sovereign masculine’s
suspension of itself as reason and rule and its subsequent maintenance of this relation to
the aspect of the feminine represented by Lilith as that which is excluded that the
masculine’s sovereignty is founded and maintained.
Just as Agamben tells us that “The foundation is thus not an event achieved once and
for all but is continually operative in the civil state in the form of sovereign decision,” so
do we see the way in which the tensions generated in the positing of these three distinct
realms of Lilith, Adam, and Eve with Adam in the role of the civil state continually make
themselves felt in terms of the sovereign decision that perpetuates and reinforces these
distinctions, as evidenced not only by the contents of any number of the sources cited in
Section 2 of this chapter but by a host of contemporary realities that concern feminists
and ecofeminists alike, such as unequal pay for equal work for women, the pornography
industry, sex trafficking, prostitution, lack of maternity leave for most working mothers,
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continued denial of complete reproductive freedom for women, rape culture, slutshaming, domestic violence, and various other afflictions, some far more horrifying than
the ones faced by women in the more affluent countries. If it be conceded that erotic
perception, desire, lust, and sensual longing are inescapable human realities, then the
ways in which these three realms represented by Lilith, Adam, and Eve, once
distinguished as such, will interact will indeed be a continual and constant laying and
maintenance of this foundation.
Agamben tells us that the “sovereign decision” in the state always refers to the bare
life of the citizens, that is, in each sovereign decision there is either implicitly or
explicitly asserted the fact that each citizen is a potential homo sacer. In other words, in
each sovereign decision there is a threat. Likewise, there is in the operation of the
masculine, as represented by Adam in his sovereign power to make decisions, the
continually reestablished fact that each woman, as an instantiation of the feminine, is a
potential Lilith. Just as Agamben points out, this is the originary political element, and it
is neither zoē nor bios. It is bare life; it is the homo sacer. It is neither Eve nor Adam. It
is Lilith.
Agamben says that the wargus is also a homo sacer, In a true Heideggerian fashion,
Agamben excavates the term wargus to demonstrate how the wargus (vargr, werewolf,
wolf-man) was originally the bandit and the outlaw, one who had been banned, cast out,
exiled, and Agamben explains how such a person upon being banned was considered
dead and thus could be killed with impunity. Agamben thus sees the wargus as the
historical precursor to homo sacer. And I contend that Lilith shares much the same fate.
I also see in the wargus another way in which the ecofeminist critique rings true for, as
133

Agamben explains, the wargus, as wolf-man, is understood to be neither man nor beast
but something inbetween, and it is only from within this inbetween place that the relevant
conceptual distinctions may be made. Lilith, like homo sacer and the wargus, is
representative of “a zone of indistinction and continuous transition between man and
beast, nature and culture.”174
Agamben’s use of the concept of the ban in formulating his ideas lends itself to
appropriation for our purposes here, as well. Agamben, in explaining homo sacer as he
who is abandoned and in explicating the nature of that abandonment, writes:
The relation of abandonment is so ambiguous that nothing could be harder
than breaking from it. The ban is essentially the power of delivering
something over to itself, which is to say, the power of maintaining itself in
relation to something presupposed as nonrelational. What has been
banned is delivered over to its own separateness and, at the same time,
consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons it—at once excluded and
included, removed and at the same time captured. . . . The ban is the force
of simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties together the two poles of
the sovereign exception: bare life and power, homo sacer and the
sovereign. Because of this alone can the ban signify both the insignia of
sovereignty and expulsion from the community.175
Lilith, as the aspect of the feminine which represents sexuality in all its nonrationality, is abandoned to the (non)status of the nonrelational. However, a relation of
power is maintained with Lilith by the sovereign masculine in all its rationality, as
represented by Adam, by delivering Lilith over to her own separateness. Lilith is
consigned to the mercy of the one who abandons her. Like homo sacer and the
sovereign, the simultaneous attraction and repulsion ties together this aspect of the
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feminine represented by Lilith and the sovereign masculine as represented by Adam. Our
contemporary phenomenon of slut-shaming is a perfect example of “the ban” in action.
We will recall that in one of the Aramaic Incantation Bowl inscriptions there was the
issuing of the ban against Lilith. The ban, or herem as it is called in Hebrew, is an act
that clearly indicates the exercise of sovereign power, and, in its employment, there is
most assuredly the complete abandonment of the one against whom the ban is issued. To
proclaim something or someone to be under ban is to establish it as existing outside both
the juridical and the divine realms; it is to deem it as completely and utterly forsaken. In
the act of forsaking, however, there is the operation of the sovereign power. Thus, that
which is banned is nonetheless included under the rule of sovereign power by virtue of
being excluded from it. Agamben, in quoting from William Robertson Smith’s Lectures
on the Religion of the Semites, notes the relevance of this:
Another Hebrew usage that may be noted here is the ban (Heb. herem), by
which impious sinners, or enemies of the community and its god, were
devoted to utter destruction. The ban is a form of devotion to the deity,
and so the verb “to ban” is sometimes rendered “consecrate” (Micah 4:13)
or “devote” (Lev. 27;28ff.). But in the oldest Hebrew times it involved the
utter destruction, not only of the persons involved, but of their property.176
That aspect of the feminine which is represented by Lilith, sexuality itself, or that
power that incites lust and desire, that power to entice to sensual indulgence, and the
willingness to engage in such, is declared to be under ban, forsaken, abandoned, rendered
life incapable of being murdered yet not capable of being sacrificed but open to being
killed. Having designated it as such, the foundation is created upon which the respective
realms of Adam and Eve, or the sovereign masculine and the subjugated feminine, may

176

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, 76.

135

be distinguished, determined and developed. The carving out of the realm designated by
Lilith founds the sexually political, and the sovereign masculine power of Adam, as
representative of the masculine and of reason, is established thereby. We can see that if
Agamben is correct in his analysis, the positing of Lilith as an aspect of the feminine that
must be distinguished and consequently abandoned is the necessary condition upon
which the sovereignty of the masculine depends. For Agamben says, “The relation of the
ban has constituted the essential structure of sovereign power from the beginning.”177
The positing of the inferior other and the establishment of the superior self is
undoubtedly at work in the establishment of all systems of domination and all systems of
human intercourse that center on power and control. Contemporary discussions,
dialogues, and debates regarding the environment and environmental issues often are
hinged on a distinction between approaches that are said to be “ecocentric” or
“biocentric” and approaches that are said to be “anthropocentric.” If we take what we
have learned from an examination of Agamben’s ideas, in particular the need for that
which constitutes the hinge as that which allows for the distinction to be made and the
respective realms designated, perhaps we can hit upon a different conceptual
understanding such that some kind of reconciliation could be achieved between the idea
of human being as separate/unique/superior to nature and the idea of human being as
mere part of nature like any other. I believe that such a different conceptual
understanding may be found in an examination of some of the ideas of Nietzsche and
Heidegger through the lens of eco-phenomenology and ecofeminism. Additionally, in
returning to ideas of Nietzsche and Heidegger, we will have occasion to put to use the

177

Ibid., 111.

136

insights of Agamben in a further analysis of important concepts and their intersections
with ecofeminism.

Beyond the Binary

VI.1. Eco-phenomenology: Two Different Realisms
The central aim of the eco-phenomenology movement in environmental ethics is the
undoing of those metaphysical presuppositions that have brought us to our current state
of environmental devastation. In an examination of the lines of thought within ecophenomenology, Thomson uncovers two different approaches, approaches that result in
two different realisms, and thus two different ethical perfectionisms, and involve
distinctions and insights with great relevance to this project.
Returning to the insights Nietzsche provides us regarding humanity and its orientation
toward the earth (first discussed in IV.3), we can see there that Nietzsche was very
concerned with what he perceived as an emphasis on the “otherworld” that entailed a
demeaning of this world; the otherworld is superior, this world inferior. We can
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understand this binary way of thinking which Nietzsche criticizes as yet another example
of the self and other dualisms that concern ecofeminists; in this instance, the analogy
would be that the self (understood as transcendent in its true essence, a disembodied
“spirit”) is being identified with the otherworld, and it is this world, Nietzsche’s “earth,”
that is being identified as the other. This conceptualization in which self is identified
with the otherworld is relevant from an ecofeminist point of view in that the otherworld is
conceived of as a world of spirit, a world free of flesh, while this world is a world of flesh
and matter, and the desacralization of the flesh is one of ecofeminists’ concerns. We see
this idea at work in Nietzsche’s thought when he says, “Lead back to the earth the virtue
that flew away, as I do—back to the body, back to life, that it may give the earth a
meaning, a human meaning.”178

As I explained in IV.3, Nietzsche’s conviction was that

in the esteeming of the “otherworld,” there was a loss of esteem and proper reverence for
this world, for our very human, bodily existence itself. This is a dualism that clearly
devalues this world, our humanity, and our bodily existence. Moreover, a mindset in
which this world is conceived of as a machine and held to be inferior to an otherworld
would undoubtedly lead to the nihilism that Nietzsche saw as being the inevitable result.
Such a dualism or binary may reveal even more to us if we consider it in conjunction
with other relevant ideas such as Agamben’s analysis of sovereign power.
Agamben’s idea is that sovereign power is predicated upon an abandoned realm that
itself as state of exception serves as a hinge for the two created spheres in which
sovereign power rules. Agamben’s conceptualization can be understood as operative in
Nietzsche’s scenario. We can think of the abandoned realm or state of exception as being
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the very one to which Nietzsche calls for us to return, that is, Nietzsche’s “earth,” and the
two sovereign realms created by means of this state of exception are the otherworldly
realm and the mechanistic-scientific world of matter. We will later see how Agamben’s
analysis may be applied in a critique of Nietzsche’s own views and how that critique can
help elucidate further the superiority of Heidegger’s view.
While Nietzsche provides us with some extremely important insights into the
devaluation of this world that is entailed in the esteeming of an “otherworld,” when his
ideas are viewed through the lens of eco-phenomenology, he still falls short of offering us
an understanding that could lead to an amelioration of our contemporary ills. Heidegger,
however, may be understood as offering us something more promising. If we approach
the ideas of these two thinkers from the point of view of eco-phenomenology, we are able
to achieve a clearer understanding of their thinking and how it may be argued that
Heidegger’s thought does provide us a solution.
In his paper "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and
Environmental Philosophy," Thomson distinguishes between two competing approaches
within eco-phenomenology. He starts by setting forth what we could understand as
something like a “vision and mission statement” of eco-phenomenology: by undermining
the theory/practice distinction, mind/world dualism, and the division between facts and
values, eco-phenomenology seeks to dig up and replace those ethical and metaphysical
presuppositions that are the conceptual roots of our environmental crises.179
Recognizing that all eco-phenomenologists are ultimately committed to some form of
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ethical realism, Thomson discerns two different approaches within eco-phenomenology,
and he spells out what it is that sets the two approaches apart in terms of both the
attendant metaphysics and the consequences thereof, both practically and conceptually
understood. Thomson labels the two approaches as naturalistic ethical realism and
transcendental ethical realism. The means by which Thomson lays out these key
distinctions is primarily through the juxtaposing of the views of Heidegger and Nietzsche
regarding "earth." By carefully exploring the two philosophers' use and understanding of
the term, Thomson uncovers what can be seen as the very essence of the distinction
between the two competing ethical realisms at issue. As we will see, it is as if Nietzsche,
in his own critique, first pointed the way for us but yet fell short of forging the path due
to the limitations inherent in naturalistic ethical realism. It is in the thought of Heidegger
and the tools with which his thought provides us, in the form of what Thomson calls
transcendental ethical realism, that our path forward may actually be cleared. The two
types of ethical perfectionism that result from the different realisms, according to
Thomson, are eco-centric perfectionism and humanistic perfectionism. The two
perfectionisms will be dealt with further in the third section of this chapter.
The approach and methodology that is employed in arriving at both ethical realisms,
naturalistic and transcendental, is phenomenology. As mentioned earlier, it is understood
by eco-phenomenologists that this approach can uproot the problematic concepts
underlying our current environmental crises. How will this occur? By means of which
ethical and metaphysical principles? Thomson writes:
The 'metaphysical' principle holds that phenomenological approaches
reunite mind with world, or, more precisely, that phenomenology's
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descriptive approaches begin from - and so return us to - the experience of
a pre-differentiated mind-world unity.180
The ethical principle is connected to the metaphysical principle in that it is because the
mind/world dualism is overcome that we are able to see our environmental “values” as
already existent in the world. As Thomson puts it, “certain pro-environmental values are
‘always already in the world,’” and this grounds our approach to discovering these values
and acknowledging them as the basis for a new environmental ethics.181 In other words,
it is in our unreflective awareness of the world around us, an awareness that is itself
indicative of the intimate connection between the human being and the world, that the
inherent values of this unity are encountered (and all the more readily when we are
properly attuned to our environment and possessed of the appropriate comportment), and
it is in reflecting upon that unreflective awareness that those values are made able to be
articulated given that they are then understood to be that which they are, more than mere
facts.
According to Thomson, although “earth” is central to the thought of both Nietzsche
and Heidegger, it signifies something very different for each of the thinkers. In the quote
from Nietzsche cited earlier in chapter IV where Nietzsche admonishes us to “remain
faithful to the earth,” we saw that Nietzsche called for a return to the earth, he called for
us to remain true to it, to serve its meaning, to keep our gift-giving love and knowledge
directed there. Again, for Nietzsche, the earth is to be understood in contrast to the
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“otherworldly” in that the earth is what is real and the otherworldly only a poisoning
illusion that robs us of our willingness and ability to make the most of what we have here
on earth. The ultimately unattainable goal of the otherworldy, to Nietzsche’s way of
thinking, serves to only cripple humanity further by causing the resentment that leads to
nihilism. Thus, Nietzsche beseeches us to “remain true to the earth,” as Thomson
explains, by “maintaining ourselves within the bounds of the knowable.”182
According to Thomson, it is this very notion of “maintaining ourselves within the
bounds of the knowable” that grounds the conceptualization of a Nietzschean ecophenomenological approach as one that results in a naturalistic ethical realism, for in
such an approach, “good” and “bad” are ultimately matters of fact, and values should be
grounded thereupon. This is quite different, Thomson explains, than a Heideggerian ecophenomenological approach which yields a transcendental ethical realism. Thomson
writes:
[Here] we can discover what really matters (hence ethical realism) when
we are appropriately open to the environment, but what we thereby
discover is neither a 'fact' nor a 'value' but rather a transcendental source of
meaning that cannot be reduced to facts, values, or entities of any kind
(hence transcendental ethical realism).183
Thus, unlike the Nietzschean approach, or any other approach for that matter in which the
discovery of the ethical is something grounded in facts, reason, or utility, etc.,

Iain Thomson, “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental
Philosophy,” 387.
182

183

Iain Thomson, "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental
Philosophy," 385.

142

transcendental ethical realism sets forth the idea that in order for the meaning to be
experienced there is the prerequisite and necessity for persons to be possessed of a proper
attunement or comportment toward their environment so that the experience of meaning
can occur. For example, if a person wants to know what should or should not be done
with a particular forest, the first step in answering such a question will be to determine if
said person is open to the forest in the requisite manner: Is said person able to sense the
possible meanings that are present within the forest? This notion of attunement to or
comportment toward environment is a centrally important idea. On the surface level, one
could explain what it means to be open to an environment by means of certain ideas that
are quite commonplace, such as paying attention, being present, not being distracted.
And while those phrases do indeed point us in the right direction, the concept of
attunement is best and more thoroughly explained in terms of Heidegger’s own ideas of
knowledge and tenderness as discussed in III.3. As explained there, for Heidegger,
knowledge and tenderness involve both the capacity for open receptivity and a kind of
meditative and reflective thinking that may be explained as a thinking that mirrors what
is, as well as a modality of being that is gratitude-laden and appreciative. One can
encourage or cultivate an enhanced or increased perceptual sensitivity that in turn allows
for the discovery of something in nature already present but heretofore unnoticed. Such
an idea is embraced by many thinkers, philosophers, and scientists, and across different
disciplines. One such thinker is Roger Walsh. Researching for over 30 years in areas
including neuroscience and the effects of meditation, Roger Walsh, M.D. and Professor
of Psychiatry, Philosophy, and Anthropology writes:
As human perceptual sensitivity increases beyond a certain threshold, we
penetrate beyond the realm of our ordinary experience of the world and its
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concomitant "reality" and obtain a fundamentally different view of nature.
This view may be obtained through any of the epistemological modes of
acquiring knowledge: sensory perception, intellectual conceptual analysis,
or contemplation. Heightened sensitivity may be obtained either through
direct training of awareness as in meditation or other consciousness
disciplines, through refinement of conceptual analysis, or by augmentation
and systematization of sensory perception through instrumentation and
experiment as in advanced science. But no matter how it is obtained,
enhancement of sufficient degree may reveal a different order of reality
from that to which we are accustomed.184
The idea that perceptual sensitivity may be increased and thereby reveal a different
order of reality is precisely what is involved in the notion of attunement and the modes of
being indicated in Heidegger’s knowledge and tenderness. In my own experience
teaching at Green Mountain College for the past six years, I have witnessed first-hand the
dramatic difference in perception that is possible from even the simplest of alterations in
behavior done with an aim toward heightening sensitivity. As part of every
environmental ethics class that I teach, regardless of fall or spring semester, I have my
students participate in what I call a “phenomenology walk.” This walk takes place on
Cerridwen Farm, a small working farm that is a part of this environmental liberal arts
college. I and the students walk through the farm, stopping at different locations, and
often walk along the back field which is bordered by the Poultney River. It is common
for some students to already be familiar with the farm, field, and river. Some even work
on the farm either as part of other coursework or as work-study students. Although we
do not read any material in the environmental ethics class that is straightforward
phenomenology, I take the time to briefly explain phenomenology at the point in the
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semester when we read material on ecocentrism, deep ecology, and ecofeminism. I
explain that phenomenology may most simply be understood as the practice of
approaching experience such that the aspect of the mind that is geared toward evaluation
and judgment is first recognized and then “bracketed” off to whatever extent possible so
that a fuller openness to simple experience with an aim to pure description thereof may
occur. Armed only with this most simple of understandings of phenomenology, we go
for our “phenomenology walk” on the farm, field, and river’s edge, purposely spending
time encountering the different animals there on the farm. Students are not allowed to
speak during this entire practice (for whatever reason, students seem to invariably obey
my instructions). Without fail, students report an incredible difference in their experience
of the animals, the trees, and the river, and they report dramatically increased perceptual
sensitivity to not only the animals they encounter but to the environment in general,
citing things such as noticing sounds and smells not noticed before, or the movement of
tree limbs or leaves, as well as noticing relationships among parts of nature that they had
not noticed before, such as how the sheep tend to gather at the bottom of the hill where
the grass is greener and thicker due to the creek that runs there. Some students have even
reported that in this exercise they felt they encountered certain animals as beings for the
very first time. “I have never experienced goats in that way before. I felt like they were
trying to communicate with us. That was amazing,” a student once said, after our class
had stood silently for several minutes watching a small herd of goats, various members of
which were insistently bleating at us in different ways with different pitches of voice.
Likewise, in a class I created and teach at the college called Body and Being, the
curriculum for which includes explicit study of phenomenology in addition to other
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philosophy as well as actual yoga, dance, and movement, I have students participate in a
couple of different “phenomenology exercises” that I created. The response from
students in terms of their experience and their awareness of alteration and enhancement
of their perceptual sensitivity is quite amazing. In one of the exercises, I first have
everyone engage in ten minutes of silent, slow, deep breathing so as to lower their heart
rates and calm their minds. I then have the students pair up, sitting cross-legged on the
floor, knees almost touching, facing one another. For the span of a 4-5 minute song that
is ambient and soothing, I ask them to maintain with one another silent and unbroken eye
contact. I explain to them that in the act of truly holding eye contact, the looker is gazing
directly into one eye of the face of the other person, and thus they should not be shifting
their gaze from eye to eye since that breaks the gaze. I tell them that after the exercise I
will want to hear from them about their experiences. In the course of doing this for
several years now with many different sets of students, I have found that some
fascinating occurrences are quite commonplace and others nearly universal. Not only do
the students report seeing and feeling things they have never seen or felt before and being
in a state of heightened perceptivity (many will even go on to reproduce the experience
with other people on campus outside of class, so struck are they by the profundity of the
experience), but certain interesting phenomena are reported time after time. Most will
report the desire or urge to laugh, giggle, and break the gaze. They describe the desire as
arising from feeling nervous and feeling uneasy at first (inevitably now and then someone
will giggle, but I’m always impressed with how many students fulfill the directive and
remain silent). The students report that in holding the gaze they begin to experience
surges of emotion, especially love and sadness. They report that, although they are
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looking straight into the eye of the other person, in their peripheral vision it will seem
that the other person’s face will begin to morph. The changes most commonly reported
as observed are that the person’s face shows different emotions such as fear, sorrow,
surprise, and joy and also that the person’s face will begin to age and then become young
again, over and over. Students inevitably report that in participating in the experience
they feel a bond with the other person even if the person is a stranger, as well as feeling
what they often refer to as a feeling of “universal love.” The other phenomenology
exercise I have them do involves the same setup but instead of eye contact they close
their eyes and take turns giving and then receiving touch from elbow to fingertips. Many
will invariably report how they never before realized how soothing simple soft touch can
be. Many will report that the exercise put them in awareness of their own mind, their
thinking, and that they are made aware of issues and blocks surrounding touch and
intimacy. Many will describe it as feeling good but struggling to just be present with the
sensation due to biases and judgments surrounding flesh to flesh contact. The insights
gained are many and quite powerful.
My own understanding of the various things taking place within these exercises is one
that involves Heidegger’s notions of knowledge and tenderness. The receptivity and
openness with which the students enter into the experience allows for them to have an
experience that they would not have otherwise. Their attunement, whether it be to their
environment, to animals, or to another person, opens up a dimension of perceptual
experience that reveals something that is indeed already there but that likely would have
otherwise been missed. They are able to mirror what is and to appreciate that reality.
These ideas, of course, are all in keeping with the earlier discussion of the meaning,
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importance, and powerful nature of eye contact in III.5. Ultimately, however, the most
relevant point to this is the fact that perceptual sensitivity can indeed be augmented,
human beings can indeed attune themselves so as to approach their environments and
their world in a more profoundly phenomenological manner and thus encounter “a
transcendental source of meaning that cannot be reduced to facts, values, or entities of
any kind.”185 For Heidegger, this transcendental source of meaning is “earth.”
Understanding the earth as the transcendental source of meaning is revealed when we
look at the way in which Heidegger understands “earth” as contrasted with Nietzsche's
understanding of “earth.” As discussed, Nietzsche’s definition of “earth” is developed
through the contrasts he articulates between “earth” and the “otherworld.” In those
expressions, he makes clear that the earth is that which may be known by means of the
five senses. For Nietzsche, in “remaining true to the earth,” we will be “maintaining
ourselves within the bounds of the knowable.”186 Heidegger’s own understanding of
“earth” is quite different from Nietzsche’s, and is articulated in contrast to his
understanding of “world.” Thomson explains that Heidegger’s understanding of “world”
is that it is “not the totality of physical objects, but rather the holistic nexus of
intelligibility organized by our identity-constituting life projects.”187 Understood in this
way, we can see how one’s world may change or collapse in myriad ways and a new
world emerge. One day a man is married to a particular woman and holds a particular
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job, and he has a particular understanding of his life and its purpose. The next day any
one or all of those things may change. His world may collapse. A new world and
understanding of self and purpose may emerge. The very possibility of a new world
emerging is due to the nature of earth, as Heidegger understands it. The way in which
Heidegger differentiates between “earth” and “world” allows for this transcendental
ground of inexhaustible meanings to be discovered. Thomson explains:
For Heidegger 'earth' refers to something cognitively unattainable, or
something that can never really be known . . . Earth, on his analysis, both
sustains this meaningful world and resists being interpretively exhausted
by it . . . 'Earth', in other words, is one of Heidegger's names for that which
gives rise to our worlds of meaning without ever being exhausted by them,
a dimension of intelligibility we experience primarily as it recedes from
our awareness, eluding our attempts finally to know it, to grasp and
express it fully in terms of some positive content. Heidegger contends,
nevertheless, that we can get a sense for the 'earth'…188
That which we are unable to ever fully grasp yet can undeniably get a sense for is that
which becomes available to us when we practice phenomenology with both knowledge
and tenderness. This “realm,” if you will, is precisely the realm missing from
Nietzsche’s view. Its absence, one may argue, is why the naturalistic ethical realism that
results therefrom is inadequate to the tasks at hand. I want to note here that if we apply
Agamben’s analysis to Nietzsche’s own ideas, we can see how Nietzsche’s binaries of
“earth” and “otherworld” may be understood to be founded upon the realm he excludes or
abandons, the realm that Heidegger embraces and calls “earth.” We will explore further
in the third section of this chapter the importance of this “hinge” in terms of moving
beyond the binary in a pursuit of true dwelling.
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A further aspect of transcendental ethical realism that is relevant to how meaning
arises in experience is explained by Thomson as the way in which Heidegger historicizes
Kant's discursivity thesis. The idea is that intelligibility is the result of a subconscious
process in which there is a spontaneous organization of input from a "sensibly
overwhelming world to which we are fundamentally receptive."189 Heidegger, as
Thomson explains, understands that the implicit organization that takes place, however, is
not achieved by means of historically-fixed categories as Kant would have it but rather by
means of a dynamic and changing historical understanding of being of entities, which is
itself established and stabilized by the reigning metaphysics of a given era or epoch. 190
This understanding of the dynamic and non-static nature of “categories” is central to
ecofeminist thought, as we will explore further in the next section. The notion of a
dynamic and changing historical understanding of beings is in keeping with the relevant
and important distinctions Heidegger makes between “earth” and “world” in that it is in
the nature of “earth” as source of inexhaustible meaning to allow for the emergence of
different “worlds.” “Earth,” as that which both overflows and exceeds and withdraws
and hides in darkness, makes possible the changing historical understanding of the being
of entities in that it makes possible the different and various eras and epochs themselves
by allowing for changes in the metaphysics that shape a given era or epoch as such.
Given these features of existence, we can see the importance of a perpetual and continual
attunement to being, along with a comportment of openness and appreciation toward
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those things by means of which being reveals itself, according to Heidegger, things such
as art, poetry, and myth, things that can assist us in our pursuit of true dwelling. For it is
the multi-layered and polysemic nature of myth that allows for its “adaptability” to
changing circumstance and thereby renders it able to retain its relevance throughout
different epochs in that it is, like Heidegger’s “earth,” a source of inexhaustible meaning.
These traits of myth, like nature, are revelatory of a-letheia and thus an important part of
what the pursuit of dwelling entails.
As we have seen, the trait of “earth” to remain always partially hidden, always
somewhat out of reach, is what constitutes the very essence of truth understood as aletheia. In exploring further Heidegger's understanding of “understanding” as something
conditioned by and occurring within time, we find something relevant he says in What Is
Called Thinking?:
Historical science may thoroughly explore a period, for instance, in every
possible respect, and yet never explore what history is. By way of history,
a man will never find out what history is . . . The essence of their sphere history, art, poetry, language, nature, man, God - remains inaccessible to
the sciences . . . The essence of the spheres I have named is the concern of
thinking.191
Each of the areas mentioned by Heidegger is conditioned by time and the reigning
metaphysics of the given epoch or era in which it is operative. Each is constrained in the
sense of being what it is by virtue of existing within a larger context and configuration of
realities and metaphysical presuppositions that are themselves subject to something
operative within something greater that is mutable, transitory, and in flux. As Thomson
explains, “Metaphysics, as ontotheology, temporarily secures the intelligible order both

191

Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, 33.

151

ontologically, from the inside-out, and theologically, the outside in (so to speak), thereby
supplying the most basic conceptual parameters and ultimate standards of legitimacy for
each of history’s successive epochs or constellations of intelligibility.”192 Thus, when
Heidegger says that a man will never find out what history is by way of history it is much
like saying that a fish will never find out what water is by way of water. Why? The fish
exists in the water. Only if there is access to a given thing from outside of the given thing
is it even possible to gain access to any greater understanding of the thing. This outside
may only be had via thinking. To suppose that one can be outside in this way is to
recognize the mutability of what may seem immutable from inside, it is to acknowledge
the essence of a-letheia as the concealed and unconcealed in flux. Such a vision of the
very nature of truth and understanding is indeed the one embraced by ecofeminist
thinkers such as Trish Glazebrook who seek to forego the model of truth as immutable,
objective, and universal in favor of a model of truth that is organic, dynamic, and natural.
The differences recognized in making the distinctions that Thomson does between the
two realisms and between Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s understanding of earth are
important differences crucial to various elements of this project, including the way in
which ecofeminist thinker Trish Glazebrook distinguishes between what she calls “ecologics” and “phallic logic.” To that we now turn.

VI.2. Phallic logic and Eco-logics
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Many of the insights gained from our discussions thus far coincide with ideas
articulated by Trish Glazebrook in her essay, "Gynocentric Eco-Logics." A number of
the points made by Glazebrook in the essay are specifically Heideggerian and ecofeminist
and thus are most apropos to this inquiry and help shed further light on matters central to
this project as a whole, such as the nature of truth and the limits of scientific objectivity
taken as paradigm of truth. Glazebrook sets forth her understanding of Heidegger on the
notion of truth and its applicability to understanding nature and hence environmental
issues when she writes:
For Heidegger, truth is never complete; rather unconcealment always has
concealment at its heart. Applied to the question of nature, Heidegger’s aletheia suggests any interpretation of nature cannot be exhaustive but
rather is a partial insight in which other possibilities for understanding are
precluded. Nature is never present to the thinker as a totalized whole but
is experienced in a play between concealment and revelation.193
Glazebrook provides as an example of this idea the practice of dissection. She explains
that while the informative scientific practice of dissection yields us knowledge of the
inner workings of the subject under study, the principle of life itself withdraws in the face
of dissection. She posits this as analogous to the way in which one cannot cut open a
stone in an attempt to understand why it is affected by gravity. She concurs with many
thinkers, including others referenced in this project such as Sartre, Kohak, Walsh, Gaard
and Gruen, that the truly astute thinker will always remain mindful of the limitations of
his or her approach and subsequent findings and remain open to other possibilities.194
I believe that in undertaking to understand some of Glazebrook’s most central ideas
and to link them up with insights we have gained thus far, we can see even more clearly
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both the issues that plague us and impede our dwelling as well as how a return to
dwelling may be accomplished and what such a return may look like. Some of
Glazebrook’s central contentions are captured when she states:
I suggest therefore that nature can be eco-logically understood as that
which always exceeds interpretation, that which is always more than the
account to which it is reduced. Accordingly, scientific and technological
interpretations of nature [resultant as they are from "phallic logic"] have
no epistemological privilege as the final word, as complete understanding,
as the "real" truth. They are truths, but not the only ones. Hence their
logic is not a tumor that needs to be cut out, but an excessive infestation
that needs to be cut back to make room for other logics, especially ecologics that promote wholeness and balance in this epoch of ecodestruction, that make the physical environment relevant to knowledge
claims by modeling themselves upon its diversity and inexhaustibility.195
Glazebrook's conception of nature as that "which always exceeds interpretation" is of
course in keeping with Heidegger's distinction between “earth” and “world,” and it does
entail those characteristics specific to Thomson's transcendental ethical realism.
Glazebrook’s main argument in the essay is that "phallic logic" is, as a disease of
modernity, a root cause of most current environmental crises. She sees the cure for this
not in the complete foregoing of phallic logic but in there being made a place for what
she is calling eco-logics. The way in which she construes eco-logics is via specific ideas
belonging to Heidegger. The term “phallic logic,” as she explains, is the logic of
modernity. The term “logic” is not being used in the sense of a discipline in which rules
are employed to manipulate abstract statements. “Logic” is being used as an
epistemological term, that is, a description of the way understanding is structured.
Glazebrook’s claim is that phallic logic is what undergirds and reinforces patriarchy.
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That is to say, patriarchy as the model of sovereign power makes appeal to objective truth
as that which founds its power. It is interesting to note here how we can apply
Agamben’s analysis and see that the binary realms of “subjective” and “objective” which
are operative in patriarchal thinking may well be analogous to Agamben’s “divine” and
“juridical” realms in that they are the two realms established by means of the exclusion or
abandonment of another realm, the abandonment of that realm being what founds
sovereign power in Agamben’s analysis. Agamben’s abandoned realm or “state of
exception,” in this case, is the phenomenological realm, the realm which precedes any
division between subject and object. This is the realm whose reclamation can indeed
bridge the fact/value divide and, as Thomson said, “undermine the theory/practice
distinction.”196
As Glazebrook explains, phallic logic takes scientific objectivity as its paradigm, thus
ultimately imposing upon all phenomena limitations and structures which themselves
obscure or otherwise distort our perception of reality such that truth itself is corrupted,
damaged, limited, or otherwise rendered incomplete. Glazebrook argues that it is due to
the exclusive use of this phallic logic that we are facing many of our current crises. She
makes very clear that the call for alternative “logics” comes from within the scientific
community as well as from without. Quoting various scientists, ecologists, geologists,
and others, Glazebrook makes the case that there is little doubt within the scientific
community that the objective model of modernity does not provide us with all that we
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need and require. In summing up the thoughts and ideas of these various scientists and
thinkers to which she makes appeal, Glazebrook says:
Science is therefore best practiced as phenomenological conversation . . .
environmental science uncovers natural processes in order that human
being can adjust to them and be at home in the world . . . Our knowledge
of the environment is not just rational but also involves responsive,
emotional engagement . . . [Many scientists are] arguing for ecologically
functional models to replace dispassionate objectification, for emotional
and spiritual connection to the earth, and for an epistemological validity to
knowledge that cannot be fully articulated according to the demands of
objectivity, they appeal to the limitations of knowledge and its
fragmentary situatedness.197
Glazebrook tells us that there is a call from within the sciences themselves to make room
for new approaches to understanding nature that take into account the limitations of
human knowledge, our continuously unfolding experience and observation of nature and
natural processes, as well as our intimate connectedness to nature as manifest in the
physical, emotional, and spiritual realms. All of this is in keeping with the ideas central
to this project spelled out thus far. There is the concept of truth understood as a-letheia,
that is, truth understood as being in its very essence beyond full and total apprehension by
finite human beings and manifesting itself in the continuous movements of
unconcealment and concealment. There is the monumentally important endeavor of
human dwelling, and the two kinds of thinking as well as the building that constitute it.
There is the recognition and understanding of the place and purpose of the human being
as mortal in relation to each of the other three parts of the fourfold. There is the centrally
important power and purpose of art and myth and their role in the realization of dwelling
as mortal in the fourfold. There are those mechanisms of power by means of which
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certain aspects of our lived reality are abandoned and exiled and thereby made the
grounds for the establishment of a sovereign power that excludes them and prevents our
attainment of real dwelling. All of these things, when viewed through the framework of
ecofeminism, provide us the means by which we may begin to think differently about our
current realities, long-standing modalities, and future possibilities.
The alternative approach Glazebrook sets forth and terms "eco-logics" is an approach,
as mentioned, grounded in certain explicitly Heideggerian theses. In explaining ecologics, she states, “I propose that such new eco-logics, that is ways of thinking about
nature, take their guidance from the physical environment. If nature informs knowledge
claims, then knowledge itself is construed organically: it is finite and changing rather
than fixed and eternal."198 Knowledge is alive, we might say. It will grow and alter and
change. All of that which can be known does not remain static, fixed, eternal, and
unchanging. Wisdom acknowledges this. As Glazebrook says, “The claim is not that
truth and falsity are irrelevant, but that they are insufficient.”199 Truth will reveal itself in
actions of concealment and unconcealment through nature and over time. In this way, we
can see clearly the conceptual link that Heidegger makes between a-letheia and physis.
Nature is the greatest teacher of truth and the nature of truth, we might say. Heidegger
emphasizes that if we attend to nature, we can learn about truth. Just as a given oak tree
unconceals and conceals different aspects of itself, all of which may be said to be “true”
over time and throughout the seasons, so does reality and being itself do the same. This
is precisely why truth and falsity are insufficient. They presuppose the nature of truth as
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fixed and static, and anyone engaged in a phenomenological encounter with reality would
not see this to be the case.
Just as the view articulated by Thomson, which he termed transcendental ethical
realism, recognizes and gives place to the realm that is constituted by “facts” while
maintaining that reality ultimately exceeds it, so, too, does the approach Glazebrook calls
"eco-logics" give place to the realm properly governed by phallic logic while maintaining
that reality ultimately exceeds what that realm can provide us. Glazebrook states,
"Rather than simply inverting phallic logic, they [eco-logics] instead orchestrate an
openness to and respect for differences that displace any logic of domination. Thus they
make a place for phallic logic, but resist its excessive claim to universality."200
In fleshing out her point of view, Glazebrook makes reference to early thinkers who
conceived themselves as operating under the paradigm of objectivity yet who were
clearly from our current understanding and point of view engaged in this phallic logic of
homogenization, conquest, and domination in the very ways explained in chapter four’s
discussion of ecofeminism. Francis Bacon's alignment of women with nature, his use of
the pronouns "she" and "her," and his description of his undertaking as one in which he
hopes to "conquer nature in action" is one such example.201 Glazebrook is very careful to
make clear that she is not in any way arguing for the abandonment of phallic logic, or for
throwing out Bacon's taxonomy or Newton's physics or any other such thing, nor is she
assuming that they are somehow useless or wrong; rather, she is simply arguing that their
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claim to exclusive access to truth is in error, that it is a dangerous scientism that eclipses
a broader and more encompassing understanding of the matters at issue.
In contrast to those thinkers whose claims to universality ultimately undermined their
quest for truth, Glazebrook highlights Goethe's practice of science and the way in which
it is now understood as a phenomenology of nature (quite influential on Hegel) that
refuses to leave the object behind. About Goethe's approach to understanding nature,
editor of the book Goethe's Way of Science: A Phenomenology of Nature, David Seamon,
writes:
Goethe's method teaches a mode of interaction between people and
environment that involves reciprocity, wonderment, and gratitude. He
wished us to encounter nature respectfully and to discover how all its
parts, including ourselves, belong. In this way, perhaps, we come to feel
more care for the natural world, which answers back with meaning.202
Seamon speaks of Goethe’s practice of science in a way such that we can see quite
plainly the ideas of eco-phenomenology, Heidegger’s knowledge and tenderness, and
Thomson’s idea of transcendental ethical realism. As discussed in chapter three, the
concepts of knowledge and tenderness have crucial importance for Heidegger in terms of
his understanding of what is required for proper dwelling. In a discussion of Heidegger’s
proposed alternative to representational thinking, Glazebrook explains:
The truth originally experienced by the pre-Socratics, the truth of modern
science, and the truth of technology are ways in which human being
knows nature. But Denken and Besinnung are thoughtful, respectful, and
thankful relations to nature, rather than its reduction to object and
resource. Heidegger’s vision is an ethic of reciprocity and care, the very
vision for which ecofeminists call, a vision that stands in marked contast
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to what has been diagnosed and rejected as a logic of domination by
both.203
Such an approach is the one attributed to Goethe by both Glazebrook and Seamon.
Goethe’s approach to nature seems to exemplify Heidegger’s ideas perfectly in that the
hallmarks of the approach are a continual receptive openness and an abiding care for that
which is being encountered and received. The nature of nature, as something which
exceeds any in-the-moment phenomenological experience thereof and is the means by
which our understanding of a-letheia is best understood, is respected as such by the
scientist who, like Goethe, conceives of the self as part of what is being encountered and
observed. This inclusion of the self as part of that which is under observation is made
apparent when Glazebrook writes:
The Goethean scientist is scrupulously self-critical not just in terms of
validity of conclusions reached, but in terms of method. She or he must
guard against the danger that hypothesis may hinder reconsideration of the
object under study, and instead be open to letting the natural phenomenon
continue to speak for itself.204
To allow the natural phenomenon to “continue to speak for itself” is to acknowledge the
dynamic and non-static nature of nature, it is to be open to a continuing concealing and
unconcealing, it is to practice descriptive phenomenology and so to distinguish meditative
thinking from calculative thinking and pursue the former both for its own sake and the
most proper application of the latter, and it is to be aware of and attuned to a
transcendental ethical realism and the humanistic perfectionism that results therefrom.

203

Trish Glazebrook, “Heidegger and Ecofeminism,”191.

204

Trish Glazebrook, "Gynocentric Eco-Logics," 83.

160

When we understand the binaries of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism that loom so large
in the environmental debates and discussions of our day in light of a different way of
thinking that reveals to us how these binaries obscure a third point of view, a point of
view that may be seen as an Agambean hinge upon which the two binaries of
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism hang, we are made able to see what has been hidden in
plain sight. This hinge is the descriptive phenomenological approach that yields us
transcendental ethical realism and its humanistic perfectionism. To these things we now
turn.

VI.3. The Hinge
Thinking is precisely the relation that is at stake in ecofeminism . . .
Human being has carved out for itself a special role among beings: no
other creature is capable of realizing such wide-scale manipulation of its
environment. Acknowledging how human being, though itself part of
nature, has singled itself out as steward is the first step in re-establishing
that role ethically rather than in the domineering destruction and
exploitation that are characteristic of the West. For if human being has a
privileged role in the knowing of nature, the Heideggerian account also
points out that this human role is made possible by something larger, the
very ground upon which human being stands.205
I believe that it is in the recognition of this “something larger” which itself makes
possible our unique and privileged human situation that we can escape the confines of
modernity’s dualism, move beyond the binary, and begin creating a new world in which
we may truly dwell. I believe that transcendental ethical realism is a way in which we
do recognize this “something larger.” For if we give ourselves over to thinking, to
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meditatively thinking about the very ground upon which we stand, we can see clearly that
a thinking relation to nature which is characterized by knowledge and tenderness grounds
us firmly and properly in our place in the fourfold. If space is made for the consideration
of all that can be understood by means of phallic logic, gynologic, all eco-logics, then we
will be that much more equipped to bring about the changes that are needed. From our
place as mortals in this nexus of the fourfold, consciously embraced, we are able to
perceive what is without a doubt present to us and we are able to respond to it as the truth
that it is, honoring both that which is unconcealed and that which is concealed, aware of
its flow and flux. Remaining fundamentally attuned to this continuous flux and change
both without and within, we are rendered ever increasingly able to modify and adjust so
as to flow more and more harmoniously with the unfolding of being. There should be
little doubt for all rational and well-informed beings that a fundamental shift in our
paradigm is what is required if we wish to make real changes. Patriarchy and patriarchal
religions, capitalism, the mechanistic model of the universe, and entrenched self and
other dualisms must all be transformed.
The vision I have articulated is, I believe, a vision of the future that makes possible the
survival and flourishing of those things held dear by humanity. The explorations and
excursions into the various areas of thought that have been part of this project have in no
way been without solid practical relevance to the true telos of the project, and every idea
and possibility discovered or imagined has served to flesh out and more fully articulate
the vision. As I attempted to show at different points, if we put on our Agamben glasses
and take a fresh look at some things, I believe we can see how important such a

162

perspective as his is in our attempt to move beyond the binary.206 Agamben’s idea is that
the very nature of sovereign power is that it establishes itself by means of excluding,
denying, abandoning, or otherwise exiling something. The something that gets excluded
Agamben terms the “state of exception.” He says that this state of exception is the hinge
on which the established sovereign realms thereby established connect. His examples
were the homo sacer and the wargus as state of exception. From these hinges hang the
established realms in which sovereign power operates, realms he distinguished as the
juridical realm and the divine realm. He showed how this same system was operative in
ancient history with the homo sacer and the realms of sovereign power being zoē and
bios. The uniqueness of the state of exception is that neither divine law nor juridical law
protect or otherwise acknowledge that which is the state of exception. I examined the
application of Agamben’s ideas to the mythological figure of Lilith in chapter five and
showed how we can appropriate Agamben’s ideas and gain a deeper understanding of
some important realities related to the experience of women, the concept of the feminine,
and more, all of these things being relevant to the ecofeminist critique and theory that is
in-forming this project. Thus, I believe that if we take this concept of Agamben’s and use
it as a structure for understanding, we can not only see things that may have eluded us
before but we may in fact find further means for our liberation from the restrictions of the
mindset of modernity.

In section VI.1. I attempted to show how Agamben’s analysis may be applied to Nietzsche’s ideas, i.e,
the mechanistic world and the otherworld conceived as the sovereign realms connected by Nietzsche’s
“earth” as the hinge or state of exception to which he called for us to return. I also attempted to show how
we could then use Agamben, from a Heideggerian standpoint, to see Nietzsche’s “earth” and his otherworld
as the sovereign realms whose connection is the hinge or state of exception abandoned by Nietzsche but
that constitutes Heidegger’s “earth.” And I attempted to show that the binaries of “subjective” and
“objective” may be seen as the sovereign realms that connect upon the hinge that is the abandoned
phenomenological realm.
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In my own experience researching and teaching environmental ethics, I have found
myself perpetually ambivalent and legitimately torn when it comes to the ideas of
thinkers who propose that ethics require us to forego our anthropocentrism. On the one
hand, I am always moved by the strength of their arguments regarding the way in which
human beings are indeed a part of nature. And there is no doubt, coming from an
ecofeminist point of view, that most of the tendencies which have followed from the
anthropocentric worldview as operative within a capitalist patriarchy have not in fact
been ethical and are not in fact conducive to the survival and flourishing of humanity in
general or our ecosystems. Most of the views and arguments of thinkers like Aldo
Leopold, Arne Naess, and Paul Taylor are virtually irrefutable in my estimation and no
doubt have an important place in discussions of what it would take to achieve true
dwelling. Yet, I have never felt fully convinced that ecocentrism was the full and proper
response. There seemed to me some kind of tension between the idea that we human
beings are the ones who have brought the world to its current crisis and the idea that it is
only in the complete abandonment of our own projects and interests that harmony may be
restored. Thus, when I consider ideas articulated by thinkers such as Heidegger,
Thomson, and Glazebrook, ideas that acknowledge the unique position human being
holds while acknowledging also that which holds us, and I consider all of this in light of
Agamben’s ideas, I find my own ambivalence finally answered in a way that had escaped
me until now. I see that what we can think of as the realms of “anthropocentrism” and
“ecocentrism” must hang on an Agambean hinge, and it is that hinge that is the realm
abandoned so as to establish those two, and I believe that in recovering it, we will be on
our way to real dwelling. I see this state of exception, this hinge, as the very space or
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place from and in which thinkers like Heidegger, Thomson, and Glazebrook are located.
I know of no one who has articulated a distinct name for this realm, the realm whose
exclusion founds the very designations with which we are most familiar,
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. Perhaps no one has even proposed that there is a
third realm, but some thinkers have noted that neither ecocentrism nor anthropocentrism,
commonly construed works. Thus, I shall deem this realm, this hinge, this way of
thinking, Daseincentrism.
The name doesn’t really matter that much to me, but the concept does. This is the
realm in which we would find phenomenology and transcendental ethical realism. If we
return to thinking about the idea of transcendental ethical realism, that is, the idea that
we are able to discover what truly matters when we are properly attuned to our
environment, we are able to see how on the one hand it is our being as Dasein, our being
as beings who are constituted by care and for whom being itself is an issue, that allows us
to experience being in the phenomenological ways that lead us to posit things as
mattering and how on the other hand it is also our being as Dasein that has so much more
than all those typical and stereotypical narrow and selfish human interests show up to us
as mattering.
Thomson, in the context of discussing transcendental ethical realism and
distinguishing it from naturalistic ethical realism, explains how the Nietzschean
metaphysics results in what we can understand as a mechanistic telos-lacking view of
being that is the filter through which reality is conceptualized. As he points out, ecophenomenologists who embrace a naturalistic ethical realism unwittingly reinscribe this
metaphysics into their environmentalism and we end up with ecocentric views that do not
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give place to human being or human interests and values as such and may in fact
advocate such things as “active population control,” and therefore court the charge of
“eco-fascism.” Thomson writes:
We late-moderns implicitly process intelligibility through the
ontotheological lenses inherited from Nietzsche’s metaphysics, which
ultimately understands the being of entities as eternally-recurring will-topower, that is, as forces coming-together and breaking-apart with no goal
other than their own unlimited self-augmentation.207
Such a metaphysics is one that mechanizes being and deprives it of any final causes.
Everything becomes mere resources to be optimized. As Glazebrook reminds us,
Heidegger’s own analysis of modern science revealed that once causation is reduced to
mere efficient cause and all notion of final causes is lost, nature becomes purposeless and
is rendered a mere means and instrument for human ends. Glazebrook notes:
Science determines nature as object, underwritten by human subjectivity,
and hence human being feels free to dominate and use nature in
technology. This Heideggerian tale about the modern ideological and
technological exploitation of nature is consistent with the deep ecologist's
diagnosis of anthropocentrism as causal rather than merely symptomatic
of contemporary environmental crises.208
The “anthropocentrism” that deep ecologists and others see as a causal part of our current
human and environmental crises is perhaps better and more deeply understood when we
look at the metaphysics operative therein, as I believe Thomson makes explicit. This is
Thomson’s point when he offers his critique of naturalistic ethical realism and what he
calls the ecocentric perfectionism that results, leaving behind, as it does, the place,
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purpose, and power of human beings, the very place of Dasein, in the all-too-human
desire to find solutions to our crises. What Thomson is able to show is that the very
metaphysics that gave rise to the kind of anthropocentrism that we see as causally
responsible for our current ills is the same metaphysics operative within the naturalistic
ethical realism of eco-phenomenology that, in turn, gives rise to the kind of ecocentric
perfectionism of the ecocentric views in question. Both Thomson and Glazebrook, in
good Heideggerian fashion, make clear that there are problems with ecocentrism from
both a theoretical and practical perspective, and they both endeavor to show that while
the answer is certainly not in a continuation of anthropocentric business-as-usual, it
cannot be in a complete foregoing of the aims and interests of human beings. On the
theoretical difficulties of ecocentrism, Glazebrook writes:
For in Heidegger's analysis, truth cannot occur without a thinker. Dasein's
encounter with beings calls for Dasein's presence. Yet the open region is
logically prior in the encounter to both Dasein and the beings it
understands. Under this account, truth is epochal . . . Human being is
always present in the account it gives of nature, for it is human being
giving the account.209
One of the theoretical difficulties for ecocentric views is the role and place of the human
being as the one holding or articulating the view. Glazebrook sees Heidegger’s ideas,
including the concept of Dasein, as capable of responding to the concerns of ecocentric
theorists without displacing human being. Thomson, in arguing for the Heideggerian
approach in eco-phenomenology and thus the transcendental ethical realism and its
consequent humanistic perfectionism, sheds light on both the theoretical and practical
when he says:
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Being and Time’s revolutionary conception of the self not as a thinking
substance, subject, ego, or consciousness, but as a Dasein (a ‘being-here’,
that is, a temporally-structured making-intelligible of the place in which I
happen to find myself) promises us a philosophically-defensible nonspeciesist way of making the ethically-crucial distinctions . . . missing
from the ecocentric views. Without such distinctions, these positions, we
have seen, tend to generate anti-human consequences that render their
widespread acceptance extremely unlikely, leading to a practical deadend.210
As Thomson points out, the practical difficulties seemingly inherent to ecocentric views
that deny human beings and their aims and values any special status in the overall
environmental scheme are ones that are not only detrimental to human beings but may
ultimately work against the environmental aims and goals of ecocentrism itself. It is one
thing to say that human beings are not superior to the rest of nature and should therefore
not be allowed to play the role of conqueror, but it is another thing altogether to say that
the lives of human beings, along with their hopes and desires, merit no special
recognition, for the reasoning and principles involved in the ecocentric views are often
held to lead directly to such “anti-human” consequences. Clearly, while there are those
who would and do embrace an ecocentric viewpoint that dismisses the notion that human
being is somehow more relevant than any other living thing or life itself and that the
things most distinctively human and meaningful to human being merit no special
consideration, there are important considerations and insights provided by Heidegger’s
philosophy that open up a different way of understanding things and help shed light upon
the mechanistic metaphysics at work in the ecocentric views that is arguably so close to
us that it is not noticed. If we consider that the relevant metaphysics of which we are
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speaking is precisely the way this particular binary is generated in the first place, this
binary that is the very presupposition that there are only the two approaches of
ecocentrism and anthropocentrism (typically understood), we are able to recognize that
this metaphysics needs to be supplanted by a much different view, the view I have called
Daseincentrism. The clearing created for us in our thinking by Heidegger’s own thinking
is the place from which we may begin our pursuit of true dwelling.
This view I am calling Daseincentrism, understood as an Agambean hinge, is the
realm that, in its exclusion, allowed for the making sovereign of the other two realms of
ecocentrism and anthropocentrism, realms between which discord and tension may carry
on unceasingly. An examination of the hinge that is the metaphysics I am calling
Daseincentrism yields us an alternative that is far more promising. I think the humanistic
ethical perfectionism articulated by Thomson joins with the ecofeminist views articulated
by Glazebrook to help yield a Heideggerian humanistic perfectionism that relies on the
phenomenological mode of being-in, being-with, and being-toward that is Dasein. Final
conclusions that may be drawn regarding the way in which we understand the
implications, both practical and otherwise, for the various insights gained thus far as well
as their implementation in an ethos and an ethic, the goal of which is the attainment of
real dwelling, I shall set forth in what follows.
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Dwelling in a New World
So, we have come round again near to where we started. A line from the movie
Swimming with Sharks comes to mind. Kevin Spacey’s character says, “And now try to
follow me, because I'm gonna be moving in a kind of circular motion, so if you pay
attention, there will be a point!” I hope you have been paying attention because there
have been many points. That’s the thing about a circle. The absence of angles,
depending on point of view, renders it either pointless or full of an infinite number of
potential points. I’ve tried to keep the points to a manageable number and allow their
mutually-reinforcing organization to draw them together. While my positive proposals
help resolve some of the problems I have critiqued, I suspect that were I or others to
continue to think on these things, given the very nature of some of the most central ideas,
further and possibly inexhaustible points do remain to be discovered.211 And while such
a prospect is indeed awe-inspiring, we now hopefully understand that it need only be
daunting and overwhelming if one is operating under a view that presupposes the realm
of thinking as a finite totality to be grasped in its entirety.
In the previous chapter, we saw how a Heideggerian application of phenomenology
could yield us what I called a Daseincentrism that itself may be understood as a third
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alternative to the traditional binaries of ecocentrism and anthropocentrism. In our
examination of this third alternative, as fleshed out in an exploration of the ideas of
Glazebrook and Thomson, we established even further the superiority of Heidegger’s
view in his embrace of truth as a-letheia and what such an embrace reveals. In
understanding the limitations imposed upon us by the metaphysics of modernity that
takes scientific objectivity as the paradigm of truth, we were able to see beyond those
limits and even more deeply understand the role and place of phenomenology in our
pursuit of truth and the recovery of real dwelling, as well as in our attempts to deal with
our current environmental crises.
Important concepts and distinctions were provided by Thomson in his spelling out his
ideas and making the important distinction between naturalistic ethical realism and
transcendental ethical realism and the ecocentric perfectionism and humanistic
perfectionism that result therefrom. We saw the ways in which a transcendental ethical
realism preserves the knowledge manifest as “facts” that is had by means of a naturalistic
ethical realism while opening up a space or clearing for perception, awareness, and value
that is excluded by naturalistic ethical realism and the mechanistic materialist
metaphysics that is inscribed therein. Additionally, we saw that the humanistic
perfectionism that follows from transcendental ethical realism has the ability to both
preserve the place and purpose of uniquely human interests, projects, and values while
also acknowledging and addressing the problems and issues that constitute the central
concerns of the ecocentric approaches, while avoiding the difficulties ecocentrism
necessarily entails, difficulties that, as we have seen, are both theoretical and practical.
We have seen that in thinking about the ideas of attunement and comportment toward
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being that are central to a Heideggerian phenomenology our understanding of
Heidegger’s meditative thinking is enhanced, and we are better able to grasp Heidegger’s
important distinction between it and what he calls calculative thinking. Having more
fully understood the limits of what Glazebrook calls “phallic logic,” we are able to
expand our thinking beyond the limits imposed thereby. Through conscious awareness of
the modes of being signified by Heidegger’s knowledge and tenderness and a purposeful
cultivation of such modes of being, we are able to think meditatively and move beyond
the binary that has been the legacy of modernity.
To move beyond the binary is indeed to embrace Heidegger’s understanding of truth
which does entail a rejection of phallic logic as the logic and a rejection of truth
understood merely in terms of “falsity.” To move beyond the binary is to go beyond the
self and other dualisms that make up so much of our modern conceptualizing. To move
beyond the binary is to embrace meditative thinking as that which is fundamentally
required for the attainment of real dwelling in that it is only by means of meditative
thinking that we can understand what in fact constitutes real dwelling, for only then are
we able to engage in proper and appropriate calculative thinking as the aspect of building
that it is, whether in the form of cultivation or construction, all of which, according to
Heidegger, is to be done for the sake of dwelling.212 These are the ideas at work in
Thomson and Glazebrook in their assertions that Heidegger’s approach does not exclude
facts or science or technology or phallic logic but rather, when understood, shows that
there is a way of being in, toward, and with the world that acknowledges and makes a
place for “earth,” that which is the inexhaustible source of meaning, of worlds, of truth,
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and of value, while still allowing a place for the knowledge had by those other means.
Such an approach recognizes truth as a-letheia and respects the reality of the concealed
and unconcealed. As I believe I have shown, this recognition and respect for truth as aletheia is crucial to any truly effective response to our current environmental and
existential crises. All of these things are necessary if we are to attain to real dwelling in a
new world.
Recognizing the reality of the concealed and unconcealed is to understand
Heidegger’s Law of Proximity and how it operates. In considering the ideas of Agamben
in conjunction with Heidegger, we can, it seems, “unconceal” some of what is perhaps
closest to us but has been “abandoned” and “exiled” and therefore rendered “concealed.”
Upon a proper examination, I believe that we can see how the abandonment and exile
allow for the founding of the two sovereign realms of virtually any given binary we may
wish to analyze. Applying Agamben’s analysis to the deeply entrenched constructs of
thinking that may be said to constitute the binary is a way to look for what is hidden, to
look for what is being concealed by the very approach (or epoch and its given
“categories”) that makes the initial reduction in its very act of abandoning and exiling.
To purposefully and consciously engage in such analyses would be to put into practice
our theoretical understanding of a-letheia in such a way that we may think of it as a form
of deconstruction that is simultaneously creative in its revealing of that which was
hidden. Utilized as a way to examine self and other dualisms, Agamben’s analysis, as I
am using it, promises an expansion of our understanding by looking for that which is
hidden, concealed, abandoned, and exiled and understanding it as that which serves as
“hinge” for the binaries or dualisms. But make no mistake. Such an endeavor will in no
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way allow us to achieve some totalized and complete understanding, as if truth were
something finite. The essence of truth, understood as a-letheia, remains. To suppose
otherwise would be to fall back into old metaphysics, that modern habit of thinking that
has been shown via the explorations of this project to ultimately yield only a partial and
limited understanding. Our embrace and pursuit of the “hinge” can help bring forth a
new world and set us on the path to real dwelling, but it will not reveal to us the earth.
Something Thomson says about Heidegger’s “earth” is apropos here. “Earth, in his
[Heidegger’s] analysis, both informs and sustains this meaningful world and also resists
being interpretively exhausted by it.”213 I stress again that I am in no way proposing that
Agamben’s analysis or its use somehow trumps or defeats the fundamental nature of
“earth” or a-letheia’s nature as concealment and unconcealment. Rather, I propose that
using Agamben’s analysis is a way to better understand our current world, “earth,” and aletheia, that is, it is a way to more fully and less destructively understand it, and that only
in doing so may we move toward real dwelling.
In thinking a bit more deeply about this intersection of thought between Heidegger
and Agamben and the crucial significance of the “hinge,” we should keep in mind that it
is in no way arbitrary or random that certain specific things are concealed while others
are unconcealed. As Heidegger’s understanding of understanding has it, what Thomson
referred to as the way in which “Heidegger historicizes Kant’s discursivity thesis,” that
which shows up for us as unconcealed has a specific relationship to that which does not
show up to us in its concealment in that the “categories” which are determining our ways
of conceptualizing, and thus determining what is unconcealed to us, are themselves
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determined by the dominant metaphysics of a given era or epoch. Thus, if we
successfully undertake to unconceal at least some of that which is presently concealed
from us by means of an Agambean analysis of that which is presently unconcealed to us
with an eye toward discovering the “hinge,” we are, at least in some sense, somehow a
part of a new era, epoch, paradigm, or world, or, at the very least, we are able to perceive
one as possible. If in looking out upon our present world we attempt to see what is right
there in front of us but somehow occulted, we may well discover that which has been
exiled or abandoned, and in uncovering the “hinge,” we may begin a process of
reclamation, and this reclamation may be precisely what is needed before we can resume
our proper place in the fourfold and commence real dwelling, for such a reclamation
would involve the explicit recognition of the polysemic nature of reality and a conscious
foregoing of the mindset of modernity that put upon us the yoke of monosemic exactitude
in all our undertakings of understanding.
In an edited collection of Heidegger’s essays, David Farrell Krell notes that when
Heidegger delivered his tripartite lecture “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Frankfurt in
1936, a reviewer for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung compared Heidegger’s lectures
to “an abandoned landscape.”214 I found this meaningful, for if we consider the era in
which Heidegger was working, thinking, and lecturing in light of ideas discussed in this
project, we can see how a great deal of what Heidegger was attempting to convey may
very well be understood as ideas and concepts that had been “abandoned” and “exiled”
by and in the founding of modernity. Hence Heidegger’s passionate engagement with
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ancient Greek thinking. I want to consider again now briefly a few of the Greek concepts
discussed earlier in the project.
Interestingly, our earlier discussions of Хάος may now be linked up with insights and
ideas gained from Agamben. Let us recall how in chapter two we looked at Drew
Hyland’s analysis of Хάος (as in Hesiod’s First of all came Хάος dictum), and the way in
which Hyland proposed that Хάος best be understood as “difference.” When considering
the idea of Хάος as the gap, yawn, or separation, Hyland said, “The between somehow
precedes the binaries which it distinguishes.” We see here the notion of the binary being
dependent upon some third. The between, as hinge, precedes the binaries which it makes
possible. As we saw in our earlier exploration, however, Hyland’s thinking and
reasoning, while good, had stopped too soon in declaring Хάος to mean difference.
Through an examination of John Bussanich’s arguments, which, as we saw, had been
somewhat misunderstood by Hyland, we came to see that Хάος was not best understood
as difference itself but as that which allows for the emergence of both difference and
sameness. Bussanich had said, “Since its function is cosmogonic, Хάος must be defined
as undimensional or principial space, an articulated nothing: it is the barest indication that
there is a qualitative something, from and in which cosmic differentiation occurs.”215
While there are no doubt ways in which the concept of Хάος differs from Agamben’s
hinge or state of exception, I find the similarities very striking and worth noting and
considering. As we saw in chapter five, Agamben sees realms in which power operates
as being made possible only by the abandonment or exiling of some other given realm.
His explanation of this involves the idea that it is only from this abandoned realm, what
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he calls the state of exception and refers to as “hinge,” that the realms of power thus
established may be delineated. Agamben’s examples are all binary, whether he is
speaking of the realms of divine and juridical law or making appeal to the more ancient
realms of zoē and bios in order to substantiate his theory. Agamben’s description of the
homo sacer as one who may be killed but not murdered exemplifies the way in which
homo sacer is neither part of the divine realm nor part of the juridical realm. Were he
part of the juridical realm, he could indeed be murdered. Were he part of the divine
realm, the same holds true. But, as Agamben explains, being the state of exception and
not part of either, he may be killed with impunity. The homo sacer, in essence, as such,
is nothing. But he may definitely be said to be an “articulated nothing,” an “articulated
nothing” from and in which differentiation occurs.
Agamben’s characterization of the state of exception as the “hinge” upon which the
two realms hang and from which they may be articulated understands the “hinge” as the
necessary condition for the delineation and articulation of the relevant binaries.
Agamben says, “Life that may be killed but not sacrificed is the hinge on which each
sphere is articulated and the threshold at which the two spheres are joined in becoming
indeterminate.” 216 The idea that the hinge is the threshold at which the two spheres are
joined in becoming indeterminate is profoundly similar to the way in which I explained
Bussanich’ rendering of Хάος in that both “sameness” and “difference” depend upon it,
that is, without it, one cannot distinguish them as such. Thus, Хάος understood in this
way as the gap, yawn, or separation functions much like Agamben’s hinge as he
describes it.
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To what end do I make these connections? Only to the end of further thinking. When
Heidegger says about Хάος, “Nothing that is real precedes this opening, but rather always
only enters into it,” we can perhaps be prompted to consider that an exploration of these
ideas and the ways in which they intersect may yield insights otherwise missed.217 For it
seems that in thinking about things in this way, as I explained in the last chapter, that is,
with an eye toward an Agambean analysis of binaries, we can look for what is concealed
and seek to understand it as that whose “abandonment” and “exile” make possible the
very delineation of the binaries. In thinking about Хάος in light of Agamben, I am
intrigued by the idea that what is signified by the term “Хάος” may be more than we have
even uncovered thus far given the operation of concealment and unconcealment coupled
with this notion of exile and abandonment. Likewise, if we think again about the Greek
term peras and the way Heidegger defines it as “that from which something begins its
essential unfolding,” (Anwesens ‘presencing’) we can see connections to Agamben’s
ideas.218 The simple consideration of these ideas appears to me as central to thinking, for
even a path of thinking that leads to no particular place is still a clearing, and in the
clearing a new world may emerge and real dwelling may commence.
In thinking about the clearing and how it may serve us in our pursuit of real dwelling,
something Glazebrook notes is helpful, “When Heidegger renamed the open region
which he associated with the truth “the clearing” he talked of it as a forest clearing into
which the light may come.”219 Each of us, hopefully, has had the phenomenological
experience of walking through dense woods and coming suddenly into a clearing. The
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brightness can be temporarily blinding, but there is no doubt that the clearing makes
possible things not possible outside of it, such as the possibility of real dwelling. It is in
the clearing that the event of being (Ereignis) takes place, where thinker and thing come
together making truth possible. There is for Heidegger a very definite way in which
Dasein’s way of being in the world, Dasein’s capacity for thinking, both meditatively and
calculatively can bring “dwelling to the fullness of its essence.” Heidegger tells us:
The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for
the essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell . . . But how
else can mortals answer this summons than by trying on their part, on their
own, to bring dwelling to the fullness of its essence? This they
accomplish when they build out of dwelling, and think for the sake of
dwelling.220
My own thinking is that it is in a synthesis of the ideas and concepts explored in this
project and applied thoughtfully and with gratitude and openness that a fundamental shift
may occur such that we may attain to the goal of real dwelling. Thus, I contend that the
embrace of a descriptive phenomenological approach whose metaphysics reflect the
infinitude of being as well as the central place of Dasein therein, such as the
transcendental ethical realism articulated by Thomson and its correlative humanistic
perfectionism, is the approach required in this venture. For it is only with a humanistic
perfectionism that the crucial place and purpose of human projects is recognized and
safeguarded as that which can promote real dwelling by helping us to better understand
our place in the fourfold by means of that phenomenological comportment toward
existence that is characterized by knowledge and tenderness. For, as I have shown, such
a comportment is the one that allows for the broadest and deepest understanding of
existence which makes possible the very experience of embodied participation in the
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fourfold by means of the enhanced perceptual sensitivity that is gained thereby and the
gratitude-laden openness to what those perceptions bring. To practice pursuit of this
humanistic perfectionism is to dwell poetically. Our ultimate collective human and
mortal ek-stasis is the poiesis that is real dwelling.
The concept of a humanistic perfectionism in itself presupposes human beings as a
central area of concern as both agents and end goals of the perfectionism, but it in no way
entails the reduction of all else to mere means for human ends and thus avoids the
problems inherent to anthropocentrism, regularly understood. I believe that a proper
understanding of Heidegger shows us that what it is to be perfectly human is to be in such
a way that value, values, are re-cognized, having their source in that which is inherently
beyond any complete and totalizing comprehension, they are emergent in the being-in,
the being-with, and the being-toward that is our existence. The being-toward is what is
represented in its optimum form as knowledge and tenderness in proper attunement and
comportment. This proper being-toward is that which opens up possibilities of
intelligibility through greater and enhanced perception and of reflecting upon that
unreflective awareness in a way that does in fact honor Heidegger’s idea that “higher than
actuality stands possibility.”221 Within such an understanding of a humanistic
perfectionism, truth, that “thing of indefinite approximation,” is infinite.222 To enact the
idea that the possible ranks higher than the merely actual is to forego limiting structures
which impede our ability to exist in a phenomenological openness to being. It is to
consciously allow ourselves that unreflective awareness that precedes reflection, leaving
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us free to experience without bias or prejudice, and thus rendering us able to exist in our
bodies, to dwell creatively in the fourfold in receptivity, wonder, and gratitude, open to
the full spectrum of affective dispositions that may emerge and express, open to the play
of those transcendental realities that we understand through myth as gods. Such a way of
existing is the one Heidegger attributes to the poet as discussed in chapter three; it is the
way of existing that I propose is possible to each of us to some degree or another via
ideas discussed regarding meditative thinking and knowledge and tenderness. It is a
poetic way of being, a sacred intersection of nature and human being. Heidegger says,
“Only because there are those who divine, are there those who belong to nature and
correspond to it. Those who co-respond to the wonderfully all-present, to the powerful,
divinely beautiful, are “the poets.” 223 When we remember how Heidegger’s esteem of
the poet is predicated on the poet’s being as such rather than on any poetic product
produced, as we saw in chapter three, we understand better the nature of poetic dwelling.
Poetic dwelling is the achievement at which all ideas in this project aim. It would be the
synthesis and fulfillment of the aims of ecofeminism as well as the humanistic
perfectionism of a transcendental ethical realism. It would understand and give place to
myth and art. It would set us to thinking in such a way that we could rightly be said to be
building out of dwelling and thinking for the sake of dwelling by restoring us to our place
in the fourfold of earth, sky, divinity, and mortal. Perhaps we are entering into, or at least
viewing on the horizon, a new era or epoch in which our understanding of being is
changed. Perhaps we have been or are in the midst of our encounter with what is foreign
to us, what has brought on our feeling of homelessness, but a god does wish to save us.
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“The historical spirit of the history of a humankind must first let what is foreign come
toward that humankind in its being unhomely so as to find, in an encounter with the
foreign, whatever is fitting for the return to the hearth. For history is nothing other than
such return to the hearth.”224
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